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Glossary
This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authors 
of the Report drawing on glossaries and other resources 
available on the websites of the following organizations, 
networks and projects: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Switzerland), Non-State Actor Zone for Climate 
Action (Germany), United Nations Environment (Kenya), 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Germany) and World Resources Institute (United States).
Adaptation: The process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to 
moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. 
In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects. 
Avoid Shift Improve: A framework proposed for mitigation 
from the transport sector. Avoid refers to the need to 
improve the efficiency of the transport system such as 
through integrated land-use planning. Shift involves 
servicing demand using low-carbon modes like using public 
transport instead of motorized private vehicles. Improve 
relies on vehicle efficiency improvement or alternative 
vehicle technologies to reduce emissions such as using a 
vehicle powered by alternative fuels.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change is 
measured. In the context of transformation pathways, the 
term ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that are based 
on the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures 
will be implemented beyond those that are already in force 
and/or are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline 
scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, 
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to 
highlight the level of emissions that would occur without 
further policy effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then 
compared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed 
to meet different goals for greenhouse gas emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The 
term ‘baseline scenario’ is used interchangeably with 
‘reference scenario’ and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of 
the literature the term is also synonymous with the term 
‘business as usual (BAU) scenario’, although the term ‘BAU’ 
has fallen out of favour because the idea of ‘business as 
usual’ in century-long socioeconomic projections is hard to 
fathom. 
Bottom-up model: In the context of this assessment, a model 
that represents a system by looking at its detailed underlying 
parts. Compared to so-called top-down models, which focus 
on economic interlinkages, bottom-up models of energy use 
and emissions can provide greater resolution with regards to 
sectors or mitigation technologies. 
Cancun Pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted 
their existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas emissions 
to the Climate Change Secretariat and these proposals 
were formally acknowledged under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Developed countries presented their plans in the shape of 
economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up to 
2020, while developing countries proposed ways to limit 
their growth of emissions in the shape of plans of action. 
Carbon dioxide budget (or carbon budget): For a given 
temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C long-
term limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects the 
total amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted for 
temperatures to stay below that limit. Stated differently, 
a carbon budget is the area under a carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits 
on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain level 
of global mean surface temperature rise. 
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): A way to place emissions 
of various radiative forcing agents on a common footing by 
accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for a given 
mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of 
CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when 
measured over a specified time period. For the purpose of 
this report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise 
specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases 
listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e 
assuming a 100-year global warming potential. 
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO2 released 
per unit of another variable such as gross domestic product, 
output energy use or transport. 
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Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO2 or CO2e 
emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax or the 
price of emission permits. In many models that are used to 
assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices are 
used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation 
policies. 
Carbon sequestration: The process of removing carbon from 
the atmosphere and depositing it in a reservoir. 
Carbon stock: The quantity of carbon contained in a carbon 
pool or reservoir. 
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. 
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately 
emitted as CO2, a carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax 
on CO2 emissions. 
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social 
welfare. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty 
and depend on, among others, local circumstances and 
implementation practices. Co-benefits are often referred to 
as ancillary benefits. 
Conditional INDC: INDC proposed by some countries that 
are contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as the 
ability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws, 
ambitious action from other countries, realisation of finance 
and technical support, or other factors. 
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of the 
Convention. It currently meets once a year to review the 
Convention’s progress. 
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on 
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected economic 
trends and current policy approaches including policies at 
least through 2012. Estimates may be based on either official 
data or independent analysis.
Double counting: In the context of this assessment, double 
counting refers to a situation in which the same emission 
reductions are counted towards meeting two countries’ 
pledges. 
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhouse gas 
emission levels consistent with having a likely chance (>66 
per cent) of limiting the mean global temperature rise to 
below 2°C/1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the 
GHG emission levels consistent with the global effect of the 
INDCs, assuming full implementation from 2020. 
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhouse gas 
emissions over time. 
Global warming potential: An index representing the 
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases 
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in 
absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. 
Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible for 
causing global warming and climatic change. The major 
greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) 
and nitrous oxide (N2O). Less prevalent, but very powerful, 
GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
Gross domestic product: The sum of gross value added, at 
purchasers’ prices, by all resident and non-resident producers 
in the economy, plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of products in a country or geographic 
region for a given period, normally one year. Gross domestic 
product is calculated without deducting for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. 
Integrated Assessment Models: Models that seek to 
combine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the form 
of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore complex 
environmental problems. As such, they describe the full 
chain of climate change, from production of greenhouse 
gases to atmospheric responses. This necessarily includes 
relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic and 
biophysical processes. 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): 
Submissions by Parties which identify actions each national 
government intends to take under the Paris Agreement. 
INDCs are, in effect, the basis of post-2020 global emission 
reduction commitments included in the Paris Agreement. 
International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs): Initiatives 
outside the UNFCCC aimed at reducing emissions of 
climate forcers by, for example, promoting actions that 
are less greenhouse gas intensive, compared to prevailing 
alternatives. Cooperative initiatives also involve national and 
sub-national partners (they are often referred to as, simply, 
‘cooperative initiatives’). 
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing on its 
own, and requiring separate ratification by governments, 
but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among other 
things, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by industrialized countries. 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A 
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions and 
removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct human-
induced land use, land use change and forestry activities. 
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 per cent chance. 
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities of 
meeting temperature limits. 
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a 
standard even though participants would be better off with 
an alternative. 
Medium chance: A likelihood of 50–66 per cent chance. 
Used in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits. 
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Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a human 
intervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more 
efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, 
switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the 
insulation of buildings and expanding forests and other ‘sinks’ 
to remove greater amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere. 
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/concept 
that potentially supports greater transparency in the climate 
change regime. 
Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an international treaty that 
was designed to reduce the production and consumption 
of ozone-depleting substances in order to reduce their 
abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the 
Earth’s ozone layer. 
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): By its decision 
1/CP.21, paragraph 22, the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
invited Parties to communicate their first NDC no later 
than when the Party submits its respective instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Paris 
Agreement. In the same paragraph, the COP further stated 
that if a Party has communicated an INDC prior to joining the 
Agreement, that Party shall be considered to have satisfied 
the provision of decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 22, unless that 
Party decides otherwise. 
Non-state actor: In the context of climate action, ‘non-state 
actor’ includes companies, cities, subnational regions and 
investors. More broadly, non-state actors have been defined 
as entities that participate or act in international relations. 
They are organizations with sufficient power to influence 
and cause a change even though they do not belong to any 
state institution. 
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO2e emissions that 
is reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate for 
emissions occurring elsewhere.
Party: A state (or regional economic integration organization 
such as the EU) that agrees to be bound by a treaty and for 
which the treaty has entered into force. 
Pledge case: This case identifies the maximum level of 
greenhouse gas emissions that each country or Party could 
emit in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering 
the use of offsets. 
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold based 
on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include an initial 
socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving 
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or 
other climate change-related variables.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse 
gas or aerosol into the atmosphere. 
Sustainable development: Development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
Tipping point: A level of change in system properties beyond 
which a system reorganizes, often abruptly, and does not 
return to the initial state even if the drivers of the change 
are abated. For the climate system, it refers to a critical 
threshold when global or regional climate changes from one 
stable state to another stable state. The tipping point event 
may be irreversible. 
Top-down model: A model that applies macroeconomic 
theory, econometric and/or optimization techniques 
to aggregate economic variables. Using historical data 
on consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-
down models assess demand and emissions for goods and 
services from main sectors, such as energy conversion, 
transportation, buildings, agriculture and industry. 
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that 
can result from a lack of information or from disagreement 
about what is known or even knowable. It may have many 
types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously 
defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of 
human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented 
by quantitative measures (for example a probability density 
function) or by qualitative statements (for example reflecting 
the judgement of a team of experts). 
Unconditional INDCs: INDCs proposed by countries without 
conditions attached. 
2020 pledge: See Cancun Pledge. 
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Acronyms
°C degrees Celsius
BAU            business as usual
CO2           carbon dioxide
CO2e         carbon dioxide equivalent
COP            Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
EJ exajoules
EU European Union
GHG       greenhouse gas
Gt          gigatonne
ICI           international cooperative initiative
INDC       Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IPCC        Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
km kilometre 
kt  kilotonne 
kWh  kilowatt hour
LULUCF  Land use, land-use change and forestry
m2  square metres
Mt million tonne 
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
OECD      Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDG          Sustainable Development Goal
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA/US United States of America
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Foreword
There is a troubling paradox at the heart of climate policy. 
On the one hand, nobody can doubt the historic success of 
the Paris Agreement. On the other hand, everybody willing 
to look can see the impact of our changing climate. People 
already face rising seas, expanding desertification and 
coastal erosion. They take little comfort from agreements 
to adopt mitigation measures and finance adaptation in the 
future. They need action today.
That is why the Emissions Gap Report tracks our progress in 
restricting global warming to 1.5 - 2 degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels by the end of this century. 
This year’s data shows that overall emissions are still rising, 
but more slowly, and in the case of carbon dioxide, hardly 
at all. The report foresees further reductions in the short 
term and increased ambition in the medium term. Make no 
mistake; the Paris Agreement will slow climate change. The 
recent Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol will do 
the same. 
But not enough: not nearly enough and not fast enough. 
This report estimates we are actually on track for global 
warming of up to 3.4 degrees Celcius. Current commitments 
will reduce emissions by no more than a third of the levels 
required by 2030 to avert disaster. The Kigali Amendment 
will take off 0.5 degrees Celcius, although not until well after 
2030. Action on short-lived climate pollutants, such as black 
carbon, can take off a further 0.5 degrees Celcius. This means 
we need to find another one degree from somewhere to 
meet the stronger, and safer, target of 1.5 degrees Celcius 
warming.
So, we must take urgent action. If we don’t, we will mourn 
the loss of biodiversity and natural resources. We will regret 
the economic fallout. Most of all, we will grieve over the 
avoidable human tragedy; the growing numbers of climate 
refugees hit by hunger, poverty, illness and conflict will be a 
constant reminder of our failure to deliver. 
None of this will be the result of bad weather. It will be the 
result of bad choices by governments, private sector and 
individual citizens. Because there are choices. This report 
highlights plenty of them. For example, it shows how UN 
Environment can help governments to ensure that every 
dollar they invest and every regulation they introduce will 
help to increase the scale and speed with which those 
choices deliver results.
Even beyond government, the report shows many regions, 
cities and industrial sectors are choosing to target emissions 
reductions above those pledged by governments. Investors 
and bankers are choosing a more inclusive green economy. 
Authorities and legislators are choosing to improve energy 
efficiency, building codes and operating standards. While 
small scale businesses, farmers and families are choosing 
better production and consumption habits, like less waste 
and smarter travel. 
So, the choices are ours. The historic deals of last year are 
within reach, but we must redouble our effort. That’s why 
today, as the Paris Agreement legally enters into force, we 
sincerely hope this report will be a wakeup call to the world.
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The Emissions Gap Report 2016 
A UNEP Synthesis Report 
Executive summary
1. The strengthened long-term objectives 
of the Paris Agreement require even 
stronger actions than previously 
identified, calling for accelerated efforts 
pre-2020, as well as increasing the 
ambition of the Nationally Determined 
Contributions.
The Paris Agreement has very specific language about the 
long-term goals and how to get there, including: 
• A long-term goal of keeping the increase in global 
average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius 
(°C) above pre-industrial levels.
• An aim to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, as 
this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts 
of climate change.
• The need for global emissions to peak as soon as 
possible, followed by a rapid decline – recognising 
that this will take longer for developing countries.
Compared to the 2°C goal that was the reference point of 
earlier Emissions Gap Reports, these new objectives require 
stronger short-term action and deeper cuts in the medium 
and longer term, as the remaining carbon dioxide budget 
is now considerably lower. Against the background of the 
large emissions gap that was identified in previous reports, 
this further amplifies the need for ambitious early action 
that accelerates and strengthens the Nationally Determined 
Contributions of countries.
Enhanced pre-2020 and pre-2030 action will reduce the 
so-called transitional challenges associated with the 
necessary shift in emissions pathways, and: 
• Reduce the lock-in of carbon and energy intensive 
infrastructure in society and the energy system, 
encourage the rapid deployment of state of the 
art technologies, and spur near-term learning and 
development of technologies that will be essential in 
the long term.
• Reduce the overall costs and economic challenges 
during the transitional period, for example, in terms 
of upscaling energy investments.
• Reduce future dependence on unproven technologies, 
including negative emissions technologies, and 
increase the options to achieve stringent emission 
reductions.
• Reduce climate risks, for example, by reducing the 
pace of the global temperature increase. 
• Realise immediate co-benefits through enhanced 
early action on climate change mitigation, such 
as improved public health as a result of lower air 
pollution, improved energy security, and reduced 
crop yield losses.
Additional early action will be essential to keeping the door 
open to limit warming to below 1.5°C by 2100.
2. Record speed of entry into force of 
the Paris Agreement signals strong 
commitment to action
The adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change by 
195 countries and the global agreement on the Sustainable 
Development Goals, made 2015 a landmark year. The 
Paris Agreement is the first climate deal with universal 
contributions to mitigation action. With ratification having 
surpassed the agreed minimum of 55 countries, representing 
at least 55 per cent of global emissions, the Agreement will 
enter into force before the Conference of Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
Marrakesh (COP 22). This sends a strong signal that countries 
are committed to action.
The need for urgent action has been reinforced by the fact 
that 2015 was the hottest year since modern record keeping 
began. Although high temperatures were exacerbated by the 
effect of El Niño, it is notable that 10 of the warmest years on 
record have occurred since 2000, and the trend continues, 
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with the first six months of 2016 all being the warmest ever 
recorded. 
3. Focus of the 2016 Emissions Gap Report
The United Nations Environment (UNEP) Emissions Gap 
Report 2016 provides an authoritative assessment of the 
extent to which the current and planned national emissions 
reductions, as specified in the submitted Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions, will contribute towards the Paris 
Agreement goals. It does so by providing an estimate of the 
additional reductions – the Gap - required by 2030 to be on a 
least-cost path that is likely to ensure the global temperature 
goals.
The assessment focuses on the 2°C goal, as well as on the 
implications for limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C.
The key new features and results of the 2016 Report are:
• The assessment is based on Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions submitted by almost all 
countries in the world, and a large number of studies 
supporting robustness of the estimates.
• The key quantitative results stay within the ranges 
presented in the 2015 assessment. 
• The results underpin the urgency of immediate 
and strong action, and the need to build on the 
momentum of the entry into force of the Paris 
Agreement. Since the results are not likely to change 
in the next two years, enhanced action need not wait 
for the facilitative dialogue in 2018.
• The report identifies where solutions are available 
to deliver low-cost emission reductions at scale, 
including three major areas of action: contributions 
by non-state actors, energy efficiency acceleration, 
and synergies with achievement of the sustainable 
development goals.
The report has been prepared by an international team of 
leading scientists who assessed all available information, 
including those reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change in its fifth assessment report, as well as 
more recent scientific literature. The assessment production 
process has been transparent and participatory, and 
governments of the countries with specific mention in the 
report have been invited to comment on the assessment 
findings before finalisation.
4. Global greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to increase
Total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue 
to show a steady increase, reaching approximately 52.7 
gigatonnes carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO
2
e) in 2014. 
There have been small variations around this longer trend. 
Notably, the rate of global greenhouse gas emissions increase 
during the period 2000 to 2010 was faster (2.2 per cent per 
year) than during the period 1970 to 2000 (1.3 per cent per 
year), increasing in 2010 and 2011 (3.5 per cent per year) 
and then slowing in 2012 to 2013 (1.8 per cent per year).
 
Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel use and industry seem to stabilise
Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion, 
cement production and other industrial processes are the 
major source of total global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Currently, they account for about 68 per cent of total global 
greenhouse gas emissions, and were estimated to be 36.2 
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Figure ES1: Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel use and industry.
* Other OECD countries include Australia; Canada; Mexico; Republic of Korea and Turkey. 
** Other G20 countries include Argentina; Brazil; Indonesia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa and Turkey. 
*** Other big countries and areas include Egypt; Iran; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Nigeria; Taiwan, Province of China; Thailand and Ukraine.
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GtCO
2
 in 2015. Figure ES1 presents a detailed overview of 
the development in global carbon dioxide emissions from 
fossil fuel use and industry for the period 1970 to 2015. 
In 2015, global carbon dioxide emissions from these sources 
stagnated for the first time and showed signs of a weak 
decline. Prior to 2015, global carbon dioxide emissions 
increased by roughly 1.3 per cent per year for the period 
2012 to 2014, which was significantly slower than that of 
the 12 preceding years, where the average increase was 2.9 
per cent per year (2000-2011), but higher than the average 
growth rate of around 1 per cent per year during the 1990s. 
These findings are in line with other studies on trends in 
global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.
In summary, global greenhouse gas emissions continue to 
grow, and while the indications are encouraging that the 
growth rate of global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel use and industry is slowing, it is still too early to say 
whether this is likely to be permanent.
The continued growth of global emissions and the underlying 
trends show that the world is not yet on a trajectory that 
allows for a transition to stringent low emissions development 
pathways consistent with the stated temperature goals.
 
5. Collectively, members of the G20 are on a 
likely track to meet their Cancun Pledges 
for 2020, but these pledges do not deliver 
the necessary early emission reductions 
From a global perspective, early action is especially 
important for the major economies of the world; crucially 
these countries, as members of the G20, account for 
approximately three quarters of global emissions. Most 
of the G20 members at COP 16 in Cancun formalised the 
emission reduction pledges they had put forward as a 
follow up to the Copenhagen Accord. Since then, the annual 
Emissions Gap Reports have consistently assessed the 
progress countries are making towards delivering on these 
pledges, as they represent the main formalised early action 
commitment, and their timely achievement will send very 
positive signals to other countries. 
It should be noted that not all pledges demand the same 
level of effort. A country currently on track to achieve its 
pledge has not necessarily made a greater effort to mitigate 
emissions than a country not yet on track. The projections 
assessed are subject to the uncertainty associated with 
macroeconomic trends, such as changes in gross domestic 
product, and population trends, as well as the impact of each 
country’s climate policy action. The emission trajectories 
analysed here do not quantify the potential impact of using 
offsets to achieve pledges, which is considered to be quite 
limited.
The assessment shows that according to all available 
estimates three of the G20 members – China, the European 
Union, and India – are on track to meet their pledges without 
purchasing offsets. Three more – Brazil, Japan, and Russia – 
are on track according to most estimates.
According to both government and independent estimates, 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America are likely to 
require further action, possibly supplemented by purchased 
offsets, in order to meet their pledges. Mexico’s Cancun 
Pledge is conditional on the provision of adequate financial 
and technological support from developed countries as part 
of a global agreement, and the fulfilment of this condition 
has not been assessed.
Government and independent sources have found a gap 
between Australia’s projected 2020 emissions and its 
target level for that year. However, Australia’s latest official 
projections find that for the budget period, and including 
carry-over from its first commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the country is now on track to meet its Kyoto target.
According to independent analysis, the Republic of Korea will 
also require further action to meet its pledge. This cannot be 
verified using available official projections. The Republic of 
Korea has domestically abandoned its 2020 target, replacing 
it with the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
target in the amended Green Growth Act. However, its 
earlier pledge has not been officially withdrawn. 
Sufficient information is currently unavailable to determine 
whether Indonesia and South Africa are on track to meet their 
pledges. In the case of Indonesia, independent projections 
span a wide range, and official projections reflecting current 
policies are unavailable.
Finally, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not made 
greenhouse gas reduction pledges for 2020. All three 
countries submitted post-2020 pledges to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change as part of their 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions.
Overall, there is general progress on pledge achievement, 
but several countries will need to accelerate action to meet 
their Cancun Pledge by 2020. It must be underlined that, 
collectively, these pledges are not ambitious enough to 
have a better starting point in 2020 to meet the 2030 levels 
of global greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the 
longer-term goals of below 2 or 1.5°C. 
The urgency of enhancing pre-2020 mitigation action is, 
therefore, indisputable:
• It strengthens the likelihood that countries will meet 
and exceed their Cancun Pledges.
• It provides a more solid foundation for implementing 
the Nationally Determined Contributions from 2020, 
and for continuously strengthening their ambition. 
• It supports the transition towards a least-cost 
emissions reduction trajectory after 2020 that is 
consistent with the 2°C goal. 
• It is likely the last chance to keep the option of limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C in 2100 open, as all available 
scenarios consistent with the 1.5°C goal imply that 
global greenhouse gas emissions peak before 2020. 
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6. Pathways for staying well below 2 and 
1.5°C require deep emission reductions 
after, and preferably also before, 2020 
and lower levels of emissions in 2030 
than earlier assessed 2°C pathways.
The central aim of the Paris Agreement is to keep the global 
temperature increase by the end of the century to well below 
2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, with an ambition to 
limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C. While 
these global goals are quite clear, there is a need to interpret 
what they mean. For example, what if the global average 
temperature exceeds these goals during the century, but 
is below the goals by end of it? Similarly, it is necessary to 
define an acceptable probability for achieving the goals, 
which in the end is a political rather than scientific question, 
as it requires value judgments about what is acceptable 
and desirable to society. In line with the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s definition of “likely”, this report 
generally uses a 66 per cent or higher probability.
A large body of literature is available on least-cost pathways 
that limit warming to below 2°C with a 66 per cent or higher 
probability. This issue has been covered extensively by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and earlier 
Emissions Gap Reports. For a 1.5°C goal, the body of literature 
is much more sparse and there are no published scenarios 
that meet the 1.5°C limit permanently with more than 66 
per cent probability. Therefore, the studies assessed operate 
with a 50 per cent probability, which in Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change terminology is considered “about 
as likely as not”. The 2018 Special Report on the impacts 
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and 
related global greenhouse gas emission pathways by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will provide a 
more comprehensive picture as it will cover new studies. 
Table ES1 presents the pathway characteristics for achieving 
the two different temperature goals, showing the median 
acceptable emission levels for key years between 2020 and 
2100.
As in the earlier Emissions Gap Reports, it is important 
to highlight that most scenarios that are available in the 
literature, and that limit warming to below 2 or 1.5°C, 
assume the use of so-called negative emissions technologies 
in the second half of the century -- that is the active and 
permanent removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
This can be achieved, for example, through sustainable 
afforestation and reforestation, enhanced soil carbon 
absorption, biochar, and the combination of bio-energy with 
carbon capture and storage. Important challenges have been 
identified for large-scale application of negative emissions 
technologies. For example, with biomass there is a challenge 
to produce enough biomass without harming biodiversity 
and a potential for competition between energy and food 
production over land and water resources.
Table ES1: Overview of pathway characteristics for two global temperature targets. 
1.5°C (>50% in 2100) Pathways limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with >50% probability 
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 6; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 2
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:
Kyoto-GHGs: (2060-2080); total CO
2
 (including LULUCF): (2045-2050); CO
2
 from energy and industry: (2045-2055)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO
2
e/year]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 56 47 39 8 -5
range and spread** 53(-/-)56 46(-/-)48 37(-/-)40 4(-/-)14 -5(-/-)-3
CO
2
 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO
2
 emissions in GtCO
2
]
Time period 2015-2030 2030-2050 2050-2075 2075-2100 2015-2100
median* 552 236 -199 -353 217
range and spread** 503(-/-)567 178(-/-)259 -146(-/-)-277 -288(-/-)-372 71(-/-)383
2°C (>66% in 2100) Pathways limiting warming to below 2°C by 2100 with >66% probability 
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 10; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 4
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:
Kyoto-GHGs: 2085 (2080-2090); total CO
2
 (including LULUCF): 2070 (2060-2075); CO
2
 from energy and industry: 2070 (2060-2075)
Annual emissions of global total greenhouse gases [GtCO
2
e/year]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 52 48 42 23 -3
range and spread** 49(49/53)55 44(46/50)53 29(31/44)44 17(18/27)29 -11 (-9/-1)0
CO
2
 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO
2
 emissions in GtCO
2
]
Time period 2015-2030 2030-2050 2050-2075 2075-2100 2015-2100
median* 533 362 70 -288 553
range and spread** 481(499/582)572 242(258/431)447 -97(-52/175)187 -120(-146/-327)-342 483(490/934)988
* Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO
2
e/year 
** Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO
2
e/year. Format: minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value – no percentiles are provided if less than  
10 scenarios are available. 
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile); (minimum – maximum) if less than 10 scenarios are available.
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Some studies have examined options for hedging against 
a strong reliance on negative emissions in the long-term. 
These studies find that this is only possible by reducing 
emissions more steeply in the very near-term that is over the 
coming 5 to 15 years.
Table ES2: Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios.
Emissions estimates (GtCO
2
e/year) 
Scenario Global total emissions in 2025 Global total emissions in 2030 Number of scenarios in set
Baseline 61.0 (56.7-64.3) 64.7 (59.5-69.5) 179
Current policy trajectory 56.2 (54.8-59.4) 59.4 (57.9-63.1) 3
Unconditional INDCs 53.9 (50.6-56.3) 55.5 (51.9-57.5) 10
Conditional INDCsa 53.0 (49.3-54.9) 53.4 (49.5-54.7) 10 (6+4)
2°C pathwaysb (least-cost from 2020) 47,7 (46.2-50.2) 41.8 (30.6-43.5) 10
1.5°C pathwaysc (least-cost from 2020) 47.2 (45.8-48.2) 38.8 (37.7-40.0) 6
Figure 2.1  Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry
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Figure ES2: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030.
Sources: The 20th–80th-percentile ranges are shown for the baseline and the 
2°C and 1.5°C scenarios. For current-policy and INDC scenarios, the minimum–
maximum and 10th–90th-percentile range across all assessed studies are given, 
respectively.
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7. The emissions gap for 2030 is 12 to 14 
GtCO
2
e compared with 2°C scenarios, for 
1.5°C the gap is three  GtCO
2
e larger. Even 
if fully implemented, the unconditional 
Intended Nationally Determined Contri-
butions are only consistent with staying 
below an increase in temperature of 3.2°C 
by 2100 and 3.0°C, if conditional Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions are 
included. 
In the period up to COP 21 in Paris, United Nations 
Environment had, as part of the preparation of the Emissions 
Gap Report 2015, engaged a team of independent experts 
to assess the mitigation impacts of the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions. The results were presented as 
a key part of the Emissions Gap Report and covered the 
118 countries having submitted an Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution by 1 October 2015. This year, 
new international studies are available that include the 160 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted, 
representing 187 out of 195 Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The assessment 
is based on 10 different global level Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution studies that all provide analysis 
of the unconditional contributions and six that cover both 
conditional and unconditional pledges. The scenarios 
presented describe the following cases:
• The baseline scenario reflects emission projections 
that assume no additional climate policies have been 
put in place from 2005 onwards. 
• The current policy trajectory scenario reflects the 
best estimates of global emissions taking into account 
currently adopted and implemented policies. 
• The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
describe how global greenhouse gas emissions might 
evolve under full implementation of two Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution cases:
 °  Unconditional Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution case: assuming full implementation 
of unconditional Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions.
 °  Conditional Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution case: assuming full implementation 
of both unconditional and conditional Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions.
The 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios represent least-costs global 
scenarios consistent with a likely chance of limiting warming 
to below 2°C and 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels consistent 
with the estimates presented in table ES2.
Figure ES2 shows that full implementation of the 
unconditional Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions – using rounded numbers – will reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 by nine GtCO
2
e (range: 
7-13) relative to the median in the no-policy baseline 
scenario, and by four GtCO
2
e (range: 2-7) relative to the 
median in the current policy trajectory. Comparing the 
cost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios to the unconditional 
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Figure ES3: Comparison of projected emissions by 2030 and all-
time 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets. Cumulative global total carbon 
dioxide emissions for the conditional INDC case, the unconditional 
INDC case and the current policies scenario, and carbon budgets 
from the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC AR5) (IPCC, 2014a). The carbon budget 
ranges show the values based on the range of scenarios assessed 
by Working Group III (IPCC, 2014b). The solid horizontal line at 
1,000 GtCO
2
 shows the estimate based on complex Earth-System 
Models, assessed by Working Group I (IPCC, 2014a). 
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Intended Nationally Determined Contribution projections 
shows a gap in 2030 of 14 GtCO
2
e (range: 10-16) between the 
unconditional Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
scenario and the 2°C scenario. Comparing the unconditional 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution scenario with 
the 1.5°C scenario would further increase the gap by three 
GtCO
2
e, as shown in figure ES2.
If countries were to fully implement the conditional Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions, the estimated global 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 would be about 2.4 
GtCO
2
e (range: 1.2−4.8) lower in 2030 compared to the 
unconditional Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
scenario case. This leaves a gap in 2030 of 12 (range: 8–13) 
GtCO
2
e between the conditional Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution scenario and the cost-optimal 2°C 
scenario. When comparing with the 1.5°C scenario, the gap 
would increase by an additional three GtCO
2
e. 
Interestingly, a number of countries have Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution targets suggesting emission 
levels in 2030 above their estimated no-policy baseline or 
current policy scenario. These countries are, thus, assumed 
to overachieve on their Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution targets, and the different model teams treat 
this issue in different ways, which adds an uncertainty of 
* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025.
Figure ES4: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 economies, and G20 as a whole, by 2030 for the business 
as usual (BAU) emissions projection from the INDC submission (third bar), for the current policies scenario from official and national 
studies (fourth bar), from global model studies used for our analysis (fifth bar), for the unconditional INDC scenario (sixth bar), and for 
the conditional INDC scenario (seventh bar). The uncertainty ranges are explained in the main text. For reporting reasons, the emissions 
projections for China, EU, India and USA are shown in panel (a), and the other countries in panel (b), with different vertical axes. The 
Figure also shows the number of studies underlying the estimate (if available) for the last four bars: current policies (national studies), 
current policies (all studies) and the unconditional INDC and conditional INDC (all studies).
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2
e (range: 0-1) by 2030, to the estimated Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution and gap projections.
Compared to last year’s report, the estimates of the emission 
levels that would be realised under full implementation of 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions have not 
changed significantly. In summary, the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions represent a first start to initiate 
the required transition, but are far from being consistent 
with the agreed upon long-term temperature goals.
The full implementation of the unconditional Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions is consistent with 
staying below an increase in temperature of 3.2°C (median, 
range: 2.9–3.4°C) by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels 
with greater than 66 per cent probability. This is lower 
than current policies, which imply staying below warming 
of 3.6°C (median, range: 3.4–3.7°C) by 2100 with greater 
than 66 per cent probability. Full implementation of the 
conditional Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
would lower the temperature projections relative to 
the unconditional Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions by about 0.2°C.
Under the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
scenarios, the carbon dioxide budget estimated by the 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for limiting 
warming to below 2°C with at least 66 per cent probability 
will be close to depleted by 2030, and the similar budget 
aligned with limiting warming to below 1.5°C with at least 
50 per cent probability will already be well exceeded by 
2030. Figure ES3 shows the cumulative carbon dioxide 
emissions implied by the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution scenarios. 
8. Assessments of Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions from individual 
G20 members show ambition, but also 
reveal that for some countries current 
policies are estimated to deliver greater 
reductions than the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions. This 
indicates that there might be room for 
strengthening the ambition of Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions, 
noting that the analytical uncertainties 
are fairly large.
Reflecting on the dominant share of global emissions 
coming from the G20 members, this year’s Emissions Gap 
Report presents a more detailed assessment of the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions from this group of 
countries. 
The calculation of the G20 members’ median emission 
projections resulting from full implementation of the 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution is based on the 
same data as the 2015 Emissions Gap Report, complemented 
with: a) the data from two new studies, and b) the estimates 
for the three G20 economies, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey, that were not included in the previous report.
Results of this assessment are presented for all the individual 
countries and the European Union in figure ES4, noting that 
data is not available for all countries. 
The figure shows that for many countries the implementation 
of the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution would 
lead to lower emissions than the current policies scenario 
that is additional policies would have to be implemented to 
meet the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. It 
is interesting to note that for some countries the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution is above the current 
policies scenario, indicating that it should be possible to 
enhance ambition quite easily. However, additional research 
is necessary because for many countries the uncertainty 
ranges overlap, and the number of studies for the current 
policies and Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
cases vary significantly.
Figure ES4b
** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.
0
1
0.5
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Argentina Australia Brazil Canada Indonesia Japan Mexico Russia Saudi
Arabia
South
Africa**
Turkey
4
-   2  3  3 1  4  5  - -  3  6  - 1  4  6  - -  3  4  5 1  4  7  - -  3  4  4 1  3  6  - 1  3  3  - 1  5  -   4 -  3  6  - -  3  3  -
Emissions (GtCO2e/year)
Number of studies
1990
2010
National BAU reported in INDC
Current policies (national studies)
Current policies (all studies)
Unconditional INDC (all studies)
Conditional INDC (all studies)
Republic
of Korea
xx The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Executive summary
9. Non-state actor initiatives could likely 
reduce emissions in 2020 and 2030 with 
a few additional gigatonnes. It is difficult 
to assess the overlap with Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions 
as these are often not detailed enough. 
State and non-state actions can both 
overlap and mutually reinforce each 
other. 
Global climate governance has become substantially more 
diverse, with many actors other than national governments 
undertaking climate actions. Such actors include: the private 
sector, cities and regions and other subnational actors like 
citizen groups, referred to here as “non-state actors”. Their 
actions could be both individual (for example, a company 
or city taking on a particular target), as well as cooperative 
(for example, an international cooperative initiative for 
city action). In some instances, national governments also 
participate and sometimes even drive the action. Figure ES5 
shows the broad sector engagement of major cooperative 
mitigation initiatives. 
During COP 20 in 2014, the Non-state Actor Zone for 
Climate Action was launched – an online platform to 
showcase non-state climate actions, both by individual 
and cooperative entities. It currently contains more than 
11,000 commitments, mostly from individual actors. The 
Lima-Paris Action Agenda was also launched in 2014, by 
Peru, France, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Secretariat and the office of the United 
Nations Secretary General, and was given a prominent 
position during COP 21 to showcase the commitment of 
both state and non-state actors. These initiatives have now 
been integrated, for COP 22, as part of a new Global Climate 
Action Agenda to boost commitments and cooperative 
action between governments, cities, businesses, investors 
and citizens to cut emissions and help vulnerable nations 
adapt to climate impacts and build their own clean energy 
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Figure ES5: Overview of sectoral distribution of 203 mitigation-focused International Cooperative Initiatives.
and sustainable future. More emphasis is put on increasing 
transparency, tracking results and demonstrating credibility 
of non-state action.
Some open questions remain, for example how can the 
international process best formally recognise, support, and 
catalyse non-state action? Equally important will be how 
non-state action relates to national governments’ efforts 
to implement their Nationally Determined Contributions, 
and to the development of future Nationally Determined 
Contributions.
National action and Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions, on the one hand, and non-state actions, on 
the other, can reinforce each other and together create 
a virtuous cycle of increasing ambition. Many initiatives 
address issues like financing, technology deployment and 
capacity building that may have important indirect effects 
on emissions. They can go hand-in-hand with policies of 
national governments.
In relation to the emissions gap, the interest is focused on 
the potential and actual contribution of actions by non-state 
actors to enhance global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
A growing number of studies are available, estimating the 
potential contribution from actions by non-state actors to 
global efforts of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Figure 
ES6 illustrates the results from eight different studies. The 
data still has significant gaps concerning actual impacts, 
overlaps and relation with Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions; the figure is, therefore, only indicative of 
information about the potential of non-state action. The 
arrows showing the emission reductions potential start at 
different levels, because the individual studies use different 
baselines, and the last three studies explicitly estimate 
the impact additional to Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions.
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The data indicates that the aggregated impact of the 
initiatives are in the order of a few GtCO
2
e in 2030 beyond 
the current Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
that is potentially a significant contribution to closing the 
gap, if the initiatives reach their stated goals and if these 
reductions do not displace actions elsewhere. At the same 
time, many initiatives, in addition to their direct actions and 
contributions, provide political momentum and exercise 
pressure on governments to take further action.
10. Ambitious action on energy efficiency 
becomes more urgent given that the long-
term objective in the Paris Agreement 
is more stringent. Well-documented 
opportunities exist to strengthen national 
policies and deliver deeper reductions 
through more effective delivery of energy 
efficiency policies.
When examining the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions, it is evident that 167 countries have included 
energy efficiency as one of their priority action areas. It 
is also important to note that despite generally declining 
fossil energy prices, global investments in energy efficiency 
increased by six per cent to US$221 billion in 2015, indicating 
that action is already happening.
Energy efficiency has been included in earlier Emissions 
Gap Reports reflecting the significant potential for emission 
reductions. This year’s report presents policies that have 
proven to accelerate energy efficiency gains in three key 
sectors: buildings, industry and transport (see figure ES7). 
About 40 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions are 
generated from direct energy use in these three sectors, 
while an additional 25 per cent are related to the power 
generation providing electricity to these end users. 
If scaled-up, globally, the assessed energy efficiency policies 
can dramatically reduce energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions in these key sectors. Sector-specific estimates 
of emission reduction potentials are highly dependent on 
the underlying assumptions and approaches. Studies based 
on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change show that for a cost range of 
between US$20 and 100 per tonne of carbon dioxide, the 
estimates of both direct and indirect emissions reduction 
potentials in 2030 are (in GtCO
2
e): 5.9 for buildings, 4.1 for 
industry and 2.1 for transport. The study notes that these 
estimates are conservative and the real potential in each 
sector is likely bigger. 
A more recent analysis by the International Energy Agency 
indicates that the cumulative direct and indirect emissions 
estimates to 2035 are (in GtCO
2
e): 30 for buildings, 22 
for industry and 12 for transport. The two studies are not 
comparable due to basic differences in approaches, but, 
collectively, illustrate the significant potential in the three 
sectors.
Beyond mitigation, improved energy efficiency also offers 
many other benefits like reduced air pollution and local 
employment. Energy efficiency is an integral part of Sustainable 
Development Goal seven, which aims to ‘ensure access to 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’. 
The energy efficiency target is to double the global rate of 
improvement in energy efficiency by 2030, from 1.3 per cent 
per year to 2.6 per cent. The achievement of this goal will be 
important for achieving many of the other goals.
Figure ES6: Illustration of impact of initiatives by study.
Note: The arrows showing the emission reductions potential start at different levels because the individual studies use different baselines 
(the last three studies explicitly estimate the impact additional to INDCs).
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Many policy options exist in the three sectors; this 
assessment has focused on a small number of policies 
already implemented or under implementation in many 
countries where good results have been achieved.
Not all mitigation options can be associated with individual 
sectors, and it is important to consider the wider energy 
system as an integration between different elements. For 
example, design of housing efficiency needs to be closely 
integrated with the selection of heating and cooling 
techno logies and lighting.
While most emissions in cities originate from the building, 
industry and transport sectors, a sizeable share of these 
emissions could be avoided through city-level mitigation 
options, such as spatial planning, improving transit options, 
increasing and co-locating employment and residential 
densities, and increasing green spaces.
More sustainable lifestyles, behaviours, cultures and 
consumption patterns are equally important to consider 
when designing policies – for example, for transport, building 
and appliance efficiency. While traditional policymaking has 
focused on technological and economic solutions, changes 
in energy behaviour are increasingly recognised as a key 
focus area when aiming for transformative action.
11. The Paris Agreement defines the 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on 
climate change. Making the right choices 
in implementing all goals will be crucial to 
achieving the Paris Agreement objectives 
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 
2015, defines the international development agenda of the 
next 15 years. The 2030 Agenda expressly recognizes the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
as the authoritative body for defining the sustainable 
development goal thirteen on climate change, providing a 
direct link between the Paris Agreement and the goal on 
climate change. 
Climate action is not only a sustainable development goal 
in its own right; it also directly affects and is affected by 
efforts to achieve many of the other goals. In some cases, 
interactions between the different goals may be mutually 
reinforcing, or path-aligned, while in other cases they may 
be conflicting, or path-contingent. This means that strategic 
choices matter. Successful implementation of both the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Sustainable Development Goal agendas will, 
therefore, depend on the ability of national governments to 
develop and implement a set of national targets that serve 
both agendas, optimise benefits, exploit synergies, and 
reconcile trade-offs.
Among the key findings of analyses to date is that the 
earliest impacts of climate change may undermine our 
ability to deliver the goals by 2030, and that failure to 
deliver on the climate action goals will have even larger 
implications for maintaining development progress post-
2030. 
 
Exploring a complementary approach, the nature of the 
relationship between seven Sustainable Development 
Goals, selected based on their relevance for mitigation in key 
sectors, and the mitigation action required under the Paris 
Agreement is investigated. Table ES3 presents an overview 
of the findings. Of the four path-aligned goals, three 
directly relate to sustainability and ecosystems and would, 
therefore, be expected to align well with climate change 
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Figure ES7: Sectoral energy efficiency policies assessed.
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mitigation goals. Encouragingly, the report additionally finds 
that achieving universal access to energy is compatible 
with emission reduction targets, as this is associated with 
low energy demands and, in most cases, best achieved 
through expansion and reliance on low-carbon distributed 
technologies.
For the path-contingent goals, there is often general or 
even specific knowledge of how to overcome many of the 
challenges, as well as longstanding experience of particular 
policies and practices that can help to minimize trade-offs 
and maximize synergies between different interests.
While it is too early to provide an assessment of the 
quantitative emissions implications of pursuing the 
Sustainable Development Goals, and vice versa, emerging 
results from integrated assessment models provide 
insights into the available “solution space” that allows for 
simultaneous achievement of multiple goals and targets. 
An emphasis on measures that reduce energy and 
other consumption demands generally benefits overall 
development concerns by freeing up the solution space for 
other goals, for example, food security and infrastructure.
Table ES3: Overview of path-aligned and path-contingent Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) covered in the report.
Alignment SDG Topic
Path-aligned SDG7 Sustainable Energy Access
SDG11 Sustainable Cities
SDG12 Sustainable consumption and production
SDG15 Terrestrial Ecosystems
Path-contingent SDG2 Hunger and food security
SDG8 Growth and employment
SDG9 Infrastructure, industrialization, and innovation
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Introduction
Chapter 1
Together with the September 2015 unanimous adoption 
by United Nations member countries of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030, the 
Paris Agreement provides a new, strengthened framework 
for global climate change action. Moreover, the Agreement 
accentuates the urgency of action and the context of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication. 
The Paris Agreement builds on the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by countries 
in advance of COP 21 as requested in the Lima Call for 
Climate Action (UNFCCC, 2014). The 2015 Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2015) undertook a thorough assessment of 
the aggregate effect of the INDCs on global greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2025 and 2030, based on the INDCs submitted 
by 1 October 2015. It concluded that while the INDCs 
represent a real increase in ambition compared to global 
greenhouse gas emission levels resulting from a projection 
of current policies, the contributions are far from what is 
required for an emissions pathway consistent with staying 
below 2°C. More specifically, the 2015 Emissions Gap Report 
estimated that full implementation of both unconditional 
and conditional INDCs would imply an emissions gap of 12 
gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030 
between what the INDCs contribute and the least-cost 
emission level for a pathway to stay below 2°C. This estimate 
is in line with the findings of the synthesis report of the 
aggregate effects of the INDCs by the UNFCCC (2015b).
Recognising the need to bridge the significant gap between 
the ambition levels in the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) and the level of ambition required 
to meet the Paris Agreement goal of staying well below 2°C 
and pursuing a 1.5°C target, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement 
specifies that “Each Party shall communicate a nationally 
determined contribution every five years” (UNFCCC 2015a, p. 
23) and, furthermore, that “Each Party’s successive nationally 
determined contribution will represent a progression beyond 
the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution 
1.1 The Emissions Gap Reports
Since 2010, United Nations Environment (UNEP) has 
produced annual Emissions Gap Reports based on requests 
by countries for an independent scientific assessment of 
how actions and pledges by countries affect the global 
greenhouse gas emissions trend, and how this compares 
to emissions trajectories consistent with the long-term goal 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The difference has become known as the 
emissions gap. In addition to estimating the emissions gap, 
the reports focus on key options for achieving the emissions 
reductions necessary to bridge the gap, and provide an 
assessment of how these can be accelerated and scaled 
up. Countries have found these emissions gap assessments 
useful in informing the political process. This seventh 
Emissions Gap Report is based on requests by countries for 
an update that focuses on some of the key issues emerging 
with the adoption of the Paris Agreement and its specific 
long-term temperature goal.
1.2 The context of the 2016 Emissions Gap 
Report 
The adoption of the Paris Agreement – the first agreement 
on climate change with universal contributions on mitigation 
– at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP 21) to the UNFCCC has been called a landmark in 
international efforts to address climate change. The objective 
of the Paris Agreement of “holding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 22) 
translates directly into urgency of enhanced and immediate 
mitigation action. 
The Paris Agreement has been ratified with record speed and 
will enter into effect on 4 November 2016, 30 days after the 
threshold of more than 55 Parties, representing at least 55 
per cent of global emissions, ratified or otherwise joined the 
agreement. This threshold was achieved on 5 October 2016.
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)
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and reflect its highest possible ambition” (UNFCCC 2015a, 
p. 22). The Agreement also decides to convene a facilitative 
dialogue among Parties in 2018, “to take stock of the 
collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards 
the long-term goal…and to inform the preparation of 
nationally determined contributions” (UNFCCC 2015a, p. 4). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
invited to produce a special report by 2018 on the impacts 
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and 
related global greenhouse gas emission pathways. The 
facilitative dialogue and special report by the IPCC means 
that 2018 presents important opportunities to strengthen 
the nationally determined contributions and the global 
mitigation ambition by 2020.
Two recent events have provided additional momentum 
to the acceleration of global mitigation efforts. Under the 
auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, 
governments, with the support of industry, and civil society 
representatives have agreed in early October on a new 
global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction 
Scheme for International Aviation, which will begin with 
a pilot phase from 2021 through 2023, followed by a first 
phase from 2024 through 2026. A few weeks later, the 197 
governments meeting as parties to the Montreal Protocol 
reached an agreement on the so-called Kigali Amendment, 
under which developed countries will start to phase down 
the use of hydrofluorocarbons by 2019. Developing countries 
will follow with a freeze of consumption levels in 2024, with 
some countries freezing consumption in 2028. By the late 
2040s, all countries are expected to consume no more than 
15-20 per cent of their respective baselines.
Studies on the impact of these agreements on emissions and 
future temperature increase are still scarce. However, early 
indications are that the contributions will be significant; 
although with the stipulated timeframes for implementation 
the short-term impacts on the 2030 emissions gap will be 
limited. The two agreements do, however, send strong 
signals on the willingness to take political action.
1.3 Aim, key questions, and approach of the 
report
In line with previous reports, the objective of the 2016 
Emissions Gap Report is to provide an up-to-date scientific 
assessment of the global progress towards the emissions 
reductions required to be on track to meet the long-term goal 
of the UNFCCC. In particular, this year the report emphasizes 
the implications of the Paris Agreement’s strengthened goal 
of holding the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2°C, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for immediate 
and longer-term mitigation action (Chapters 2 and 3). 
In line with previous years, the report assesses actions in 
selected areas that can contribute to bridging the emissions 
gap, and how these can be accelerated and scaled up. 
Previous reports have covered a wide range of areas, 
including agriculture, forestry, and renewable energy. 
The areas selected this year are non-state action (Chapter 
4); energy efficiency (Chapter 5); and the nexus between 
the Sustainable Development Goals and climate change 
mitigation (Chapter 6). 
Non-state action and energy efficiency have been examined 
in earlier reports, but increased political focus on these 
options and availability of new studies that provide better 
understanding of their large emissions reduction potential, 
in combination, provides a strong rationale for revisiting 
these options.
The report asks four principal questions: 
1. What is the current status of pre-2020 mitigation 
action?
2. What is the gap between the estimated level of 
global emissions in 2030 if the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions are fully implemented, 
and the range consistent with the well below 2oC or 
1.5oC temperature goal?
3. What are the possible emissions reduction 
contributions of non-state action and increased 
energy efficiency, and how can action in these areas 
be accelerated to enhance the ambition of nationally 
determined contributions?  
4. What do we know about the nexus between the 
Sustainable Development Goals and mitigation, and 
areas of alignment and conflict between the two?
This year, the assessment is based on submissions of 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by almost all 
countries in the world, and more international studies now 
support the robustness of the Gap estimates. The conclusion 
is that the results remain within the ranges of the 2015 
assessment, and that countries should not wait for further 
evidence but start to act immediately.
As in previous years, the report adopts an assessment 
approach and has been prepared by a wide range of 
scientists from around the world. This year, 34 scientists 
from 18 institutions in 17 countries have contributed to the 
report.
United Nations Environment hopes that this seventh edition 
of the Emissions Gap Report will help inform discussions at 
COP 22 and support the enhanced and accelerated mitigation 
ambition required to meet the goal of the Paris Agreement.
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Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
The strengthened language of the Paris Agreement of 
holding the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels translates into a need for even stronger and 
more immediate mitigation action than previously assessed. 
This chapter looks into pre-2020 action, focusing on trends, 
progress and urgency. It provides an overview of the state of 
play of global emission trends and progress towards achieving 
the Cancun Pledges by G20 members as two key indicators of 
the level of pre-2020 action. Trends in current performance 
and progress are, furthermore, likely to influence the 
extent to which parties are positioned to implement their 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and transition 
to the stringent least-cost emissions reduction trajectories 
after 2020, required to reach the temperature target of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The chapter presents an update, based on the 
latest available scientific literature, on the following critical 
topics:
• Do emissions show signs of peaking? Section 2.2 
gives an overview of current trends in total global 
emissions of greenhouse gases, and of energy-related 
carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from fossil fuels and 
industry as a major driver of total greenhouse gas 
emissions.
• Are G20 members on track to meet their Cancun 
Pledges? Section 2.3 provides an update of the 
2015 assessment (UNEP, 2015), based on current 
policy portfolios of G20 members, and plausible 
assumptions regarding macroeconomic trends and 
offsets.
• What are the implications for urgency of action? 
Based on the two preceding sections, Section 2.4 
reiterates the urgency of immediately enhancing 
mitigation actions to facilitate a transition towards 
least-cost emission reduction trajectories after 2020 
that are aligned with 2°C and 1.5°C targets. 
2.2 Trends in current global emissions
Total global greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase. 
In 2014, they reached approximately 52.7 gigatonnes CO
2
e 
(GtCO
2
e) (range: 47.9-57.51) (UNEP, 2015).2 Over the past 
decades the trend in global greenhouse gas emissions has 
been one of steady increase with small variations around 
this longer-term trend. Notably, global greenhouse gas 
emissions increased at a faster rate (2.2 per cent per year) 
during the period 2000 to 2010 than they did during the 
period 1970 to 2000, where the growth rate was 1.3 per cent 
per year (IPCC, 2014b). Considering the period from 2010, 
the emissions growth slowed to 1.8 per cent on average in 
2012 to 2013, from a 3.5 per cent increase in 2010 and 2011 
(JRC/PBL, 2014). 
Global CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuels and industry3 are 
the major source of total global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Currently, they account for about 68 per cent of total global 
greenhouse gas emissions, and were estimated at a total 
of 36.2 GtCO
2
 for 2015 (range: 32.7-39.9) (Olivier et al., 
1 90 per cent confidence interval based on the uncertainty range assessed 
in The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Working Group III (IPCC, 2014b).
2 Data for this year is available from EDGAR and PRIMAP. Sources: JRC/PBL 
(2014), Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (2016).
3 It covers the CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement 
production and other processes, including flaring of waste gas during gas 
and oil production, cement clinker production and other limestone uses, 
feedstock and other non-energy uses of fuels, and several other small 
sources.
Lead authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) and 
Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute)
Contributing authors: Greet Janssens-Maenhout (Joint Research Centre, European Commission), Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and 
Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
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Figure 2.1: Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel use and industry (Olivier et al., forthcoming).
* Other OECD countries include Australia; Canada; Mexico; Republic of Korea and Turkey. 
** Other G20 countries include Argentina; Brazil; Indonesia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa and Turkey. 
*** Other big countries and areas include Egypt; Iran; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Nigeria; Taiwan, Province of China; Thailand and Ukraine.
2.3 Progress towards achieving the Cancun 
Pledges: an update focusing on G20 
members
As the Emissions Gap Report has done since 2013, this 
section provides an update on the progress towards 
achieving the Cancun Pledges, focusing on members of the 
G20.6 These economies, collectively, generate around three 
quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions.7 Although it is 
critical that all countries advance as far as possible towards 
achieving – and ideally exceeding – their Cancun Pledges this 
is particularly the case for the highest-emitting economies, 
given their large share of total global greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
2.3.1 Assessment of G20 members’ 2020 emissions 
under three cases 
To assess G20 members’ progress towards their Cancun 
Pledges, this section compares current emissions trajectories 
with those associated with the achievement of these parties’ 
pledges. Three cases are considered: a pledge case, based 
on official data; a current policy trajectory case, based on 
official data; and a current policy trajectory case, based 
on independent analysis. These three cases are further 
described in box 2.1, while the findings are presented in 
table 2.1. 
6 The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the United States of 
America (USA), and the European Union (EU). In our analysis, the EU including 
all its Member States (regardless of G20 status) is considered as a single Party, 
and EU Member States are not considered individually. In general, evaluating 
the pledges of other countries is limited by a lack of data.
7 In 2012, these parties accounted for 77 per cent of global emissions, excluding 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), and 75 per cent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, including LULUCF (CAIT WRI, 2015).
forthcoming).4 Given their share of total greenhouse gas 
emissions, it is relevant to look more closely at the trend 
in CO
2
  emissions from fossil fuels and industry. Figure 2.1 
shows the development in global CO
2
 emissions from fossil 
fuels and industry for the period 1970 to 2015.  
In 2015 global CO
2
 emissions stagnated for the first time and 
showed signs of a weak decline compared to 2014 (-0.1 per 
cent). This was preceded by a slowdown in the growth rate 
of CO
2
 emissions, from 2.0 per cent in 2013 to 1.1 per cent in 
2014 (Olivier et al., forthcoming). These findings are in line 
with the studies of the Global Carbon Project on trends in 
global energy-related CO
2
 emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2015; 
Jackson et al., 2016).5  
Global CO
2
 emissions increased by roughly 1.3 per cent 
annually for the period 2012 to 2014, a pace significantly 
slower than that of the 12 preceding years, where the 
average annual increase was 2.9 per cent (2000-2011), but 
higher than the average annual growth rate of around 1 per 
cent during the 1990s. 
In summary, global greenhouse gas emissions continue 
to grow, and while there is an encouraging indication of a 
halting of the growth rate of global CO
2
 emissions from fossil 
fuels and industry, it is still too early to say whether this is 
likely to be permanent.
4 These results are based on IEA (2016) statistics and preliminary estimates 
based on the latest BP statistics, including the recent revision of coal statistics 
in China.
5 The changes in the growth rate of global CO
2
 emissions in 2015 compared 
to 2014 comprise very different growth rates and show differences amongst 
top CO
2
 emitters. For example, growth rates in CO
2
 emissions decreased in 
China and the US in 2015, compared to 2014, whereas they increased in the 
EU and India in 2015, compared to 2014. Olivier et al. (forthcoming) provide 
additional insights into whether the changes in growth rate for the top 
emitters are of a structural, and therefore more permanent, nature or not.
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Box 2.1: Assumptions of the assessment of progress towards Cancun Pledges
For each G20 member, table 2.1 compares estimates for 2020 emissions under three cases:
1. Pledge case (official data): Identifies the maximum level of greenhouse gas emissions that each country or Party 
could emit in 2020 and still meet its pledge – without considering the use of offsets. If a pledge is presented as a 
range (Australia, Brazil, China, India), the less ambitious end of the range is adopted as the official pledge estimate. 
If a country has both a conditional and an unconditional pledge (Indonesia), only the unconditional pledge is used. If 
a country has only a conditional pledge (Mexico, South Africa), the conditional pledge is used. For countries whose 
pledges are framed relative to a baseline scenario, it is assumed that baselines are not adjusted in the future. For 
countries whose pledges are framed as greenhouse gas intensity targets, economic growth consistent with official 
projections is assumed.8 Where available, the 2020 emission level described by the country or Party as the pledge 
level is used; alternatively, these levels are calculated working from official base-year or baseline data. 
2. Current policy trajectory case (official data): Identifies official estimates of 2020 emissions, considering projected 
economic trends and current policy approaches, as identified by each modelling study cited in our analysis, including 
policies at least through 2012.
3. Current policy trajectory case (independent analysis): Similarly identifies estimates of 2020 emissions considering 
the best current estimates of projected economic trends and current policy approaches, but is based on independent 
analysis rather than official data. Figures are drawn from the Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2015) and den Elzen 
et al. (2015) for all countries, as well as other country-specific sources, where noted. Current policy trajectory 
(independent analysis) supplements the official sources described in point two by providing data that aims for 
consistency across countries and political independence.
Projections considering only a limited subset of sectors and gases, for example CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuels, are 
omitted, as they cannot be compared to projections and targets that include the full set of greenhouse gases  across 
the entire economy.
Source: UNEP (2015).
2.3.2. Summary of progress of G20 members9 
According to the assessment presented in table 2.1, six 
G20 members are on track to meet their Cancun Pledges 
according to the most available analyses. Four members 
are likely to require further action, to purchase offsets or 
use a combination of the two to meet their targets. For 
two 20 members there is currently insufficient information 
to assess whether they are on track to meet their  pledges,
8 For China, the gross domestic product is assumed to reach 61.6 trillion yuan 
in 2020, consistent with China’s National Communication (People’s Republic 
of China, 2012). For India, the gross domestic product is assumed to reach 
120.41 trillion rupees (2006–2007 rupee value) in 2020, consistent with the 
average of the scenarios presented in Planning Commission Government of 
India (2014).
9 This section builds on Section 2.3.2 of UNEP (2015). Updates are included 
where these are available.
illustrating that better data is necessary to adequately 
track progress in some countries. For another member, 
no conclusion is drawn due to differing interpretations 
of what would constitute pledge attainment. The three 
remaining G20 members have no Cancun Pledges. Further 
details are provided below. As highlighted in box 2.2, 
three important caveats should be kept in mind when 
assessing country progress towards the Cancun Pledges.
Box 2.2: Assessing progress towards achieving the Cancun Pledges: three caveats
1. Pledges do not necessarily demand the same level of effort to achieve. In other words, a country currently on track 
to achieve its pledge has not necessarily made a greater effort to mitigate emissions than a country not yet on track. 
2. Projections are subject to uncertainty associated with macroeconomic trends, such as changes in gross domestic 
product, and population trends, as well as the impact of each country’s climate policy action. 
3. The potential impact of using offsets to achieve pledges is not quantified for the emission trajectories considered. 
If offsets are traded internationally, and are counted towards the pledges of both buying and selling parties, the 
global impact of the pledges will be weakened. Most countries have not clarified their intentions concerning their 
use of offsets to meet their Cancun Pledges. G20 members, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, and the USA have 
explicitly not excluded the possibility; other members have not formally commented (CAIT WRI, 2015).
Source: UNEP (2015).
6 The Emissions Gap Report 2016 –Pre-2020 action: trends, progress and urgency
Table 2.1: Emissions in 2020 under Cancun pledge case and current policy trajectory cases for G20 members categorised alphabetically 
by status of progress in million tonnes CO
2
 equivalent (MtCO
2
e).10
Parties Cancun Pledge case
(based on official 
data)
Current policy 
trajectory
(based on 
official data)
Current policy trajectory
(based on independent 
estimates)11
Mitigation pledge and current policy trajectory details
G20 members assessed to be on track to meet their Cancun Pledges
Brazil 2,070a 
(Government of 
Brazil, 2010)
N/A 1,750-2,075a (CAT, 2014)12
1,470-1,520a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Baseline scenario pledge 
China* 14,500a
(People’s Republic of 
China, 2012)
N/A 12,200-12,600a (CAT, 2015)
12,535-13,420a (den Elzen 
et al., 2015)
Intensity pledge
Cancun Pledge case assumes 40% reduction in 
greenhouse gas intensity calculated based on the 2020 
gross domestic product cited in People’s Republic of 
China (2012). The CO
2
 projection is complemented for 
non-CO
2
 projections from CAT (2015).
European 
Union
4,500b
(EEA, 2014)
4,235b,c 
(EEA, 
forthcoming) 
4,115-4,375b (CAT, 2015)
4,105-4,370b (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Base year pledge
India* 3,815b 
(Planning Commission 
Government of India 
2011, 2014)
N/A 3,575-3,610b (CAT, 2015)
3,535-3,960a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Intensity pledge
Cancun Pledge case is calculated based on an assumed 
20% reduction in greenhouse gas intensity (Planning 
Commission Government of India, 2011), the 2020 
gross domestic product from Planning Commission 
Government of India (2014), and exclusion of the 
emissions from agriculture and land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) (Planning Commission 
Government of India, 2011). 
Japan 1,345b,c 
(Government of 
Japan, 2016)13
N/A 1,230-1,330b (CAT, 2015)
1,135-1,330b (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
1,350-1,400b (Kuramochi, 
2014)
Base year pledge
Russian 
Federation
2,515b 
(Government of 
Russia, 2014)
2,410b  
(Government of 
Russia, 2015)
2,415-2,455b (CAT, 2015)
2,295-2,375b (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Base year pledge
Cancun Pledge case reflects 25% reduction calculated 
based on national inventory data (Government of 
Russia, 2014).
G20 members likely to require further action or purchased offsets
Canada 620b,c 
(Government of 
Canada, 2016)
770b,c 
(Government of 
Canada, 2016)
745b (CAT, 2015)
720-760b (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Base year pledge
Mexico 670a 
(NCCS, 2013)
830a 
(Government of 
Mexico, 2012; 
NCCS, 2013)
785-800a (CAT, 2015)
770-810a (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
In the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC) (Government of Mexico, 2015), Mexico has 
updated its baseline14 to 792, and if the Cancun Pledge 
is calculated based on this baseline, it would be: 555a. 
Current Policy Trajectory (Official Data) is based on 
Government of Mexico (2012), adjusted per NCCS 
(2013).
Republic of 
Korea
550a
(Republic of Korea, 
2015) 
545a 
(Republic of Korea, 
2014)
N/A 745-755b (CAT, 2015)
585-620b (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
Cancun Pledge case of 550a is calculated from INDC 
(Republic of Korea, 2015) baseline of 783.
United 
States of 
America
5,345a,c 
(U.S. Department of 
State, 2015)
5,450-5,600a,c 
(U.S. 
Department of 
State, 2015)
6,360-6,600b (CAT, 2015)
5,445-6,170a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
5,340-5,610a,c (Belenky, 
2016)
5,225-5,815a,c (Larsen et 
al., 2016)
Base year pledge
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Parties Cancun pledge case
(based on official 
data)
Current policy 
trajectory
(based on 
official data)
Current policy trajectory
(based on independent 
estimates)11
Mitigation pledge and current policy trajectory details
G20 members for which no conclusion is drawn regarding Cancun Pledge alignment
Australia 520a,c 
(Department of 
Environment and 
Energy Australia, 
2016)
580a,c 
(Department 
of Environment 
Australia, 
2016)15
575b (CAT, 2015)
600a (Kuramochi et al., 
2016)
570 (Reputex, 2016)
Base year pledge
Indonesia 1,335a 
(BAPPENAS, 2015)
2,185a 
(Ministry of 
Environment 
Indonesia, 2010; 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forestry Indonesia, 
2015)
N/A 820b (CAT, 2015)
1,910-1,950a (den Elzen et 
al., 2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
Cancun Pledge case of 1,335a is calculated based on 
the baseline from BAPPENAS (2015).16
2,185a is calculated based on the baseline from the 
Ministry of Environment Indonesia (2010) and the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry Indonesia 
(2015).
South 
Africa
585a 
(Department of 
Environmental Affairs 
Republic of South 
Africa, 2011a, 2011b)
N/A 730b (CAT, 2015)
560-885b (PBL, 2015)
Baseline scenario pledge
G20 members with no Cancun Pledge
Argentina No pledge 465 (Ministry 
of the 
Environment 
and Sustainable 
Development 
Argentina, 
2015)
365-460b (CAT, 2015)
Saudi 
Arabia
No pledge N/A 840b (CAT, 2015)
Turkey No pledge 600a,c 
670b,c
(Republic of 
Turkey Ministry 
of Environment 
and 
Urbanisation, 
2016)
625b (CAT, 2015)
485-690b (den Elzen et al., 
2015)
Notes: 
aFigures including LULUCF
bFigures excluding LULUCF
cFigures based on global warming potentials from IPCC (2007)
*China and India have greenhouse gas intensity targets based on the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to gross domestic product. For consistency, we have converted 
these to absolute emission numbers based on the official documentation cited above, but a determination of whether each country has achieved its pledge should be 
based on intensity rather than absolute emissions.
Estimates are rounded to the nearest 5 MtCO
2
e.
10 Figures do not consider the possible purchase or sale of offsets. Figures including LULUCF indicated witha, excluding LULUCF indicated withb.
11 References to den Elzen et al. (2015) in this column represent PBL estimates based on the method of den Elzen et al. (2015). Some numbers presented here have 
been updated per latest estimates available from http://infographics.pbl.nl/indc/ [Accessed 19 October 2016].
12 The most recent Climate Action Tracker (November 2015) (CAT, 2015) analysis does not include LULUCF.
13  In the revised 2nd Biennial Report (Government of Japan, 2016), Japan revised its accounting approach on LULUCF, which is now accounted for not only the target 
year but also the base year
14  The INDC baseline is based on a new methodology with global warming potentials from IPCC (2014a); it is, therefore, not comparable to any other sources cited 
here. All other sources use global warming potentials from IPCC (1995); the NCCS (2013) also uses a previous methodology.
15 Due to conflicting information, Australia is placed under the category “G20 members for which no conclusion is drawn regarding Cancun Pledge alignment”.
16 The INDC baseline is based on a revised national inventory that shows significantly lower 2010 emissions than those shown in the National Communication and 
assumed by other studies cited here. See BAPPENAS (2015) for a comparison of 2010 emissions.
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2015; den Elzen et al., 2015).19 The Republic of Korea has 
domestically abandoned the 2020 target by replacing it with 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) 
target in the amended Green Growth Act (The Law National 
Information Center, 2016). As of August 2016, the country’s 
2020 mitigation target submitted to the UNFCCC has not 
been withdrawn. 
G20 members for which no conclusion is drawn 
regarding pledge attainment
Government and independent sources also find a gap 
between Australia’s projected 2020 emissions and its target 
level for that year. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, 
Australia uses a carbon budget approach that accounts for 
cumulative emissions over the period of 2013 to 2020 in 
order to assess progress against its target. Australia’s latest 
official projections (Department of Environment Australia, 
2016) find that for the budget period, including carry-over 
from its first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, 
Australia is now on track to meet its Kyoto target. 
Insufficient information is currently available to determine 
whether Indonesia and South Africa are on track to meet their 
pledges. In the case of Indonesia, independent projections 
span a wide range, and official projections reflecting current 
policies are unavailable. The Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry Indonesia (2015) identifies baseline 2020 emissions 
as 2.95 GtCO
2
e, and the abatement necessary to achieve the 
unilateral 26 per cent reduction target as 0.767 GtCO
2
e. It 
further identifies a suite of mitigation activities both under 
and outside of Perpres No. 61/2011. A subset of these 
activities has reported abatement of 46.38 MtCO
2
e (of which 
41.29 MtCO
2
e occurred under Perpres No. 61/2011) from 
2010-2012, or an average of 15.46 MtCO
2
e per year. The 
remainder of the activities, however, have not reported their 
emissions reductions, nor have future emissions reductions 
been forecast.
In the case of South Africa, independent estimates of 2020 
emissions vary widely, from well below the pledge level 
to well above it. Moreover, these projections exclude land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), whereas South 
Africa’s pledge includes LULUCF. Official projections are not 
available. South Africa’s pledge is conditional.
G20 members with no Cancun Pledge
Three G20 member states, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey, have not proposed greenhouse gas reduction pledges 
for 2020. However, all three countries have submitted 
post-2020 Pledges to the UNFCCC as part of their INDCs. In 
addition, Turkey has submitted a Biennial Report including 
its projected emissions for 2020 (Republic of Turkey Ministry 
of Environment and Urbanisation, 2016).
19 It has been reported that the 2020 target was abandoned domestically 
(Carbon Pulse, 2016), but to date there is no report that the Republic of Korea 
abandoned its pre-2020 Pledge made under the UNFCCC.
10111213141516
G20 members that are on track to meet their Cancun 
Pledges
Three of the G20 parties – China, the EU, and India – are 
on track to meet their pledges without purchasing offsets, 
according to all available analyses. Three more – Brazil, Japan, 
and Russia – are on track, according to most estimates.
China and India’s pledges are framed in terms of greenhouse 
gas intensity reductions from 2005 levels, and several 
sources indicate that both countries are currently on track to 
achieve them. Studies indicate that China, which pledged a 
reduction of 40-45 per cent in emissions intensity, is on track 
to achieve a reduction of at least 42 per cent (CAT, 2015; PBL, 
2015; Sha et al., 2015). India reports that it achieved a 12 
per cent reduction in emissions intensity from 2005 to 2010 
(Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change India, 
2015), while Garg et al. (2014) show a 17 per cent reduction 
from 2005 to 2012 (out of a pledged reduction of 20–25 per 
cent from 2005 to 2020). The CAT (2015) and PBL (2015) 
show India on track for intensity reductions of 36 per cent 
and 28 per cent by 2020, respectively.17   
Japan announced an adjustment to its pledge in November 
2013 from a 25 per cent reduction on 1990 levels to a 3.8 
per cent reduction on 2005 levels – similar to an increase of 
about 6 per cent on 1990 levels. There is no official 
current policy projections available, but CAT (2015) shows 
Japan on track to meet its revised pledge, whereas den Elzen 
et al. (2015) estimates a range in 2020 from slightly below 
to slightly above the pledge level. Japan’s actual trajectory, 
however, will depend significantly on the respective roles of 
nuclear power and coal-fired power to meet future needs.18 
G20 members that are likely to require further action or 
purchased offsets
Canada, Mexico, and the United States are likely to require 
further action and/or purchase offsets in order to meet 
their pledges, according to government and independent 
estimates. Mexico’s Cancun Pledge is conditional on the 
provision of adequate financial and technological support 
from developed countries as part of a global agreement 
(Government of Mexico, 2015).
According to independent analysis, the Republic of Korea 
will also require further action to meet its pledge, but 
this cannot be verified based on publicly available official 
projections. Independent estimates of 2020 emissions 
range from well below to well above the pledge level (CAT, 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Calculated for China based on an assumed gross domestic product growth 
rate of 8.5 per cent (PBL, 2015) and 7.0 per cent (CAT, 2015), and for India 
based on an assumed gross domestic product growth rate of 7.5 per cent 
(PBL, 2015) and 6.4 per cent (CAT, 2015).
18 A study commissioned by Japan’s Ministry of Environment (Ministry of 
Environment Japan, 2015) projected that by 2030, the share of renewable 
energy in the electricity sector could reach around 25-30 per cent in a 
‘medium deployment’ case and 30-35 per cent in a ‘high deployment’ case.
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To summarise, this section has examined the extent to which 
G20 members are proceeding towards the minimum level of 
their Cancun Pledges. The cumulative impact of the progress 
of G20 members towards achieving their Cancun Pledges 
is not calculated, as there is limited information on the 
CO
2
 emission projections for the current policies scenario. 
However, as Chapter 3 shows, 2020 emissions under current 
global policy trajectories – which take progress by the G20 
members into account – roughly align with those associated 
with implementation of the high end of the estimated 52–54 
GtCO
2
e emissions range of the Cancun Pledges (UNEP, 2014). 
2.4 Amplified urgency of enhanced pre-2020 
action 
The strengthened long-term objective of the Paris Agreement 
amplifies the urgency of enhancing early mitigation action. 
Enhanced early action facilitates a transition to the stringent, 
long-term emission reductions required to hold the increase 
in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, it is critical for pursuing the 1.5°C target (see 
also Section 3.2). 
The previous sections clearly demonstrate that although 
there are encouraging signs of mitigation action, the current 
level of action is very far from what is required to move 
towards alignment with the strengthened objective of the 
Paris Agreement. Total global greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to increase, and although the growth in global CO
2
 
emissions – a major contributor to total global greenhouse 
gas emissions – has shown encouraging signs of levelling 
out over the past two years, it is too soon to tell whether 
this is likely to be permanent. G20 member countries and 
states continue to make progress towards achieving their 
Cancun Pledges, but current trends indicate that, overall, 
the continuation of current levels of action is likely to result 
in total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 that are in 
line with the weakest Cancun Pledge scenario considered 
in previous Emissions Gap Reports (see for example UNEP 
(2013)).  
The urgency of enhancing pre-2020 mitigation action is, 
thus, indisputable:
• It bolsters the likelihood that countries meet and 
exceed their Cancun Pledges.
• It provides a more solid foundation for implementing 
the Nationally Determined Contributions and for 
continuously strengthening their ambition. 
• It supports the transition towards a least-cost 
emissions reduction trajectory after 2020 that is 
consistent with the well below 2°C target.
• It is likely the last chance to keep the option of limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C in 2100 open, as all available 
scenarios consistent with the 1.5°C target imply that 
global greenhouse gas emissions peak before 2020. 
In addition to these critical aspects of pre-2020 action, 
enhanced early action (both pre-2020 and pre-2030) is 
associated with a number of other important outcomes and 
a wide range of additional economic, technological, societal, 
and climate outcome benefits. For example, enhanced 
early action will reduce climate risks and impacts. It will, 
furthermore, enable the realisation of near-term co-benefits 
of climate change mitigation, including health-related 
benefits associated with lower air pollution; improved energy 
security; and reduced crop yield losses. These, and other 
benefits and trade-offs between immediate and delayed 
mitigation action, have been assessed in detail in previous 
Emissions Gap Reports (UNEP, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
Building on these, the most important implications of failing 
to respond to the increased urgency of early action include: 
• Delaying action implies that significantly higher 
rates of global emission reductions are required in 
the medium- and long-term to meet the well below 
2°C target. The order of magnitude of these rates is 
without historic precedent.
• Delaying action reduces the ‘solution space’ and 
options available to society to achieve stringent 
emission reductions.
• Delaying action will result in greater lock-in of 
carbon- and energy-intensive infrastructure in the 
energy system and society, as a whole. It will also be 
a disincentive for near-term learning and technology 
development that will be essential in the long-term. 
• Delaying action translates into greater dependence 
on negative emissions technologies in the medium-
term – technologies that so far are unproven on a 
larger scale. 
• Delaying action increases the costs of mitigation in 
the medium- and long-term, and implies greater risks 
of economic disruption. 
• Importantly, delaying action is associated with greater 
risks of failing to meet the well below 2°C target and is 
likely to be incompatible with meeting a 1.5°C target.
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2030 trends and ambition
Chapter 3
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute) and Joeri 
Rogelj (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) 
Contributing authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) 
and Sebastian Sterl (NewClimate Institute)
3.1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims at limiting global average 
temperature increase to well below 2°C relative to 
pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to further limit 
global average temperature increase to 1.5°C. This chapter 
provides an update of the mitigation challenge associated 
with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and the 
estimated global emission levels under various assumptions 
regarding the implementation of policies and Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). 
3.2 Pathways limiting warming to below 2 
and 1.5 degrees Celsius 
The Paris Agreement is clear about its aim to keep warming 
well below 2 degrees Celsius (°C) and pursue efforts to limit 
it to 1.5°C, but it does not provide a specific probability 
with which these limits are to be avoided. Deciding on the 
appropriate level of probability is a political rather than 
scientific question, as it requires value judgments about what 
is acceptable and desirable to society (Schleussner et al., 
2016). However, clarity regarding the working assumptions 
about these probabilities is required to enable comparable 
quantification and exploration of pathways consistent with 
the Paris Agreement’s temperature target. Therefore, all 
results in this report are accompanied by unambiguous 
descriptions of the quantitative temperature goals they 
inform, acknowledging that other interpretations are 
possible and valid. In line with last year’s Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2015), the scenarios considered are least-cost 
pathways starting in 2020 that limit warming to below 2°C, 
with at least 66 per cent probability by 2100 (never resulting 
in a probability of below 60 per cent), and which return 
warming to below 1.5°C with at least 50 per cent probability 
by 2100, respectively (table 3.1).
A large body of literature is available on pathways that 
limit warming to below 2°C with 66 per cent or higher 
probabilities. This has been covered extensively by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Clarke 
et al., 2014) and earlier Emissions Gap Reports. Summary 
statistics for least-cost pathways starting from 2020, in line 
with limiting warming to below 2°C with at least 66 per cent 
probability, are provided in table 3.1. 
The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC also covered 1.5°C 
pathways to a limited extent (IPCC, 2014a; IPCC 2014b). 
These included least-cost pathways starting from 2010 in line 
with a 66 per cent probability of limiting warming to below 
1.5°C in 2100.1 Currently, there are no scenarios available 
that assume least-cost pathways starting from 2020 that 
can return warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with at least 
66 per cent probability. Therefore, this report describes the 
characteristics of scenarios that assume least-cost pathways 
starting from 2020 and return warming to below 1.5°C in 
2100 with a lower, 50 per cent probability.
Following the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, a 
dedicated review of the 1.5°C scenarios appeared in the 
literature (Rogelj et al., 2015), and other reports, including 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect 
of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
(UNFCCC, 2016e), have additionally provided more specific 
information about global emission pathways in line with 
1 The IPCC reports that global CO
2
 equivalent (CO
2
e) emissions in these 1.5°C 
scenarios are reduced by 70-95 per cent and 110-120 per cent below 2010 
levels in 2050 and 2100, respectively. CO
2
 equivalence in the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC was computed using 100-year Global Warming Potentials 
reported in the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC. CO
2
e emissions 
include all greenhouse gases and are derived from Integrated Assessment 
Model scenarios which also include consistent evolutions of radiatively active 
air pollutants.
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1.5°C. Each of these publications draws upon scenarios 
published earlier (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a; 
Rogelj et al., 2013b). 
More literature is forthcoming and will be assessed in the 
framework of a Special Report on the impacts of global 
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related 
global greenhouse gas emission pathways by the IPCC. 
This report will be finalized by 2018, in time to inform the 
facilitative dialogue under the UNFCCC. 
Based, on the available literature, it is possible to identify 
four key characteristics of 1.5°C scenarios that start a least-
cost pathway from 2020 and limit warming to below 1.5°C 
in 2100 with greater than 50 per cent probability. These are: 
(1) Immediate mitigation action: all available scenarios 
consistent with this definition, peak global 
greenhouse gas emissions around 2020.
(2) The rapid up-scaling of the full portfolio of mitigation 
technologies: this includes widespread adoption of 
renewables, the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels, 
and the use of negative emissions technologies that 
allow for the active removal of carbon dioxide (CO
2
) 
from the atmosphere.
(3) Development along a low-energy demand trajectory. 
(4) Temperature overshoot: almost all available scenarios 
consistent with this definition, temporarily exceed 
the 1.5°C limit during the 21st century.
The issues of negative emissions and temperature overshoot 
are discussed in more detail in the following.
A large proportion of the scenarios that limit warming 
to below 2°C, available in the literature, assume the use 
of so-called negative emissions technologies (Tavoni and 
Socolow, 2013; Williamson, 2013; UNEP, 2014; UNEP, 2015; 
Smith et al., 2016) – the active removal and permanent 
sequestration of CO
2
 from the atmosphere. This can 
be achieved, for example, through the combination of 
bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (Obersteiner 
et al., 2001). Scenarios with significantly lower amounts of 
negative emissions exist, but the exclusion of this mitigation 
option at times renders ambitious climate goals unattainable 
(IPCC, 2014a; Riahi et al., 2015). The IPCC (2014a) reported 
that all scenarios currently available that limit warming to 
below 1.5°C by 2100, require  CO
2
 removal in the second 
half of the century (see table 3.1). Furthermore, virtually 
all scenarios currently available in the literature for limiting 
warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 temporarily exceed the 
1.5°C limit during the 21st century, and, thus, peak and 
decline temperatures in order to again fall below 1.5°C in 
Table 3.1: Overview of pathway characteristics for two global temperature targets. A detailed overview of scenario names is provided in 
Annex A.1. available online. Source: UNEP (2015) and additional calculations. 
1.5°C (>50% in 2100) Pathways limiting warming to below 1.5°C by 2100 with >50% probability
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 6; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 2
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:
Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHGs): (2060-2080); total CO
2
 (including land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)): (2045-2050); CO
2
 from 
energy and industry: (2045-2055)
Annual emissions of global total GHGs [GtCO
2
e/year]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 56 47 39 8 -5
range and spread** 53(-/-)56 46(-/-)48 37(-/-)40 4(-/-)14 -5(-/-)-3
CO
2
 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO
2
 emissions in GtCO
2
]
Time period 2015-2030 2030-2050 2050-2075 2075-2100 2015-2100
median* 552 236 -199 -353 217
range and spread** 503(-/-)567 178(-/-)259 -146(-/-)-277 -288(-/-)-372 71(-/-)383
2°C (>66% in 2100) Pathways limiting warming to below 2°C by 2100 with >66% probability
Limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation afterwards
Number of available scenarios: 10; Number of contributing modelling frameworks: 4
Year of global annual emissions becoming net zero† for:
Kyoto-GHGs: 2085 (2080-2090); total CO
2
 (including LULUCF): 2070 (2060-2075); CO
2
 from energy and industry: 2070 (2060-2075)
Annual emissions of global total GHGs [GtCO
2
e/year]
Year 2020 2025 2030 2050 2100
median* 52 48 42 23 -3
range and spread** 49(49/53)55 44(46/50)53 29(31/44)44 17(18/27)29 -11 (-9/-1)0
CO
2
 carbon budgets [global total cumulative CO
2
 emissions in GtCO
2
]
Time period 2015-2030 2030-2050 2050-2075 2075-2100 2015-2100
median* 533 362 70 -288 553
range and spread** 481(499/582)572 242(258/431)447 -97(-52/175)187 -120(-146/-327)-342 483(490/934)988
* Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO
2
e/year 
** Rounded to the nearest 1 GtCO
2
e/year. Format: minimum value (20th percentile/80th percentile) maximum value – no percentiles are provided if less than  
10 scenarios are available. 
† Rounded to nearest 5 years. Format: median (20th percentile – 80th percentile); (minimum – maximum) if less than 10 scenarios are available.
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2100. For this to happen at the scale and rate required, 
global negative emissions are required. A large overshoot 
can be avoided through strong near-term action. 
Important challenges have been identified for negative 
emissions technologies (Smith et al., 2016) which have to be 
addressed, for example, the potential competition between 
biomass and food production over land and water (Bonsch 
et al., 2016). In most cases, the amounts of bio-energy 
assumed in scenarios limiting median warming to below 
1.5°C in 2100 are within the assessed limits of estimated 
sustainable biomass production, that is, they do not impede 
on sufficient global food production (Creutzig et al., 2015; 
Bonsch et al., 2016). However, this can change over time, 
for example, if local climate impacts happen to be more 
severe than currently anticipated. Furthermore, in absence 
of strong local institutions that can provide good governance 
and prevent illegal deforestation and illegal expropriation, 
the sustainable potentials might be lower.
Because of uncertainties in availability of future technology, 
studies have explored how the absence of a specific 
technology would influence the attainability of temperature 
goals (Kriegler et al., 2013; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013b; Krey et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2015). These studies 
focus on a 2°C temperature goal, but found that a limitation 
or absence of bio-energy with carbon capture and storage 
significantly limits the feasibility of keeping temperature rise 
to low levels. At the same time, hedging against a strong 
reliance on bio-energy with carbon capture and storage in 
the long-term is possible by reducing emissions more steeply 
in the very near-term, that is, over the coming 5 to 15 years. 
Further research that explores the trade-offs and synergies 
of negative emissions technologies in relation to limiting 
warming to 1.5°C would be extremely valuable.
  
Box 3.1: Integrated Assessment Models’ strengths and opportunities. 
The IPCC defines Integrated Assessment as “a method of analysis that combines results and models from the physical, 
biological, economic, and social sciences, and the interactions among these components in a consistent framework 
to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy responses to it” (IPCC, 2014b). 
Integrated Assessment Models are the models used in such a scientific exercise.
For the study of climate change mitigation scenarios, Integrated Assessment Models  often include a representation 
of: (1) the socioeconomic driving forces, (2) the level of climate change mitigation and, (3) the physics of the climate 
system to estimate the impact on global temperature rise. To systematically explore socioeconomic driving forces, the 
research community recently developed a set of five narratives that describe worlds with very differing adaptation and 
mitigation challenges. These are referred to as the “Shared Socioeconomic Pathways” (O’Neill et al., 2014; O’Neill et al., 
2015). Subsequently, these narratives are used to explore if and how stringent mitigation targets can be reached (Riahi 
et al., in Press).
Most commonly, Integrated Assessment Models are used to create scenarios, which attempt to achieve global mitigation 
at minimum cost. Such “cost-optimal” (or “least-cost”) scenarios let the model decide when (now, in a decade, or at the 
end of the century) and where (in which geographical region and/or in which sector) emissions are reduced. The model 
user can also add additional constraints regarding which mitigation technologies are available in the model. Ultimately, 
the model chooses between different alternatives based on their relative cost, and the social discount rate, which makes 
investing in the near-term more expensive than in the longer term. 
Integrated Assessment Models are powerful tools, which allow the assessment of trade-offs and synergies between 
various mitigation options. Importantly, Integrated Assessment Model scenarios provide the costs of reducing 
emissions, for example, the costs to transform the energy system or limit the emissions from land-use and land-use 
change. However, they typically do not cover the economic and social costs of avoided climate change impacts or side 
effects. Recent studies have shown that these benefits can be significant and easily outweigh the costs of reducing 
emissions (West et al., 2013). Furthermore, Integrated Assessment Model scenarios provide detailed technological 
transformation pathways that allow keeping emissions within a specific limit. Such transformation is often based on 
our understanding of transformations that took place in the past, like the transition of horse carriages to cars. However, 
Integrated Assessment Models  typically do not contain much information on how to achieve the required pace of 
transformation in the future. Social science research can help to further understand the determinants and the key steps 
required to achieve a global low-carbon transition (Geels et al., 2016). 
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3.3 The 2030 emissions gap
3.3.1 Overview of scenarios
To assess the impact of the INDCs2  on future global 
greenhouse gas emissions, global greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2025 and 2030 are compared under four scenarios (Rogelj 
et al., 2016). The assessment draws on multiple individual 
scenarios from the published literature. Each scenario is 
global in scope, reflecting possible actions from all countries.
• The baseline scenario reflects emission projections 
that assume no additional climate policies are put in 
place from 2005 onwards. It is the medium projection 
estimate from around 180 baseline scenarios from 
the scenario database that accompanied the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (Clarke et al., 2014). 
• The current policy trajectory scenario reflects 
the best estimates of the global emissions – taking 
currently adopted and implemented policies into 
account. Current policy trajectory scenarios assume 
that no additional mitigation action is taken beyond 
current climate policies – regardless of whether this 
results in 2020 Pledges not being achieved or being 
overachieved. Current policy trajectories reflect 
all adopted and implemented policies, which for 
the purpose of this report are defined as legislative 
decisions, executive orders, or their equivalent. This 
implies that publicly announced plans or strategies 
alone would not qualify, while individual executive 
orders to implement such plans or strategies would 
qualify. Ultimately, however, these definitions 
may be interpreted differently in the different 
underlying studies. This assessment is bound by the 
interpretations used by individual research groups. 
The current policy trajectory scenario is based on 
the current policies scenarios from four3 of the ten 
available global INDC analyses that provide such 
current policy trajectory scenarios, as detailed in table 
3.2.
• The INDC scenario portrays how global greenhouse 
gas emissions might evolve under full implementation 
of INDCs. It is sourced from ten global INDC analyses, 
which updates the work of UNEP (2015), and is 
described in more detail in Rogelj et al. (2016). The 
number of INDCs considered by the studies that were 
assessed here ranges from the 118 INDCs submitted 
by 1 October 2015 to the 160 INDCs submitted by 12 
December 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015a) (table 3. 2). These 
118 to 160 INDCs cover emissions from 145 to 187 
out of 195 Parties to the UNFCCC, which in turn were 
responsible for roughly 88 to more than 96 per cent 
2 INDCs were submitted before the Paris summit; under the Paris Agreement, 
future mitigation contributions will be referred to as National Determined 
Contributions (NDCs), without the ‘Intended’.
3 These four groups with current policy scenarios are: (i) the Climate Action 
Tracker by Climate Analytics, NewClimate Institute, Ecofys and Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impact Research; (ii) International Energy Agency; (iii) 
Joint Research Centre; and (iv) PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency. The groups from London School of Economics and Danish Energy 
Agency also have current policy scenarios that are calibrated at the 
International Energy Agency current policies scenario.
of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 (JRC/PBL, 
2014). Here, the INDC scenario draws on individual 
INDC scenarios from the ten global analyses (table 
3.2). The resulting composite INDC scenario comprises 
the median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile global 
estimates for 2025 and 2030 from all of these sources. 
Compared to the previous Emissions Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2015), three new studies have been included 
(JRC, PNNL and the UNFCCC synthesis Report – see 
table 3.2), while global estimates of the official or 
independent country-specific sources have been 
excluded, since for many countries there was no data 
available. The official or independent country-specific 
sources are now only used for the national estimates 
(Section 3.4).
 
 The INDC scenario comprises unconditional and 
conditional INDC cases. As discussed in the 2015 
Gap Report (UNEP, 2015), some countries place 
conditions on all or part of their INDCs. Of the INDCs 
submitted by 12 December 2015, roughly 45 per 
cent came with both conditional and unconditional 
components; about a third was conditional only 
and the remainder did not specify conditions (WRI, 
2015). Consequently, two cases are explored in this 
assessment: unconditional INDCs and conditional 
INDCs. In the unconditional INDC case, Parties with 
INDCs are assumed to implement only those portions 
of their targets without conditions, while Parties that 
solely have a conditional target are assumed to follow 
a current policy trajectory. In the conditional INDC 
case, all Parties with INDCs are assumed to implement 
their conditional targets, and Parties that only have an 
unconditional target are assumed to implement that 
target. In both the unconditional and conditional INDC 
cases, it is assumed that for any traded international 
offsets, each unit is counted towards the INDC of a 
single country only – either the buyer or the seller.4 
• The 1.5°C and 2°C scenario represent least-costs 
global scenarios consistent with a likely chance of 
limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels. The 2°C scenario comprises the 
subset of scenarios from the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the IPCC scenario database (Clarke et al., 2014) 
that: (i) have a greater than 66 per cent chance of 
keeping global temperature increase to below 2°C 
by 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels, (ii) are 
consistent with full implementation of 2020 Pledges 
that are anchored in the Cancun Agreement, and 
(iii) distribute emission reductions across regions, 
gases and sectors after 2020 in such a way that 
global mitigation costs of necessary reductions are 
minimised. The 1.5°C scenario data is selected from 
the literature and comprises scenarios which: (i) 
have a greater than 50 per cent chance of keeping 
4 This is in line with the intention of countries not to double the count of 
offsets, which is consistent with the Paris Agreement.
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 global temperature increase to below 1.5°C by 2100 
compared to pre-industrial levels, (ii) have emissions 
in 2020 above 53 gigatonnes CO
2
 equivalent (GtCO2e) 
per year, and (iii) distribute emission reductions 
across regions, gases and sectors after 2020 in such 
a way that global mitigation costs of necessary 
reductions are minimised (Rogelj et al., 2015). 
The studies from which the current policy trajectory 
scenario and the INDC scenario are drawn differ in a number 
of ways, such as: conditional versus unconditional INDCs; 
assumptions regarding non-covered sectors and gases; 
treatment of land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
and surplus emission units; different bases for calculating 
Global Warming Potentials (table 3.2). The methodological 
differences between the groups cannot be fully harmonized, 
which leads to some uncertainty as indicated in the results 
presented in Section 3.4, where the implications of the 
differences between studies are also further explored. 
Table 3.2: Overview of global INDC studies included in the Gap assessment (in alphabetical order). Source: Rogelj et al. (2016).
Reference Sector and 
gas coverage
Cut-Off Date for 
Analysis and 
Countries Included
Scenario 
coverage
Unconditional 
INDC case
Conditional 
INDC case
Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 
2015)
All 8 Dec. 2015 Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
X X
Climate & Energy College / University of 
Melbourne dataset (Meinshausen, 2015)
All 15 Dec. 2015 INDC X X
Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive, 2015) All 20 Oct. 2015 INDC X —
Danish Energy Agency (DEA, 2015) All 8 Dec. 2015 INDC X —
International Energy Agency - World Energy 
Outlook (IEA, 2015)
Alla 15 Dec. 2015 Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
X —
Joint Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous and 
Keramidas, 2015; Kitous et al., 2016)
All Mid-Oct. 2015 Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
X X
London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE) (Boyd et al., 2015)
All Mid-Oct. 2015 INDC X X
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 
(Fawcett et al., 2015)
All Mid-Oct. 2015 INDC X —
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016)
All 15 Dec. 2015 Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
X X
UNFCCC Synthesis Report on the Aggregate 
Effect of INDCs (UNFCCC, 2016e) 
All 4 April 2016 INDC X X
a Only available at the global level. Here the International Energy Agency current policies scenario is used.
Table 3.3: Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 and 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile 
range). Ranges are computed as described in Rogelj et al. (2016). In cases where estimates are based on less than 10 scenarios, the 
minimum-maximum range is provided. The row of “Conditional INDCs” is only provided for information, as a direct comparison with the 
“Unconditional INDCs” ranges is not possible due to arbitrary model sampling differences. Source: Rogelj et al. (2016).
Emissions estimates (GtCO
2
e/year) 
Scenario Global total emissions in 2025 Global total emissions in 2030 Number of scenarios in set
Baseline 61.0 (56.7-64.3) 64.7 (59.5-69.5) 179
Current policy trajectory 56.2 (54.8-59.4) 59.4 (57.9-63.1) 3
Unconditional INDCs 53.9 (50.6-56.3) 55.5 (51.9-57.5) 10
Conditional INDCsa 53.0 (49.3-54.9) 53.4 (49.5-54.7) 10 (6+4)
2°C pathwaysb (least-cost from 2020) 47,7 (46.2-50.2) 41.8 (30.6-43.5) 10
1.5°C pathwaysc (least-cost from 2020) 47.2 (45.8-48.2) 38.8 (37.7-40.0) 6
a  Assuming full implementation of both unconditional and conditional INDCs. Six studies provided an estimate for the conditional INDC case. The median estimate of 
influence derived from these six studies is used to adjust the unconditional INDC estimate of the four remaining studies that did not include conditional INDC estimates. 
The estimated improvement of moving from the unconditional to the conditional case is in the range of 2.4 (1.2-4.8 GtCO
2
e per year full range).
b  As in UNEP (2015): limiting global average temperature increase to below 2°C with greater than 66 per cent probability in 2100 (probabilities never drop below 60 per 
cent during the entire century).
c  As in UNEP (2015): limiting global average temperature increase to below 1.5°C with greater than 50 per cent probability in 2100 (allowing median temperatures to 
exceed the 1.5°C limit during some period before 2100).
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3.3.2 The effect of INDCs on global greenhouse gas 
emissions
This section presents the findings regarding the aggregate 
effect on total global greenhouse gas emissions of full 
implementation of the INDCs in 2025 and 2030, compared to 
the emissions implied by baseline, current policy trajectory, 
and 2oC and 1.5oC scenarios. The results are shown in table 
3.3 and figure 3.1. 
It is apparent from figure 3.1 that current policies lead to 
emissions that are markedly lower than the baseline, which 
assumes that no additional climate policies are put in place 
from 2005. This indicates that the baseline will become 
increasingly less useful as a reference case.
Figure 2.1  Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry
Annual Global Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GtCO2e)
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respectively.
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Figure 3.1 shows that full implementation of the 
unconditional INDCs will reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2030 by nine GtCO
2
e  (range: 7-13) relative 
to the median no-policy baseline, and by four GtCO
2
e5 
(range: 2-7) relative to the median current policy trajectory. 
Comparing these cost-optimal 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios to the 
unconditional INDC projections shows a large discrepancy. 
More specifically, there is a gap in 2030 of 14 GtCO
2
e (range: 
10-16) between the unconditional INDC scenario and the 2oC 
scenario. Comparing the unconditional INDC scenario with 
the 1.5 C scenario further increases the gap by three GtCO
2
e, 
which is in the same order as found in UNFCCC (2016e). 
In comparison, if countries were to also fully implement 
the conditional INDCs, estimated global greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2030 would end up about 2.4 GtCO
2
e (range: 
1.2−4.8) lower in 2030 compared to the unconditional INDC 
scenario case. This leaves a gap in 2030 of 12 (8–13) GtCO
2
e 
between the conditional INDC scenario and the cost-optimal 
2oC scenario. Comparing the conditional INDC scenario with 
the 1.5oC scenario increases the gap by three GtCO
2
e. 
For a number of countries, the INDC targets suggest 
emission levels above their estimated no-policy baseline or 
current policy scenario. These countries are, thus, expected 
to overachieve their INDC targets (see Section 3.4 for further 
details on G20 members). Different model teams treat these 
surpluses in different ways, which adds an uncertainty of 
one GtCO
2
e (range: 0-1) by 2030 to the estimated INDC and 
gap projections here.
The gap calculations assume that there is no double counting 
of reductions. In other words, transferred reductions are 
only counted towards the achievement of one country’s 
INDCs, not towards both the country buying and selling. 
However, as the Paris Agreement allows the possibility of 
voluntary use of “internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes”, it is possible that a system of trading offset 
credits will be developed and used. This could imply a risk of 
double counting, which could increase the global emissions 
by 2030 by 0.8 GtCO
2
e in the unconditional and conditional 
INDC case.6  
3.3.3 The carbon budget implications of INDCs 
To give an indication of the carbon budget implications of 
the INDC scenarios, figure 3.2 shows the cumulative CO
2
 
emissions implied by the INDC scenarios until 2030. Figure 
3.2 shows that under the INDC scenarios, the IPCC CO
2 
budget 
for limiting warming to below 2°C with at least 66 per cent 
probability will be close to depleted by 2030, and the IPCC 
CO
2
 budget in line with limiting warming to below 1.5°C with 
at least 50 per cent probability will already be well exceeded 
by 2030. The figure also illustrates the limited CO
2
 budget 
5 The gap numbers and ranges in the text are rounded to the nearest gigatonne.
6 Consistent with the earlier analysis of double counting in the UNEP 2014 
Emissions Gap Report, for the INDC cases it is assumed that international 
emission offsets could account for 33 per cent of the difference between 
current policies trajectory and emission levels for the INDC cases by 2030 
for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries. This is an arbitrary, conservative estimate, as many Parties have 
yet to specify any limits to the use of transferable units.
implications of the INDC scenarios compared to the current 
policy scenario. If the CO
2
 budget is exceeded, negative 
emissions at a global scale are required to capture the excess 
CO
2
. As highlighted in Section 3.2, limitations or absence of 
negative emissions technologies would significantly limit 
the feasibility of keeping temperature rise to low levels in 
2100. Steep emission reductions would be required over the 
coming 5 to 15 years to hedge against a strong reliance on 
negative emissions technologies later in this century. 
3.3.4 The global temperature effect of INDCs 
Estimates of what level of temperature increase the 
implementation of the INDCs would result in depends on the 
assumptions made about what happens after 2030, and the 
probability assigned to the temperature increase. The Paris 
Agreement indicates that consecutive National Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) have to represent a progression over 
time. Here, the same approach is adopted as in a recent study 
(Rogelj et al., 2016) which assumes that, as a minimum, this 
entails that the level of climate mitigation effort implied by 
the actions to achieve INDCs by 2030 is continued after 2030, 
until the end of the century.7 Under these assumptions, the 
full implementation of the unconditional INDCs is consistent 
with staying below an increase in temperature of 3.2°C 
(median, range: 2.9–3.4°C) by 2100 relative to pre-industrial 
levels with greater than 66 per cent probability. This is lower 
than current policies, which imply staying below an increase 
of 3.6°C (median, range: 3.4–3.7°C) by 2100 with greater 
than 66 per cent probability. Full implementation of the 
conditional INDCs would lower the temperature projections 
relative to the unconditional INDCs by about 0.2°C. 
3.4 Understanding the mitigation efforts 
of the INDCs – A closer look at G20 
members
This section presents country-specific findings for the 
members of the G20.8 As mentioned in Chapter 2, these 
economies, collectively, generate around three quarters of 
global greenhouse gas emissions, and their emission levels 
and INDCs have the largest impact on the aggregate, global 
findings of this assessment. 
3.4.1 Overview of scenarios
For each of the G20 members, median emission projections 
resulting from the full implementation of the INDC are 
calculated. The calculation is based on the same data as in 
the 2015 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2015), complemented 
with data from two new studies of the Joint Research 
Centre (Kitous et al., 2016) and Pacific Northwest National 
7 ”Continued effort” in this context is approximated by estimating the global 
carbon price implied by the INDCs in 2030 and projecting this price further 
until the end of the century in a way consistent with the scenarios available 
in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC Working Group III Scenario 
Database. See Rogelj et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the method.
8 The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), the 
United States of America (USA), and the European Union (EU). In our analysis, 
the EU including all its Member States (regardless of G20 status) is considered 
as a single Party, and EU Member States are not considered individually.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of projected emissions by 2030 
and alltime 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets. Cumulative 
global total carbon dioxide emissions for the conditional 
INDC case, the unconditional INDC case and the current 
policies scenario, and carbon budgets from the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC AR5) (IPCC, 2014a). The carbon 
budget ranges show the values based on the range of 
scenarios assessed by Working Group III (IPCC, 2014b). 
The solid horizontal line at 1,000 GtCO
2
 shows the 
estimate based on complex Earth-System Models, 
assessed by Working Group I (IPCC, 2014a).Historical 
emissions until 2015 are based on Le Quéré et al. (2015).
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Laboratory (Fawcett et al., 2015), and with estimates for the 
three G20 economies, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, 
that were not included in the previous Emissions Gap 
Report. More specifically, the data is sourced from:
(i) The official estimates included in the INDCs (UNFCCC, 
2016a).
(ii) Calculations based on the INDCs and other 
documents submitted by countries to the UNFCCC 
(such as national greenhouse gas inventories, 
national communications, biennial reports, and 
biennial update reports).
(iii) Estimates published in country-specific studies.
(iv) Eight independent global analyses,9 described further 
in detail in table 3.4.
Figure 3.3 presents the greenhouse gas emission projections 
for G20 economies for current policy trajectories, and 
for unconditional and conditional (in the case of India, 
Indonesia and Mexico) INDC cases for 2030, noting that for 
the United States of America (USA), the 2025 unconditional 
9 The UNFCCC synthesis report and the Danish Energy Agency study are 
excluded here, as these studies do not provide national estimates.
INDC is shown. The Figure provides an indication of whether 
or not a country needs to implement policies additional to 
the current policy trajectory to meet its INDC target, but 
does not attempt to indicate the level of ambition of the 
INDC targets. It is also important to note that the current 
policy trajectory scenarios, which attempt to reflect the 
most recent mitigation policies, differ from the baseline 
or business as usual (BAU) scenarios employed by some 
countries, which typically assume that no new policies 
are adopted or implemented after a given cut-off year. 
Figure 3.3 shows that for many countries the implementation 
of their INDC would lead to lower emissions than the current 
policies scenario, or in other words that additional policies 
would have to be implemented to meet the INDC target. 
However, it should be noted that additional research is 
necessary, as the uncertainty ranges overlap for many countries 
and since the number of studies available for the current 
policy trajectory case and the INDC cases vary significantly.
Figure 3.3: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 economies, and G20 as a whole, by 2030 for the business as 
usual (BAU) emissions projection from the INDC submission (third bar), for the current policies scenario from official and national studies 
(fourth bar), from global model studies used for our analysis (fifth bar), for the unconditional INDC scenario (sixth bar), and for the 
conditional INDC scenario (seventh bar). The uncertainty ranges are explained in the main text. For reporting reasons, the emissions 
projections for China, EU, India and USA are shown in panel (a), and the other countries in panel (b), with different vertical axes. The 
Figure also shows the number of studies underlying the estimate (if available) for the last four bars: current policies (national studies), 
current policies (all studies) and the unconditional INDC and conditional INDC (all studies).
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Figure 3.3b
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3.4.2 The effect of INDCs on G20 members’ 
greenhouse gas emissions
Cross-cutting information regarding national emissions 
(relative to various base years), emissions per gross 
domestic product and emissions per capita for G20 
economies is summarised in figures 3.4a-c. The projections 
of the latter two indicators are influenced by many factors. 
For example, economic and population growth will generally 
result in an increase in emissions, while energy intensity 
improvements in the global economy and reductions of 
carbon intensity in energy production will generally result 
in a decrease in emissions. The population and the gross 
domestic product  projections are based on the medium UN 
population scenario and the International Energy Agency 
World Energy Outlook Report 2014 (IEA, 2014) -- if available 
for the selected countries -- and the Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways database (scenario SSP2) (Dellink et al., 2016), 
which is consistent with the current policies scenarios.
Figure 3.4a illustrates the change in emissions by 2030 
compared to different historical years -- 1990 and 2010, the 
most recent year for which comprehensive data is available. 
It indicates that the various countries have had different 
phases of rapid emissions increase. 
Figure 3.4b illustrates the wide range of likely per capita 
emissions in 2030. It also illustrates a general trend that 
countries starting from a lower base level in 2010 tend to 
increase more by 2030. 
Figure 3.4c shows the emissions intensity of the economies. 
This is useful as an indicator of the extent to which INDCs 
lead to a convergence in emissions intensity among 
countries, and to a decoupling of economic growth and 
emissions. As figure 3.4b shows, emissions per capita are 
projected to decline between 2010 and 2030 in all G20 
economies except Argentina, China, India, the Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as a result of the 
implementation of unconditional INDCs. At the same time, 
income levels are projected to increase in this time period, 
indicating a decoupling of economic growth and greenhouse 
gas emissions. In total, decoupling is projected for 15 to 
16 of the G20 economies, depending on the conditionality 
of their INDCs. Only Turkey shows an increase in emission 
per gross domestic product. The largest reductions are 
projected for countries with the highest emission intensities 
in 2010, such as Brazil, China, and Indonesia. Furthermore, 
emission intensities of all G20 economies are projected 
to lead to levels between about 200 and 900 tonnes CO
2
e 
per million US$ in 2030, independent of these countries’ 
emission intensity levels in 2010 and income levels in 2030. 
This convergence, again, reflects a decoupling of economic 
growth and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Providing an assessment of whether the magnitude of 
change in these indicators as a result of INDCs is consistent 
with ambition and fairness requires explicit benchmarking 
across alternative normative indicators of burden-sharing, 
and is beyond the scope of the Emissions Gap Report. 
** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.
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Table 3.4: Overview of INDC studies included in the G20 member assessment by type of source (in alphabetical order). 
Reference Geographic coverage Sector and  
gas coverage
Scenario 
coverage
Global INDC analyses
Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 
2015)
All G20 economies included All Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
Climate & Energy College / University of 
Melbourne dataset (Meinshausen, 2015)
All G20 economies included All INDC
Climate Interactive (Climate Interactive, 2015) About nine countries, that is: Australia, Canada, EU, 
India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Republic of Korea, USAa
All INDC
International Energy Agency - World Energy 
Outlook (IEA, 2015)
China, India CO
2
 from  
energy useb
Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
Joint Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous and 
Keramidas, 2015; Kitous et al., 2016)
All G20 economies included All Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE) (Boyd et al., 2015)
All G20 economies, except Australia All INDC
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 
(Fawcett et al., 2015)
China, India, Russiac All INDC
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (den Elzen et al., 2016)
All G20 economies included All Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
Official country-specific data sources
Australian Government (2015) Australia All Current policy 
trajectory
Biennial Report/Biennial Update Report 
(UNFCCC, 2016b)a
Brazil, Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russia and 
Switzerland
Varies Current policy 
trajectory
Department of Environmental Affairs (2014) South Africa All Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
EEA (2014) EU All Current policy 
trajectory
Government of Canada (2014) Canada All Current policy 
trajectory
INDCs (UNFCCC, 2016a) Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea,  
South Africa, Turkey and the USA
Varies INDC
National Climate Change Strategy (2013) Mexico All Current policy 
trajectory
National Communications (UNFCCC, 2016c; 
UNFCCC 2016d)
Indonesia, USA Varies INDC
Independent country-specific data sources
Centre for Policy Research (Dubash et al., 
2015)
India CO
2
Current policy 
trajectory
Climate Advisers (Belenky, 2015) USAa All Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
Energy Research Institute Low carbon 
scenarios (based on Jiang et al., 2013)
China CO
2
d Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad 
(Garg et al., 2014)
India All Current policy 
trajectory
Institut du Développement Durables et des 
Relations Internationales (Garg et al., 2014)
Japan All INDC
King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology, (2014)
Saudi Arabia CO
2
d Current policy 
trajectory
National Center for Climate Strategy and 
International Cooperation (Sha et al., 2015)
China CO
2
d INDC
World Resources Institute (Kuramochi, 2014) Japan All INDC
World Resources Institute (Hausker et al., 
2015)
USA All Current policy 
trajectory, INDC
a  Compared to last year, we have deleted the INDC estimate of China for the studies Climate Interactive and Climate Advisers because of data inconsistency, but this does 
not affect the INDC estimate of China, as the number of studies included is still 10 (instead of 12).
b  Augmented with US Environmental Protection Agency (2012), JRC/PBL (2014) and den Elzen et al. (2015) to produce economy-wide figures. 
c  Not all countries’ projections of the studies are included for this analysis.
d  Augmented with Tavoni et al. (2015) and Government of China (2012) to produce economy-wide figures.
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Figure 3.4a: Greenhouse gas emissions relative to base year (in percentage) for G20 members under the INDCs in 2030.
Figure 3.4: Greenhouse gas emissions for the INDCs for G20 members relative to 2010 levels (a), per capita emissions (b), emission 
intensity of the economy (that is, emissions per unit of real gross domestic product – US$ 2005) (c).
* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025. 
** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e including LULUCF 
over the period 2025-2030.
Figure 3.4b: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita for G20 members under the INDCs in 2030 (tCO
2
e/capita).
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* For USA unconditional INDC is for 2025. 
** South Africa’s INDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO
2
e including LULUCF over the period 2025-2030.
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e/US$ billion).
and the budget for 2°C is almost depleted. Due to the path-
dependence of technology and the risk of lock-in, the earlier 
these targets are enhanced, the easier and less costly it will 
be to achieve them. The more ambitious early mitigation 
is, the less the world will have to rely on socially contested 
negative emissions technologies and high-cost emission 
reduction options in the future.
The estimates of the emission levels that would be realised 
under full implementation of the INDCs have not changed 
significantly compared to last year’s report. Countries 
show wide differences in the need to implement additional 
policies to meet their INDCs. In general, differences of per 
capita emissions and emission intensity narrow (with some 
exceptions), but these levels are still well above the global 
average level needed to be compatible with a 1.5°C or 2°C 
temperature target. 
However, a number of recent studies attempt this task using 
a range of different effort-sharing allocations according to 
different equity principles (Climate Action Tracker, 2015; 
Climate Equity Reference Project, 2015; Meinshausen et al., 
2015; Hof et al., 2016). These include studies that explicitly 
draw on the data from the IPCC effort-sharing allocation 
database (Höhne et al., 2014), which comprises data from 
many effort-sharing studies reviewed for the IPCC. 
3.5 Summary of findings
The decisions of the Paris Agreement on “well below 2°C” 
and “pursuing efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C” 
requires a redefinition of the emissions gap. Moving from 
2°C to 1.5°C increases the gap by around three GtCO
2
e in 
2030 with significantly more stringent emissions reductions 
required afterwards. 
INDCs are a first start to initiate this required transition, but 
are still far from being in line with the agreed long-term 
goals. Ambition of the existing INDCs, with target years 
through 2030, would have to be increased. Continuing on 
the emissions trajectory implied by the current INDCs would 
mean that the budget for 1.5°C is already overspent by 2030, 
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4.1  Introduction 
Global climate change governance is becoming increasingly 
diverse, with many actors, other than national governments, 
undertaking climate change management actions. In 
this chapter, the focus is on actors like the private sector, 
civil society organisations, cities and regions, and other 
subnational actors, often referred to as non-state actors. 
Their actions could be either individual or cooperative.1 
The 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
showed a growing institutionalisation of processes aimed 
at engaging non-state actors in efforts to manage climate 
change. This chapter assesses the role of non-state actors in 
bridging the emissions gap and summarises the role of their 
actions in the UNFCCC process. The chapter describes key 
features of a sample of around 200 cooperative initiatives, 
and provides a synthesis of recent estimates of emission 
reduction potentials by non-state actor actions. Finally, it 
highlights a number of issues where additional research is 
required.
4.2  Non-state actors and the climate change 
negotiations   
Over the past decades, non-state actors have been taking 
measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
1 In some instances, national governments also participate in cooperative 
initiatives lead by non-state actors, sometimes even driving the action.
(Andonova et al., 2009; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Bulkeley et al., 
2014).2 While they unarguably played a key role in putting 
climate change issues firmly on the international agenda, 
their place within the international climate regime has long 
been limited to roles as observers and lobbyists.3 Over the 
years, the role of non-state actors in international climate 
change negotiations has shifted towards a more structural, 
long-term engagement. 
4.2.1 Non-state actor actions in recent years
Early efforts include the Momentum for Change campaign 
by the UNFCCC secretariat, to “shine a light on the enormous 
groundswell of activities underway across the globe that 
are moving the world toward a highly resilient, low-carbon 
future” (UNFCCC, 2016c).4  
The Peruvian government, in collaboration with the 
UNFCCC secretariat, launched the Non-State Actor Zone for 
Climate Action, an online platform to showcase non-state 
commitments, both by individual and cooperative entities. 
The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action provides the 
broadest overview of non-state and subnational climate 
action to date, and includes data from multiple partner 
organisations (UNEP, 2015).5
2 These efforts go back at least 25 years, with the launch of the Rainforest 
Alliance in 1980, and fall under the broader pattern of international 
governance schemes, which emerged in the mid-1970s, partly as a result 
of the increasing globalisation spurred by the liberalisation of international 
financial markets.
3 In some instances, representatives from non-state actor initiatives have 
joined a UNFCCC party delegation team. This may have helped raise 
awareness among UNFCCC Parties about the breadth of actions undertaken 
by non-state actors.
4 Additional information about the campaign is available online at: http://
unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/6214.php [Accessed 
11 October 2016]
5 The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action database is available online at: 
http://climateaction.unfccc.int/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]
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The so-called Technical Examination Process on Mitigation, 
a multi-stakeholder forum within the UNFCCC negotiation 
process, was started in 2014 and expert meetings have 
been organized around specific themes such as transport, 
renewable energy and land use. Relevant non-state actors 
are engaged in the process.6 
At the UNFCCC COP 20 in Peru, the host government, the 
government of France (as host of the 2015 conference), 
the UNFCCC secretariat, and the office of the UN Secretary-
General launched the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.7  Focusing on 
12 thematic areas, the Agenda seeks to: (i) mobilize “robust 
global action towards low carbon and resilient societies”, (ii) 
provide “enhanced support to existing initiatives”, and (iii) 
mobilize “new partners” and provide “a platform for the 
visibility of their actions” (UNFCCC, 2016b).
France declared the Lima-Paris Action Agenda to be the 
‘fourth pillar’ of the Paris climate conference, together 
with a universal legal agreement, Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) from UNFCCC Parties, and finance and 
technology.8 
4.2.2  The Paris outcomes and beyond 
There is little doubt that the growing engagement of non-
state actors has contributed to the successful conclusion 
of the Paris Agreement (Jacobs, 2016).9 Section IV of the 
decision that accompanies the Paris Agreement (decision 1/
CP.21) illustrates the growing institutionalisation of non-state 
actor engagement within the climate regime. Addressing 
pre-2020 action, the decision introduces changes on 
previous ad hoc mobilization efforts, with a view to ensuring 
a more structured engagement (UNFCCC, 2016h). The main 
changes are:
• The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform is 
anchored in the decision (paragraph 117).
• High-level events for state and non-state climate action 
until 2020 are expected to further ensure the visibility 
and recognition at the highest level of non-state climate 
actions (paragraph 121).
• The Technical Examination Process on mitigation is 
maintained (paragraph 109), with a view to broadening 
the interface between state and non-state actors within 
the UNFCCC process.10 
• UNFCCC Parties and non-party stakeholders are 
encouraged to continue catalysing efforts to strengthen 
climate change action (paragraph 118).
6 Additional information about the forum is available online at: http://unfccc.
int/focus/mitigation/technical_expert_meetings/items/8179.php [Accessed 
11 October 2016]
7 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/about/[Accessed 11 October 2016]
8 The speech of Laurent Fabius, the conference’s president, is available online 
at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lima/laurent-fabius-scientific-conference-
closing-speech-our-common-future/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]
9 Hale (2016) argues that “following the Copenhagen summit of 2009, the 
[international climate change] regime has been shifting from a “regulatory” 
model of binding, negotiated emissions targets to a “catalytic and facilitative” 
model that seeks to create conditions under which actors progressively 
reduce their emissions through coordinated policy shifts.” He further 
suggests that “the December 2015 Paris Agreement and related decisions 
confirm this evolution” (p. 12).
10 In paragraph 12, the document calls for the launch of a parallel process on 
adaptation.
• Ensuring a degree of continuity of the Lima-Paris Action 
Agenda by establishing two high-level champions, 
who are tasked to “facilitate through strengthened 
high-level engagement in the period 2016-2020 the 
successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-
up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary 
efforts, initiatives and coalitions” (UNFCCC, 2016, p. 18) 
(paragraph 121).
Building on the above decision, and drawing on the 
multiplicity of previous efforts it echoes, a Global Climate 
Action Agenda was launched in May 2016.11 The Global 
Climate Action Agenda has two priorities:12 
• Engage with interested parties and non-party 
stakeholders, including furthering the voluntary 
initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.
• Provide guidance to the UNFCCC secretariat on the 
organisation of technical expert meetings focused on 
specific policies, practices and actions, and coordinate 
annual high-level events.
The process around COP 21 has brought a much higher level 
of recognition than before to the role of non-state actors’ 
in the intergovernmental climate change process. However, 
many open questions remain related to how the international 
process can best recognise, support, and catalyse non-state 
actor actions. Furthermore, how do non-state actor actions 
relate to national governments’ efforts to implement their 
NDCs, and to the development of future NDCs? Regarding 
the latter question, it has been argued that some kind of 
formal coordination mechanism could be implemented 
(Betsill et al., 2015).
4.3  Overview of initiatives 
Non-state climate action comes in many forms. One 
category that has attracted particular attention is the 
so-called International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs). The 
reason is that the high number of participants in ICIs can 
lead to a considerable emission reduction impact.
There is no single definition of what constitutes an ICI.13 
What is clear, however, is that over the past two decades the 
number of ICIs has grown significantly, and has experienced 
a renewed impetus ahead of COP 21.14
11 The Road Map for Global Climate Action is available online at: http://
newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658505/high-level-champions-climate-action-
roadmap.pdf [Accessed 11 October 2016]
12 The climate change champions will present a report of their work at the 2016 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.
13 Most often, ICIs are characterised as initiatives outside the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change aimed at reducing emissions 
of climate forcers by, for example, promoting actions that are less GHG 
intensive, compared to prevailing alternatives. Cooperative initiatives also 
involve national and sub-national partners.
14 Note, for example, that between September 2014 and December 2015, 
the number of local government signatories to the Compact of Mayors 
increased from 228 to 428 (and up to 568 when this report went to press). 
Similarly, between May 2015 and December 2015, more than 400 investors, 
representing US$25 trillion in assets, joined the Investor Platform for Climate 
Action.
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Table 4.1: Overview of features of 203 mitigation-focussed ICIs.
Features Observed trends
Sectoral focus
Some initiatives (37) focus on more than one sector. For single-sector ICIs, the dominant sectors are transport 
(31), agriculture (22), and energy (20).
Geographic scope
Most initiatives (163) are global in scope. By region, the number of ICIs is highest in Europe (15), and Asia and 
the Pacific (14), and lowest in West Asia (7), and Latin America and the Caribbean (6).
Permanent secretariat
Most initiatives (178) have a permanent secretariat. In many instances the secretariat is hosted by a related, 
larger organisation.
Regular reporting15 The extent to which initiatives report regularly on their activities is unclear in half (102) of the initiatives. Regular 
reporting occurs in 73 instances (and irregular reporting in 28).
Type of commitment
Only some initiatives (61) have quantitative commitments. Twice as many (128) have qualitative commitments. 
The nature of the commitment is unclear in all other instances (14).
Type of activities16 
Climate Initiatives Platform registers three types of activities: technical dialogue, political dialogue, and 
implementation. Many initiatives conduct more than one such activity. Implementation is the most common 
activity (125), followed by technical dialogue (109), and political dialogue (49).
Type of membership
Industry is involved in over half (112) of the initiatives, followed by intergovernmental organisations (94), 
national-level government agencies (91), non-governmental organisations (78), subnational-level government 
agencies (51), and academia (37).
Creation of ICIs
The annual creation of new initiatives rose from only a handful (4) in 2006, to a first peak in 2010 (20). It 
reached a low point in 2013 (2), and swelled again in 2014 (33) and 2015 (27).
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Figure 4.1: Number of initiatives launched per year between 2000 and 2015. Source: Climate Initiatives Platform database.
1516
Throughout 2016, the number of non-state commitments 
and actions continued to increase. The Non-State Actor 
Zone for Climate Action platform currently records over 
11,000 climate commitments, mostly from individual cities, 
regions and companies, but also from investors, civil society 
organisations, and cooperative initiatives.
A number of databases collect information on ICIs. Because 
definitions vary, the various databases record very different 
numbers of entries.17 On the basis of their own set of criteria 
15 Regular reporting refers to planned reporting, irrespective of its periodicity
16 Implementation refers to actions that directly lead to emission reductions 
(as opposed to the indirect impact on emissions that technical or political 
dialogues are expected to have).
17 The purpose of the database and the level of effort devoted to keeping it up-
to-date are further reasons why the number of entries differ.
which an ICI database should meet, Widerberg and Stripple 
(2016) identified and reviewed five such databases.18+19 
These are: the Non-state Action Zone for Climate Action, 
the Climate Initiatives Platform,20  the Portal on Cooperative 
18 The criteria used by Widerberg and Stripple require that the database: (i) 
collects information on ICIs and their participants, (ii) focus on transnational 
initiatives, and (iii) focus on initiatives that have climate change mitigation as 
their main focus (Widerberg and Stripple, 2016).
19 The databases were created for different purposes and, therefore, differ in 
their criteria for including a specific initiative. For example, the Non-state 
Action Zone for Climate Action database intends to showcase the breadth 
of non-state actor actions, whereas the Transnational Climate Change 
Governance database was created for academic purposes, to analyse a well-
defined, small selection of initiatives. The Global Aggregator for Climate 
Actions serves a dual, political and academic purpose.
20 The Climate Initiatives Platform database is available online at: http://
climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Welcome [Accessed 11 October 
2016]
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Figure 4.2: Overview of features of 203 mitigation-focused ICIs.
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Initiatives,21 initiatives collected in the context of the 
Transnational Climate Change Governance22  project, and the 
Global Aggregator for Climate Actions23. A further overview 
is presented in Graichen et al. (2016).
Widerberg and Stripple (2016) found that both the Non-
State Actor Zone for Climate Action and the Portal on 
Cooperative Initiatives lack clear criteria, and noted that the 
Global Aggregator for Climate Actions is no longer active.24 
Moreover, the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action 
covers relatively few ICIs. The analysis presented here draws 
on the Climate Initiatives Platform, because this database 
is updated more  regularly and is publicly accessible.25  
At present, the Climate Initiatives Platform records 203 
initiatives focussed on mitigation. The remainder of this 
21 The Portal on Cooperative Initiatives database is available online at: http://
unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7785.php [Accessed 11 October 2016]
22 The Transnational Climate Change Governance database is available online 
at: http://community.dur.ac.uk/tccg/downloads/ [Accessed 11 October 
2016, password protected]
23 The Global Aggregator for Climate Actions database is available online at: 
http://www.climategroundswell.org/blog-test/2015/7/16/galvanizing-a-
groundswell-of-solutions-to-support-cop21 [Accessed 11 October 2016]
24 The Global Aggregator for Climate Actions records all initiatives announced 
during the 2014 United Nations Climate Summit.
25 The Climate Initiatives Platform database is continuously being updated, with 
the goal of inventorying all initiatives that meet the following criteria:
 i    Irrespective of what its main focus might be, the initiative contributes to 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (that is, initiatives that have no 
discernible climate change goals – and approaches to reach them – are not 
included).
 ii  The initiative is international in scope (that is, initiatives promoting 
emission reductions in only one country are not included).
 iii  The initiative involves cooperation between two or more non-state parties 
(that is, initiatives involving only one party, or only state actors, are not 
included).
section summarises trends observed in the selection of 
initiatives currently inventoried in the Climate Initiatives 
Platform database (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1).
i  Compact of Mayors (currently “Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & 
Energy”)
ii  The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) – Top 500 Companies and Cement 
Sustainability Initiatives
iii  C40
iv  Under2MOU
v  Cement Sustainability Initiative (WBCSD)
vi  The World Wildlife Fund’s  Climate Savers programme
vii  C40 and Covenant of Mayors (currently “Global Covenant of Mayors for 
Climate & Energy”)
viii  American Business Act on Climate Pledge (ABAOCP), Caring for Climate, 
RE100; does not take into account that these initiatives are expected to 
grow by 2020/2030.
ix  En.lighten initiative
x  Energy Efficiency Accelerator
xi  Global Buildings Performance Network (GBPN) and Super-Efficient 
Equipment and Appliance Deployment Initiative 
xii  Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC)
xiii  Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Lighthouse Initiative
xiv  European Wind Initiative, Solar Europe Industry Initiative, US Wind Program, 
SunShot Initiative
xv  Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI)
xvi  International Union of Railways (UIC) Low Carbon Rail Transport Challenge 
and Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI)
xvii  Global Methane Initiative and Zero Routine Flaring by 2030
xviii  Clime and Clean Air Coalition  (CCAC) and Global Methane Initiative (GMI)
xix  Refrigerants Naturally!
xx  North American 2013 HFC Submission to the Montreal Protocol
xxi  Clime and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)
xxii  Tropical Forestry Alliance
xxiii  New York Declaration on Forests
xxiv  New York Declaration on Forests
xxv  Bonn Challenge and Governor’s Climate and Forest Task Force (GCFTF)
xxvi  New York Declaration on Forests and Governor’s Climate and Forest Task 
Force (GCFTF)
xxvii  International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation 
Organization
xxviii  No total given as study was not intended to be exhaustive.
xxix  All numbers were calculated with respect to an INDC baseline.
Note: The table summarises findings from studies that include more than one sector or actor.
Table 4.2: Greenhouse gas emission reduction impacts of selected initiatives (in million tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent (MtCO
2
e) per year, by 
study).
Actors and sectors Current individual commitments and/or initiatives’ goals
UNEP, 2015) (Hsu et al., 
2015)
(CISL and 
Ecofys, 2015)
(Roelfsema et al., 2015) (Graichen et al., 2016)
Target year 2020 2020 2020 2020 2030 2020 2030
Initiatives for 
individual 
entities
Cities and municipalities 1,080 454i 600ii 700 55iii 55
Regions 760 360iv 270
Individual companies 630 51 – 100v
10 – 30vi
800vii 1 400 540viii 660
Sector-wide 
initiatives
Energy efficiency 60ix 1,750x 60 280xi 1,180
Efficient cook stoves 120 270xii 270
Renewable energy 0.2xiii 460xiv 1,360
Transport 200xv 500 240xvi 520
Methane and other short-
lived climate pollutants
90 500xvii 1,300 0xviii 1,400
Fluorinated gases 0.0 – 0.7xix 0 700xx 50xxi 140
Reduced deforestation and 
afforestation
100xxii 331xxiii 20 – 200 300xxiv 700 800xxv 2,380xxvi
Agriculture 300
Shipping and aviation 200xxvii 500
Overlap between initiatives 200 200 300 ~100-1,000 ~100-1,000
Total expected 
reduction below 
study’s baseline
Midpoint 2,900 2,540 No totalxxviii 2,500 5,500
Range 2,500 – 3,300
Part which is already covered by  
national pledges / (I)NDCs
33% Not 
quantified
Not 
quantified
70% Not 
quantified
Not  
quantifiedxxix
Not  
quantified
Total expected reduction below  
national pledges / (I)NDCs
1,700 – 2,200 Not 
quantified
Not 
quantified
750 Not 
quantified
2,800 (range 
1,600 – 4,000)
8,000 (range 
5,400 – 10,600)
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26 27
Several initiatives were launched in 2015.26 These include, 
for example, the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, and 
the Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity 
Producers and Traders.
Geographically, ICI engagement is rather unbalanced: 70-90 
per cent of them are led by developed country actors (Chan 
et al., 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions, 
2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Bansard et al., 2016; 
Hsu et al., 2016). Participants based in the Middle East and 
North Africa, Africa, Oceania, South East Asia, and China, are 
particularly underrepresented (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Hsu et 
al., 2016).
Most initiatives that set quantitative commitments propose 
a target and time frame to which – in principle – all members 
should commit, provide guidance and coordination support, 
and conduct outreach campaigns to recruit additional 
members27 
Most of the initiatives that report regularly on their 
activities bring together governmental agencies –  at the 
local or national level – with one or more of the following 
actors: industry, intergovernmental organisations, and 
non-governmental environmental organisations. Typically, 
industry provides some form of technical support, while 
intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental 
environmental organisations provide legitimacy (through 
endorsement). In some instances, intergovernmental 
organisations provide financial support.28  
26 At the time of writing, the Climate Initiatives Platform database did not 
contain any initiatives launched in 2016 (that is, 2015 was the latest year for 
which the database had any entries).
27 Examples include the Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Partnership, RE100, and 
the Lima Challenge.
28 Examples include the Climate Group’s States and Regions Alliance and the 
Asia Forest Partnership.
Some of the initiatives that report regularly on their 
activities entail industry-only partnerships of European or 
global reach, in which members impose reporting duties 
on themselves. In these partnerships, reporting is seldom 
verified by a third party.29  
A small number of the initiatives that report regularly on 
their activities are long-established efforts that were created 
with a very specific purpose, climate change mitigation only 
being an ancillary benefit of the activity. Typically, they are 
organisations with well-developed governance mechanisms, 
which require regular reporting beyond financial reporting.30 
4.4  Estimated emission reductions of  
non-state actor actions
A growing number of analyses are available, which seek to 
estimate the potential and actual contribution of non-state 
actor action to the global effort of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, the evidence base remains fragmented, 
as outlined in this section.
National action, Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) and non-state actions may reinforce 
each other and, together, create a virtuous cycle of raising 
ambition. Many initiatives address issues like financing, 
technology deployment, and capacity building, which may 
have important indirect effects on emissions.
 
However, for analysing the overall global impact it is 
important to analyse the ambition level of both actions to 
29 Examples include the Airport Accreditation initiative and the Ultra-Low CO
2
 
Steelmaking initiative.
30 Examples include the Forest Stewardship Council and the Global Reporting 
Initiative.
Note: The table summarises findings from studies that include only one sector or actor.
i  Science-Based Targets, RE100, EP100, Zero-deforestation pledges; taking into account that these initiatives are expected to grow by 2020/2030.
ii  Overlaps between initiatives mean the impact is smaller than the sum of the individual initiatives, as initiatives are complementary to each other. In this study, they 
were not estimated in detail.
Table 4.3: Greenhouse gas emission reduction impacts of selected initiatives (in MtCO
2
e per year, by study).
Actors and sectors Current individual commitments and/or initiatives’ goals Systemic impact 
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Target year 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2030 2020 2030 2030 2030
Initiatives for 
individual 
entities
Cities and 
municipalities
454 402 500 740 1,000 3,700
Regions 1,200
Sector-wide 
initiatives
Business sector 3,900-
4,900i
> 10,000ii
Circular economy 6,000-
7,500
Overlap between initiatives 700 None Not 
quantified
Total expected impact below 
study’s baseline
3,200-
4,200
454 402 500 740 1,200 1,000 10,000 3,700 6,000-
7,500
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understand if one adds more ambition than the other and, 
therefore, helps close the emissions gap (Hale, 2016). While 
doing so is analytically challenging, a number of studies 
have made some inroads (see, for example, Höhne et al., 
2015;  Graichen et al., 2016).31  Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and 
figure 4.3 provide overviews of the estimates available.
The studies vary significantly in scope, in particular which 
kind of impact they analyse. We identified several categories 
of impact, but studies are not always clear about which 
impact they estimate: 
Individual commitments: Reductions that would occur if all 
participants of the initiatives (individual companies, cities, 
etcetera) fulfil their individually set targets. 
Initiatives’ goals: Reductions that would occur if the 
initiatives achieve their stated collective goals (in terms of 
participants of companies and cities). 
31 Analyses of the actual performance of non-state actor actions (as opposed 
to simply analysing the targets, in the assumption that they will be met) 
are emerging, but remain limited in number (see, for example, Khan and 
Sovacool, 2016). Additional emission reductions that could potentially be 
achieved by non-state actors, should they receive support from national 
governments, have not been studied to date.
Cities Increasing coverage of initiatives
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Systemic impact: Reductions that would occur if the 
initiatives achieve a transformative impact at sector level 
or economy-wide level beyond the participants of the 
initiatives themselves. 
Studies on the actual performance of non-state actors in 
meeting their voluntarily set targets (not only analysing the 
targets themselves) are emerging, but are very limited in 
number (for example Khan and Sovacool, 2016). Moreover, 
to the authors’ knowledge, additional reductions that can 
potentially be delivered by initiatives through supporting 
measures by national governments have not been studied 
to date.
The compilation of available studies shows:
• Aggregated impact of individual non-state action, 
initiatives, and national efforts cannot yet be 
estimated with precision. More studies are available 
compared to last year, in particular on cities, but large 
data gaps remain as not all sectors are sufficiently 
studied, and the overlaps and relation with INDCs are 
still unclear.  Key data shortcomings include:
 °  While emissions reductions are published, 
assumptions about greenhouse gas emission 
baseline scenarios are often missing, as are 
Figure 4.3: Illustration of impact of initiatives by study.
Note: The arrows showing the emission reductions potential start at different levels because the individual studies use different baselines (the last three studies explicitly 
estimate the impact additional to INDCs).
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the baseline scenario projections. This makes 
comparisons across studies challenging.
 °  All studies assume full implementation. This 
assumption leads to overestimates, if full 
implementation is not achieved (Khan and 
Sovacool, 2016). It follows that transparent data on 
implementation levels, and the capacity to verify 
the data, are needed (IVM and FORES, 2015).
• The evidence available suggests that both activity 
levels and actual emission reductions are increasing. 
This trend is especially marked in the area of cities, 
and ambitious plans of company initiatives are also 
emerging.
• The limited evidence available indicates that the 
aggregated impact of the initiatives to closing the 
emissions gap can be in the order of a few gigatonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCO
2
e) in 2030. This 
would represent a major contribution, if the initiatives 
reach their stated goals and the emission reductions 
do not displace actions elsewhere.
4.5 Issues for the future
This section summarises a number of issues where additional 
research is needed.
4.5.1 Integrate state and non-state action
To capture the full impact of non-state actor action, and to 
maximise complementarity action, national governments 
should take into account the potential impact of non-state 
actor actions and initiatives. This would help national 
governments obtain a better understanding of the size of 
the mitigation opportunities, while promoting heightened 
ambition and capacity to realise those opportunities.32
In areas where state and non-state actions overlap, non-state 
actor actions may be able to “reinforce, implement, and 
give credibility to the national pledges” (Hale, 2016, p. 20). 
The reverse may also be true: non-state actor actions could 
benefit from enhanced national government support – for 
example through the removal of barriers, and supportive 
legislation.33 
32 Not least, non-state actor actions can also serve as important vehicles for 
policy experimentation and knowledge diffusion.
33 Development of guidance is underway, to help governments and initiatives 
engage with each other more effectively (see, for example, the Initiative 
for Climate Action Transparency, available online at: http://www.
climateactiontransparency.org/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]).
4.5.2 Increase data on non-state action, in 
particular on targets and impact
More data and analysis are needed to fully understand the 
scope of non-state actions. More and better greenhouse gas 
and energy-use inventories for cities, companies and other 
non-state actors would be especially useful.34 
A clearer definition of the goals and targets of the initiatives 
is needed, ideally indicating levels of ambition and 
additionality in relation to other actions. Less than a third 
of the initiatives have quantitative targets. Analysing the 
emission reductions potential of initiatives that only have 
qualitative commitments is even more challenging.35 
The Global Climate Action Agenda calls on non-state 
actor initiatives to set targets that are consistent with the 
long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and to achieve 
the commitments they make.36 Monitoring, reporting and 
verification procedures are instrumental in this process, 
but they vary widely among initiatives. Only a small, but 
increasing, number of initiatives evaluate their impact.37 
One-third of the initiatives registered in the Climate 
Initiatives Platform regularly report on progress toward 
meeting their goals and targets. For most of the initiatives, 
the extent to which regular reporting of implementation 
occurs is unclear.38 Nonetheless, the trend appears to be a 
positive one, and some non-state actor actions apply what 
could be qualified as good practice in reporting.39 
4.5.3 Further issues
Studies of the lessons learned from the initiatives are scarce 
(see, for example, CISL and Ecofys, 2015). Both new and 
existing initiatives could benefit from this kind of analysis in 
the formulation of commitments and the establishment of 
effective governance structures.
Further research is needed to understand the reasons 
behind the geographic imbalance in non-state action 
leadership. At present, the focus is on short-term mitigation 
potentials. Chan et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of 
smaller-scale innovative solutions that – initially – may only 
offer limited mitigation potential, but have large mitigation 
potential in the longer term – that is, 2050 and beyond.
34 The Global Reporting Initiative has made some headway toward achieving 
this.
35 It is worth noting that the emission reductions potential of non-state actor 
actions with qualitative commitments may, in principle, be large.
36 Additional information about the Global Climate Action Agenda is available 
online at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/global-climate-action-
agenda/ [Accessed 11 October 2016]
37 It is worth noting that such evaluations are challenging to undertake, 
particularly in the case of initiatives involving multiple diffuse sources of 
emissions.
38 It is worth noting that what constitutes ‘good reporting practice’ may be very 
different from one sector to another.
39 For example, Graichen et al. (2016) find that the Bonn Challenge, the New 
York Declaration on Forests and RE100, among others, follow above-average 
reporting practices. They provide detailed descriptions of the initiatives, 
and the members’ activities and targets, in addition to preparing their own 
estimate of impact, and making available reporting guidance for potential 
new members.
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Bridging the gap – the role  
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(CEPT University), Ksenia Petrichenko (UNEP DTU Partnership), Bettina Schreck (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and 
PR Shukla (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad)
5.1 Introduction
Improving energy efficiency is essential to meeting the 
objectives of the Paris Agreement and is a greenhouse gas 
mitigation option offering many economy-wide benefits (IEA, 
2014; IPCC, 2014; von Stechow et. al., 2015). Out of the 189 
countries that submitted Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs), 168 countries included energy efficiency 
as one of their priorities (Fenhann, 2016). Countries that 
already have strong energy efficiency policies can testify to 
the multiple benefits, including improved air quality, increased 
social welfare, competitiveness and the creation of jobs (IEA, 
2014; Puig and Farrell, 2015). 
Investments in energy efficiency have shown a positive 
net return for governments, businesses and households. 
Importantly, end-use energy efficiency investments release 
upstream cost reductions in power supply systems, with 
examples of: 300 per cent return on investments from national 
benefits in appliance standards and labelling programmes (4E, 
2016); electricity companies achieving 240 per cent return 
on customer energy efficiency investments from reduced 
upstream costs in generation, transmission and peak supply 
costs (IEA, 2014). Despite falling global oil, gas and coal energy 
prices, global investments in energy efficiency increased by 
six per cent to US$221 billion between 2014 and 2015 (IEA, 
2016a). If access to credit and bond markets is increased, 
and transaction costs are lowered, even more investment will 
be mobilized, especially if the climate benefits can also be 
capitalized upon in the investments, such as through climate 
financing or internalized cost of carbon (for example, reinvested 
carbon taxes).
Energy efficiency policies struggle to work effectively against 
a context of energy price subsidies, as low energy prices 
undermine the essential economics of energy efficiency. Global 
fossil fuel subsidies were estimated at US$490 billion in 2014 
(IEA, 2015a), with a growing number of countries committing 
to reforming these subsidies. Some countries with direct or 
indirect energy subsidies should explore options to shifting 
subsidies from energy supply to end-use services. 
This chapter offers policy makers an assessment of selected 
policies that have been proven to accelerate energy efficiency 
gains in three key sectors: buildings, industry and transport. In 
2010, the buildings sector accounted for around 32 per cent 
of final energy use and annual emissions of 8.8 gigatonnes 
carbon dioxide (GtCO
2
) (direct and indirect); the industry 
sector accounted for around 28 per cent of final energy use and 
emissions of 13 GtCO
2
, (direct and indirect, as well as process 
emissions); while the transport sector accounted for 27 per 
cent of final energy use and emissions of 6.7 GtCO
2 
(IPCC 2014). 
If scaled-up, globally, the assessed energy efficiency policies 
can dramatically reduce energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions in these key sectors. Sector-specific estimates of 
emission reduction potentials are highly dependent on the 
underlying assumptions and approaches. Therefore, studies 
often result in different estimates of the potentials offered 
by energy efficiency options. Numbers from two studies have 
been included to illustrate the scale of the possible reductions 
for each sector.
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) shows that for a cost range of 
between US$20 and 100 per tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
the estimates of both direct and indirect emissions reduction 
potentials in 2030 are (in GtCO
2
e) 5.9 for buildings, 4.1 for 
industry and 2.1 for transport (Ürge-Vorsatz and Novikova, 
2008). The authors note that these estimates are conservative 
and the real potential in each sector is likely bigger. A more 
recent analysis in the World Energy Outlook’s (IEA, 2012) 
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efficient world scenario1 indicates that the cumulative direct 
and indirect emissions estimates in 2035 are (in GtCO
2
e) 30 for 
buildings, 22 for industry and 12 for transport. The two studies 
are not comparable due to basic differences in approaches, 
but collectively illustrate the significant potential in the three 
sectors.
Efficiency gains are evidently also possible in the energy 
supply sector with, for example, more efficient generators, 
transmission, and distribution systems. This chapter does, 
however, focus on end-use efficiency because emissions 
reductions are generally more cost-effective for demand-side 
investments. 
The chapter first assesses experience with key policy options in 
the three sectors: buildings, industry and transport. These are 
then followed by sections focusing wider on systems thinking 
and integration, and emerging opportunities.
In addition to the mitigation effects, improved energy 
efficiency offers other important benefits, for instance by 
playing an important role in the achievement of many of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Goal seven specifically 
aims to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
1 The core assumption in the Efficient World Scenario is that policies are put 
in place to allow the market to realise the potential of all known energy 
efficiency measures which are economically viable. This scenario includes the 
full range of available energy efficiency policies and measures but no carbon 
price is expressed in the results (IEA, 2012). These estimates aren’t potentials 
(like Ürge-Vorsatz and Novikova (2008) based on a carbon price) but rather 
scenarios of what is achievable under the economic conditions the World 
Energy Outlook runs. 
modern energy for all’, and includes an energy efficiency target 
(to double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency 
by 2030). Achievement of goal seven impacts the delivery 
of many other goals, such as good health and well being, 
sustainable cities and communities, responsible consumption 
and production, and climate action. This is further discussed 
in Chapter 6.
As an example of the importance of energy efficiency in the 
implementation of the various goals, the benefits of energy 
efficiency related to goal eleven, sustainable cities and 
communities, are presented in box 5.1.
5.2. Building Sector
The building sector offers major opportunities to bridge the 
emissions gap, due to its large share in global energy use, the 
dynamics of population growth, urbanisation and housing 
needs, and its large cost-effective mitigation potentials (IEA, 
2013; IPCC, 2014). In 2013, the 212 billion square metres (m2) 
of global building stock accounted for almost 125 Exajoules 
of final energy use (IEA, 2016b), up from 102 Exajoules in 
2000 (IPEEC, 2015). Thermal energy uses, including heating, 
cooling, and water heating, comprise the largest energy 
service, with 55 per cent of total building energy use (IEA, 
2016b). 
Top-down estimates, obtained using integrated assessment 
models, often show limited potential for energy savings up 
to 2050. Conversely, bottom-up studies conclude that major 
savings (up to 75 per cent in 2050, compared to a reference 
Box 5.1: Examples of the multiple benefits of energy efficiency that support SDG 11 
(Sustainable Cities and Communities).
Energy savings. Jakarta, Indonesia. The Jakarta Green Building Code was introduced in 2012 to reduce energy 
consumption in large commercial and high-rise residential buildings. It is expected to cut 2.7 million tonnes of CO
2
 
emissions per year by 2020 (IFC, 2016).
Improvements in air quality. Curitiba, Brazil. Integrated urban planning that encouraged high density commercial 
and residential development, combined with the city’s public transportation network, reduced traffic congestion and 
enhanced air quality (Suzuki et al., 2010). 
Impacts on public budgets. Los Angeles, United States of America (USA). Over a four-year period, the LED Streetlight 
Replacement Programme has replaced over 140,000 existing streetlights in the city with LED units. It cost US$57 million, 
but now saves US$9 million a year in energy costs and 60,000 metric tonnes of CO
2
 emissions, with a payback of six to 
seven years. Excess capacity freed up by the investment is being used to power as many as 100 electric charging stations 
(Davies, 2016). 
Creation of jobs. Melbourne, Australia. The city of Melbourne launched a 1200 Buildings Programme in 2010, to improve 
the energy and water consumption of 1,200 commercial buildings. An analysis of the economic benefits estimated that, 
by 2020, it could increase employment by 5,800 to 11,800 (Lawler, no date).
Improvement in human health and well being. Bogota, Colombia. The TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit  system in Bogota 
has replaced 2,100 old public service buses with ones that have improved operational efficiencies. The Bus Rapid Transit 
system has delivered 40 per cent reduction in air emissions, 92 per cent reduction in accidents, and delivered fuel 
savings of 47 per cent (ESMAP, 2009).
Increased access to energy and reduced fuel poverty. Tyrol, Austria. A 2007 housing subsidy was introduced that 
provides funding for social housing to overcome the additional costs of a passive design. Tyrol has the highest density of 
passive houses in the world, with a 21 per cent share in 2014 (Passive House Institute, 2015).
Benefits to energy providers. Johannesburg, South Africa. The city of Johannesburg has partnered with City Power to 
reduce peak load and household electricity consumption. About 65,000 smart meters have been deployed to monitor 
consumption in real-time and alert high energy-using households to reduce consumption (Writer, 2015). 
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scenario) are possible due to recent advances in technology, 
architecture and know-how – mainly with regard to heating 
and cooling (figure 5.1). The difference between these two 
types of analysis lies in the coverage of mitigation options, 
and the assumed rate of up-take. Bottom-up estimates 
are mainly driven by technical and economic potentials, 
whereas top-down estimates mostly reflect assumed market 
adoption rates for certain technologies and investment 
dynamics.
 
With the sector orientation here, focus is on bottom-up 
studies where well-designed policy packages are critical to 
achieving the stated potentials combining building energy 
codes, building energy certification programs, together 
with appropriate incentives and information campaigns 
(Boza-Kiss et al., 2013a).
5.2.1 Building energy codes
Building energy codes and standards are among the most 
cost-effective instruments for reducing building-related 
emissions (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013b). These regulatory tools 
set minimum requirements for parameters determining 
building energy demand, such as energy performance 
or resource use in new and/or existing buildings 
(Boza-Kiss et al., 2013b; Becqué et al., 2016). A strong and well 
implemented building energy code will take the building 
stock to a higher energy performance, and will be able 
to avoid locking-in obsolete solutions and high-emitting 
technologies, especially in rapidly developing regions 
(Becqué et al., 2016).
Building energy codes are increasingly being applied 
worldwide. In late 2015, mandatory and/or voluntary 
building energy codes were in place in over 60 countries at 
either national or subnational levels (IEA, 2016c), making 
this one of the most widely used energy efficiency policy 
instruments.2 Building energy codes are expanding their 
coverage from new construction to renovations of existing 
buildings, which is particularly important for regions 
with mature building stocks. For instance, the European 
Directive on the Performance of Buildings requires energy 
performance improvements for major retrofits throughout 
the European Union (EU) (European Parliament, 2010).3+4 
Building energy codes have also been expanding in their 
coverage of requirements – moving towards more complex, 
whole-building approaches, and requiring the integration of 
renewable energy generation (IEA, 2013).
2 California provides an excellent example of how building energy codes can 
drive emission reductions. Between the 1970s and 2016 the state’s thermal 
building energy use (and thus the corresponding emissions) has been reduced 
by more than 90 per cent. California continues to increase the stringency of 
its building regulations aiming at achieving zero net energy performance 
by 2020 for new residential buildings, and by 2030 for new non-residential 
buildings (Shirakh et al., 2015).
3 However, countries such as Germany also set energy performance 
requirements for minor retrofits (CA EPBD, 2015). Hong Kong also uses 
similar requirements to upgrade the energy performance of existing buildings 
undergoing major retrofits (Chan et al., 2014).
4 There are also building energy codes for “retro-commissioning”, which require 
periodic mandatory audits, followed by obligatory improvement of energy 
performance for low-performing buildings. Such a regulation (Local Law 87) is 
in place in New York City, where buildings over 50,000 gross square feet must 
undergo selected measures as part of a retro-commissioning process (Becqué 
et al., 2016). Austin, Texas also requires efficiency improvements in the case 
of low-performing multi-family buildings.
However, the existence of a building energy codes alone 
does not guarantee emission reductions. To ensure their 
effectiveness, the following principles need to also be adopted:
• Compliance monitoring and enforcement are 
essential (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013a; GBPN, 2014).5 
Typically, limited human and financial resources for 
this activity will be a key barrier to the successful 
implementation of building codes.
• The design of building energy codes should follow 
a holistic approach, covering energy performance, 
quality and safety, and utilisation of renewable 
energy (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013b).
• The stringency of building energy codes should be 
regularly revisited and strengthened. Leapfrogging to 
very high efficiency performance standards have also 
been demonstrated and avoid lock-in.
Building energy codes are a key policy instrument, but may 
not be sufficient in overcoming all the barriers to thermal 
energy efficiency improvements in buildings. Capacity 
building activities, supply-chain development, and other 
policy instruments – like credible building performance 
information or energy certification and financial incentives 
– all complement building codes. In fact, more integrated 
policy packages can often better overcome the many diverse 
barriers prevailing in this sector (Brown and Sovacool, 2011).
5.2.2 Building information and energy 
performance certification 
Certification of building energy performance is currently 
being used in at least 35 countries, worldwide (IEA, 
2016d).6 Labelling schemes enable policy makers to tailor 
incentive schemes and other policy instruments, fostering 
a market transformation towards high-energy performance 
building stock. Certification may exist with or without a 
label, and can be combined with the provision of a set of 
recommendations for improvement (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013a). 
Mandatory schemes are expected to have a higher overall 
impact, while voluntary schemes can be considered as 
information measures. Voluntary schemes may enhance 
the effectiveness of other policies, or be a transitional step 
towards a mandatory system. The effectiveness of certification 
and labelling schemes also depends on effective monitoring 
and enforcement, which should be an integral part of their 
design.
Many countries have developed their own building 
energy performance certification schemes, like the Home 
Energy Rating (Chile), Greenship (Indonesia) and Green 
Mark (Singapore). Many other countries have adapted 
international certification systems to the local conditions. 
However, many of these schemes were developed before 
5 Nevertheless, compliance is often problematic. For instance, in some states 
of the USA the compliance rate was as low as 20 per cent, and in Japan about 
30 per cent (Liu et al., 2010). Even in established building energy codes 
regimes, such as the EU, compliance rate ranges between 60-97 per cent for 
new buildings and 45-93 per cent for retrofits (ICF, 2015).
6 Most of these schemes are voluntary. In the case of the European Union, its 
mandatory Energy Performance Certification is required when buildings are 
sold or rented, or when they undergo major renovations.
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a stringent climate goal was universally accepted and, 
therefore, operate with less ambitious energy, or emissions 
performance levels than would be consistent with the 
global goal. Therefore, it is important that countries, before 
adopting energy performance certification programmes 
for buildings developed in the past, carefully examine their 
stringency from the perspective of carbon lock-in, and 
the energy and emissions performance requirements are 
brought as close to the state-of-the-art as possible (Boza-
Kiss et al., 2013b).
5.2.3. Highly energy efficient buildings 
The passivehaus standard. In terms of energy performance, 
one of the most ambitious building energy certification 
schemes is the so-called “Passivehaus” standard.7  This 
standard encourages very low-energy buildings from a 
heating and cooling perspective, with low thermal losses 
and optimized thermal gains (Schnieders, 2003; Feist et 
al., 2005). The Passivehaus standard has been adapted to 
different climate zones worldwide and further developed 
with the common target that annual final energy use for 
heating and cooling – not exceeding 15 kilowatt hour (kWh)
per m2 per year.8 This target represents a reduction of up to 
90 per cent in energy demand for heating and cooling for 
most existing buildings (Feist et al., 2005). The standard has 
become popular in several countries, and is experiencing a 
dynamic market adoption in several regions. The global floor 
area of Passivehauses has grown from 10 million m2 in 2010 
to 46 million m2 in 2016, with the most activity occurring in 
Europe (personal correspondence: Passive House Institute 
and Gunter Lang). Presently, the price premium for new 
Passivehauses in several countries is comparable to standard 
construction costs (Treberspurg and Djalili, 2013).
Net-zero energy buildings. The minimal remaining energy 
needs of highly efficient buildings can often be supplied with 
on-site renewable energy, thus creating a net zero energy 
building (Torcellini and Crawley, 2006). The global market of 
this type of building reached US$630 million in 2014, and 
is expected to continue its growth, to reach US$1.4 trillion 
by 2035 (Navigant Research, 2014). Numerous examples of 
net zero energy buildings exist around the world (IEA, 2013; 
Erhorn and Erhorn-Kluttig, 2014; New Buildings Institute, 
2016). 9
Energy positive (or e+) buildings. These are buildings that 
generate more (renewable) energy on-site than they use. 
Examples can be found in a number of countries, including 
Australia, France, Germany, Norway, the UK and the USA. 
These highly efficient buildings can play an important and 
more active role in the overall energy system, since they can 
act as potential micro-energy hubs, supplying energy to local 
neighbourhoods through peer-to-peer networks. This offers 
opportunities to generate and store renewable energy (both 
7 Passivehaus originated in Germany, with the pilot project launching in 1990 
(Ebel and Feist, 1997).
8 The average building stock levels in most developed countries score well 
above 100-150 kWh per m2 (Schnieders et al., 2015).
9 The concept can also be applied at a scale that is greater than individual 
buildings. For example, in 2015 California established its first net zero energy 
community (‘Sierra Crest’), consisting of 20 NZEBs (Movellan, 2015).
thermal and electric) on-site, as well as deliver significant 
distributed demand response(De Groote et al., 2016).10 
Recognizing the promise of highly energy efficient buildings 
and their societal co-benefits (Treberspurg Djalili, 2013; 
Schnieders and Hermelink, 2006), some jurisdictions are 
now recommending or mandating them as standards for 
different building types. For instance, since 2010, in Brussels 
(Belgium) all new public buildings are mandated to be built 
to the Passivehaus standard, and as of January 2015 it is a 
mandatory requirement for all new buildings and major 
retrofits (EnEffect, 2014). Hanover, Germany does not have 
mandatory Passivehaus policies, however the local housing 
market has transformed to offer high efficiency as a standard 
option, and approximately one-third of all new construction 
voluntarily conforms to the Passivehaus standard (Passive 
House Institute, 2015).
5.3. Industry
Industrial energy demand, leading to 2030, is expected 
to increase at a rate of 1.3 per cent annually, primarily in 
emerging economies (IEA, 2015a). Decision making priorities 
differ significantly between the building and industry sectors 
where short-term energy prices for industries often have a 
large impact on energy efficiency decisions, particularly at 
the point of in-plant investment (Steinbuks and Neuhoff, 
2014). 
5.3.1 Energy Management, ISO 50001 and Energy 
Performance Monitoring
Energy management systems help to reduce energy use by 
optimizing energy consumption across the entire production 
process through a suite of procedures and practices that 
ensure systematic tracking, analysis, and planning of energy 
use. This is done while keeping up with core industry 
priorities such as reduced costs, increased productivity, 
environmental compliance, and enhanced competitiveness. 
Energy management systems are an essential tool for 
sustaining continuous energy efficiency improvements in 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, as well as in large 
process-intensive industries (IEA, 2015b). ISO 50001 is the 
globally accepted standard for energy management systems.
Many governments mandate large energy end-users to 
implement energy management systems.11 The recent Clean 
Energy Ministerial meeting in June 2016 put forward the 
aspirational goal of achieving global ISO 50001 certifications 
by 2020,12 providing a new momentum to the promotion 
of energy management. Early pilot implementation of ISO 
50001 showed that for companies with no existing energy 
10 Demand response is the ability to shift energy demand by reducing peak 
consumption and grid imbalance.
11 Most countries in Europe have made energy management central in their 
energy efficiency programmes. In Germany, companies implementing energy 
management and obtaining ISO 50001 may apply for a tax reduction. This has 
driven the adoption of ISO 50001 by the German industry, which accounts for 
more than 50 per cent of the 6,778 certificates issued in 2014 (ISO, 2014).
12 The CEM estimates that the worldwide implementation of ISO 50001 by large 
energy-using organizations could achieve cumulative energy savings of 62 
Exajoules by 2030, cost savings of US$600 billion, and 6,500 Mt of avoided 
CO
2
 emissions (CEM, 2016).
36 The Emissions Gap Report 2016 – Bridging the gap – the role of energy efficiency
management system, the average energy performance gains 
in the first one-to-two years ranged between 10 and 20 per 
cent of baseline consumption (UNIDO, 2015).
5.3.2 Energy performance standards for industrial 
equipment
Many industrialized countries already have mandatory 
minimum energy performance standards in place for a range 
of energy consuming equipment within industry. Emerging 
economies are following suit with the introduction of similar 
standards for motors and boilers (box 5.2). 13
 
While individual efficient components may often only bring 
about gains of up to five per cent, system optimization 
measures can attain more durable average efficiency gains of 
20 to 30 per cent. The payback period for operational energy 
efficiency projects is often less than two years (UNIDO and 
UN Energy, 2010). This broader potential requires policy 
support, such as awareness raising, technical support and 
capacity building, which can break down the barriers for 
optimizing energy efficiency in the design, operation and 
maintenance of industrial systems.
5.3.3. Delivering industrial energy efficiency 
through energy service companies 
An energy service company is a business that provides 
a range of energy services, including implementation of 
energy efficiency technologies and projects. In the industry 
sector, the most significant energy service company 
activities tend to focus on buildings.
Utility programmes for industrial energy efficiency provide 
an additional avenue for identifying projects that energy 
service companies could implement.14 A good example is in 
Denmark, where utilities are responsible for actively seeking 
projects improving the energy efficiency of their end-users.15 
13 Electric motors use two-thirds of the electrical consumption in industry 
(IEA, 2011), whereas steam generation represents 30 per cent of global final 
industrial energy use (UNIDO, 2014).
14 Unlike the ratepayer-funded programmes that are popular for households 
and commercial users, a utility programme for industrial energy efficiency 
should: (i) provide low-cost technical assistance in terms of training, 
networking and sharing of knowledge and best practices; (ii) offer a package 
of incentives providing both technical and financial support to industrial 
users; and (iii) develop long-term relationships/agreements with the 
industrial users to deliver sustained energy improvements.
15 Large industrial end-users are obliged to conduct energy audits and 
implement all energy efficiency projects with a payback period of up to four 
years. The Danish Energy Agency provides links to approved consultants 
and standards for the audits. It also compiles and shares best practice case 
studies.
5.4. Transport
In developed countries, passenger transport demand grows 
with income, until a certain income threshold has been 
reached (Dhar and Shukla, 2015), while freight transport 
demand appears to grow as a function of the type of 
commodity concerned. Demand for both passenger and 
freight transport in developing countries is likely to follow 
a similar trend.
To date, transport has relied almost exclusively on fossil 
fuels. Given likely trends in demand for transport in 
developing countries, emissions from the sector in these 
countries could grow substantially. For this reason, 
implementing sustainable transport solutions is critical.
Seventy-seven per cent of the INDCs submitted before the 21st 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change identified transport as a key 
target sector for mitigation (Gota et al., 2015). Interventions 
quoted in these INDCs focus on actions to “improve” (141 
INDCs), “shift” (66) or “avoid” (17), compared to current 
transport forms (Gota et al., 2015). Across national 
submissions, policy options like fuel economy standards, 
regulations for cleaner fuels, and reorienting development 
plans, play a key role.
5.4.1 Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards and CO2 
emissions
Standards that specify fuel economy (average fuel 
consumption, for example, expressed as litre (L) per 100 
km) and/or CO
2
 emissions for new vehicles have been 
implemented in most industrialized countries and several 
developing countries (table 5.1). These policies have 
generally been successful, and the average fuel economy 
of new vehicles sold has improved significantly. However, 
standards are most effective when complemented with user 
charges that reflect actual road and environmental costs, 
levied according to vehicles’ usage and emissions intensity 
performance.
Compliance monitoring and enforcement are necessary to 
ensure that the purported performance levels are being 
achieved (IEA, 2016c), and consumers can have confidence 
in energy efficiency. Fuel economy improvements will also 
deliver benefits related to improved public health from 
better air quality, reduced fuel costs, and increased energy 
security.
Box 5.2: Steam Systems in China. 
In 2012, the economic emission reductions potential associated with industrial coal-fired steam systems in China 
was 1,687 PJ (or 23 per cent of the total fuel used in industrial coal-fired steam systems in the country in 2012). This 
corresponds to savings in CO
2
 emissions of 165,817 kilotonnes of CO
2
 (UNIDO, 2014). Optimization of the entire steam 
system (as opposed to boilers only) would result in much larger energy savings.
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Regulations on fuel economy and emissions have also 
helped promote other types of vehicles, such as Battery 
Electric Vehicles and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles. 
Similarly, higher fuel and road taxes have encouraged the 
purchase of more efficient vehicles. Labelling, to inform 
consumers about the fuel consumption and CO
2
 emissions 
of a vehicle, thus allowing them to make more informed 
purchasing decisions, is implemented in the EU, the 
USA and other countries (Haq and Weiss, 2016). Vehicle 
maintenance, low rolling resistant tyres, tyre pressure, road 
maintenance, and driver behaviour, all influence the fuel 
efficiency of a vehicle. Combining policies and measures, as 
has been done in France, for example, makes it possible to 
achieve results in a more cost-effective manner.
5.4.2. Electric Mobility for Passenger Transport
In 2015, the global stock of electric cars was 1.26 million 
(IEA, 2016e). Electric vehicles use energy 70 per cent more 
efficiently than non-electric vehicles (Sims et al., 2014). 
However, when power generation losses are taken into 
account, the overall system efficiency balance needs to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. In the long-term, electric 
vehicles are an important mitigation option through both 
end-use efficiency and decarbonisation of electricity supply 
(Dhar et al., 2016). They also bring about substantial co-
benefits, such as improved urban air quality.
In 2015, to increase the up-take of electric vehicles, a range 
of enabling policies were in place in 16 selected countries 
(IEA, 2016e). Policies that help increase the up-take of 
electric vehicles can be grouped in three areas:
• Economic incentives: purchase incentives (France, 
Germany, Japan, UK, USA); tax exemptions, including 
waivers on excise tax (China); lower purchase tax, or 
lower registration tax (Netherlands, Portugal); and 
differential taxation on the basis of emissions.
• Urban initiatives: e-mobility plans in cities; increased 
network of charging stations; incorporation of 
electric vehicles in urban plans and bylaws; waivers 
on parking charges; and priority in urban traffic.
• Policy continuity: An important lesson from the 
success of Norway was that in addition to strong 
incentives, there was effective policy sequencing over 
many years (box 5.3). 
 
Globally, the movement of electrification has been 
transitioning into other transport modes, including 
two-wheelers, three-wheelers and public transport. 
Electrification of transport has grown rapidly in China and 
India, where electric two-wheelers and three-wheelers are 
increasingly common, highlighting a need to offer diverse 
efficient travel modes and vehicles. China leads with around 
Box 5.3: Incentives for electric vehicles in Norway. 
Norway has one of the most ambitious programmes to foster the adoption of electric vehicles. In 2015, battery electric 
vehicles represented 18 per cent of the total car sales, which has been achieved through: (i) collaboration between 
government, private players and non-government organizations, (ii) publicly-supported charging stations (Figenbaum et 
al., 2015), and (iii) strong incentives for purchase and ownership of battery vehicles (Bjerkan et al., 2016). The case for 
decarbonisation from electric vehicles is strong, as over 95 per cent of the electricity in Norway is supplied by hydro-
electric power. The Norwegian government has supported the transition to electric mobility on a continuous basis and 
adjusted the policies with time to encourage adoption of electric cars.
Table 5.1: CO
2
 Emission targets and fuel economy standards for cars. 
Country Emission standards1 
(grams of CO
2
/km)
Fuel economy standards1 
(L/100 km)
Average fuel economy 20132 
of new vehicles (L/100 km)
Reduction 2005-20132 
(L/100 km)
Japan 5.95 by 2015
4.93 by 2020
4.9 -1.4
Canada 135 by 2016
98 by 2025
8.2 -1.3
European Union 130 by 2015
95 by 2021
6.8 -1.5
USA 132 by 2017
89 by 2025
6.4 by 2016
4.2 by 2025
8.6 -1.7
China 6.9 by 2015
5.0 by 2021
7.3 -0.1
Republic of Korea 97 by 2020 4.2 by 2020 6.0 -2.7
India 130 by 2017
113 by 2021
2016 5.6 +0.2
Source: 1 UNEP, 2010, The International Council on Clean Transportation, 2016, 2 GFEI, 2016.
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200 million electric two-wheelers (IEA, 2016e). The sale 
of electric scooters in China started rising due to a ban on 
conventional vehicles in cities, to reduce air pollution. Other 
contributing factors were policies to allow e-bikes up to a 
certain weight limit to share right-of-way on bicycle lanes, 
and investments in charging stations in cities. The Chinese 
government has also implemented aggressive policies and 
incentives for electrification of public transport, including 
subsidies and investments in charging infrastructure for 
buses. Presently, China has over 170,000 electric buses 
(IEA, 2016e). Recently, India has announced policies and 
incentives to enable the adoption of electric vehicles. 
The near-term challenges for electric vehicles include the 
currently high up-front costs, compared to conventional 
vehicles, and addressing the technical issues related to 
battery capacity, reuse and recycling. Battery costs have 
undergone significant reduction, from nearly US$1,000 per 
kWh in 2007, to nearly US$300 per kWh in 2015 (Nykvist 
and Nilsson, 2015), and are expected to further decease 
to less than US$150 per kWh in the future (Bruce et al., 
2012). Estimated cost reductions for cars could be nearly 
50 per cent for battery electric vehicles, and 60 per cent for 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (Wolfram and Lutsey, 2016). 
These lower battery costs will significantly reduce the cost 
of electric vehicles and the amount of subsidies required in 
the future. Further improvements in battery technologies 
and vehicle performance are expected to ease the existing 
limitations of driving range and battery costs. The driving 
range issue is also being addressed by local governments 
through the provision of charging infrastructure. Efforts are 
also underway to find solutions for the re-use and recycling 
of batteries, including utilisation of used car batteries as a 
source of storage within electric grids. 
5.4.3. Sustainable Logistics/Freight Transportation
Freight transport accounted for 45 per cent of transport 
sector energy demand in 2009 (Sims et al., 2014), and a 
similar share of CO
2
 emissions. More than 50 per cent of 
freight-related CO
2
 emissions come from road transport, 
especially heavy-duty vehicles (IPCC, 2014; Sims et al., 2014). 
Efficiency of freight transport can be improved through better 
utilisation of freight capacity, decisions regarding siting of 
logistics facilities, routing of freight corridors, and a shift to 
more efficient and cleaner modes of transport, such as rail 
or water-borne transport. A modal shift away from road to 
rail can lead to substantial emissions reductions, since the 
emissions from rail are only a fraction per km, compared 
to heavy-duty vehicles (Sims et al., 2014). This modal shift 
can deliver additional benefits, in the form of reduced local 
air pollution and accidents (Machado-Filho, 2009). India’s 
Dedicated Freight Corridor project is an example of an 
integrated plan that aims to increase efficiency of freight 
transport, while ensuring overall economic development 
(box 5.4).
5.5. Opportunities through systems thinking 
and integration
Some mitigation opportunities are difficult to cover in 
a sectoral breakdown, but can still be very important. 
In general, the opportunities for increasing energy 
efficiency are moving from perfecting individual products to 
optimizing systems. This section highlights a couple of such 
opportunities.
5.5.1 Urban systems: efficient settlement forms
Cities are one of the biggest consumers of energy in the 
world, representing almost two-thirds of global primary 
energy demand, and accounting for 70 per cent of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector (IEA, 
2016b). While most emissions in cities originate from the 
building, industry and transport sectors, a sizable share 
of these emissions could be avoided through city-level 
mitigation options, such as spatial planning (to ensure 
connectivity, accessibility, mixed land-use, and a certain 
level of density), improving transit options, increasing and 
co-locating employment and residential densities, and 
increasing green spaces. A growing number of cities are 
joining various non-state actor partnerships, in an effort to 
become more efficient, sustainable and low emitting. The 
growing role of non-state actors is discussed in Chapter 4.
5.5.2 Lifestyles, behaviour, culture and 
consumption patterns
More sustainable lifestyles in the form of changes in 
behaviour and consumption patterns, along with embedded 
cultural traditions and habits, are increasingly in focus as 
important means to achieving climate goals that cut across 
sectors. While policy making has traditionally focused on 
technological and economic solutions, changes in behaviour 
can often result in large energy savings (Allcott and 
Mullainathan, 2010; EEA, 2013).
 
Box 5.4: Dedicated freight corridors in India. 
The Indian government is prioritizing policies that help to shift freight transport from road to rail. This ambition was 
highlighted in India’s INDC as an important strategy for decarbonizing the transport sector (UNFCCC, 2015). The INDC 
specifies a target of increasing the share of rail in land transportation (from 36 to 45 per cent by 2030) through investment 
in Dedicated Freight Corridors. These corridors will develop separate rail networks for freight transport (DFCCIL, 2016). 
India’s INDC estimates that these corridors could reduce emissions by about 457 million tonnes of CO
2
 over 30-years, a 
figure that could increase if electricity were decarbonized.
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Most studies agree that mitigation strategies involving 
lifestyles and behaviour do not need to imply compromises 
in living standards. Recent research points out that domestic 
energy saving potentials through behavioural measures 
range from 20-30 per cent, but could be substantially larger 
in the longer term (Karlin et al., 2015).16  
While both the understanding of and the policy 
toolbox addressing behavioural and lifestyle changes as 
mitigation strategies are very rudimentary, a few 
conclusions can be derived. Policies that can influence 
the choices of consumers typically focus on price signals 
(notably: subsidies, tax rebates, and taxes) and information 
disclosure – for example, mandated energy labels (Allcott 
and Mullainathan, 2010). 
5.6. Emerging Opportunities 
Advances in information communication technology, 
including the internet, big data, smart technologies and 
systems, and shared economy platforms, social media, 
are revolutionising human activities and, consequently, 
energy consumption. While the impact of these is still being 
understood, it appears as though the economic emissions 
reduction potential is high, if these trends can be 
intelligently guided and opportunities seized.
5.6.1. Circular and sharing Economy
Recent developments enable opportunities to utilise 
capacities to a much higher degree, which in turn helps the 
world move towards a more “shared economy”, as people 
are increasingly using assets such as cars, bicycles, and 
apartments on a regular basis.17 Similarly, dematerialisation 
can shift manufacturing away from a linear to a circular 
economy. 
16 Based on the review of behavioural measures across the EU, it was found 
that behavioural measures could achieve around 5-20 per cent reduction 
in energy consumption compared to previous consumption (EEA, 2013). A 
meta-analysis found that of the 29 energy feedback studies they surveyed 
with sample sizes over 100, energy savings ranged from 0.5 to 13 per cent of 
previous consumption (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010).
17 For example, in 2015, 980 cities globally had some type of public bike-
sharing programme (May, 2016). Public bike-sharing is the fastest growing 
mode of public transportation and has grown at an annual growth rate of 
37 per cent since 2009 (Campbell et al., 2016). Similarly, many mainstream 
car manufacturers are promoting sharing electric vehicles, such as Daimler’s 
Car2Go, BMW’s Drivenow, among others.
The concept, based on a regenerative design principle, turns 
goods that are at the end of their service life into resources 
for others, closing loops in industrial ecosystems and 
minimizing waste (Stahel, 2016).18 Companies engaging in 
these production paradigms are inherently drawn to efficient 
production, distribution, recycling and materials supply chain 
practices. Large economies, such as the EU, are on their way 
to adopting the circular economy as the standard approach 
to material production and use.
5.6.2. Information and communication technology 
New information and communication technologies are 
expected to improve the efficiency of services with minimal 
environmental impacts, and also imply a certain degree of 
automation in decision making. Such systems can be applied 
to buildings to control heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting 
and utilities,19 as well as in the industry and transport sectors. 
In the industry sector, instantaneous tracking of energy 
performance and a real-time measurement of energy use 
and savings allows for significant reduction in energy use. In 
transport, real-time access to traffic information allows for 
safer and more efficient uses of transport networks.20 
 
18 Several developed countries including Germany, Japan and the USA have 
comprehensive regulations in place. Sharing and recycling are closely linked 
to behaviour and cultural issues, therefore, incentives for energy saving 
behaviour, including tax breaks, market levers and government support, will 
encourage higher adoption. In the last decade, China has taken initiatives to 
promote recirculation of waste materials through targets, policies, financial 
measures and legislation (Mathews and Tan, 2016).
19 Smart buildings can help deliver 10-15 per cent reduction in building energy 
use in the USA (Agarwal et al., 2010). Digitalization and building integrated 
modelling can help to design buildings with optimized material use and 
energy savings through the entire life cycle (WEF and Boston Consulting 
Group, 2016).
20 Increasingly, Information and Communication Technology is defining the need 
for travel through online shopping and ride-sharing, and has the potential to 
deliver emission reductions. For instance, online shopping could reduce CO
2
 
emissions by 22 per cent from shopping trips in Sweden in 2030 compared to 
2012 (Rosqvist and Hiselius, 2016).
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6.1 Introduction
The international development agenda for the next 15 
years was defined by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (the 2030 Agenda), adopted by 193 countries 
at the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 (UN, 
2015). The agenda succeeds the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, which established the Millennium Development 
Goals, and represents a considerable expansion in scope and 
ambition. It comprises 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) (see figure 6.1) and 169 associated targets, and takes 
a global perspective – seeking to provide a comprehensive, 
strategic direction to the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of development. 
 
Acknowledging the interdependence of the challenges, the 
SDGs are to be regarded as “integrated and indivisible”, 
according to paragraph 18 of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015). 
The need for an integrated approach to the SDGs is nowhere 
more relevant than in the context of climate change. This 
chapter provides a brief overview of the challenges climate 
change poses to the SDGs. It then gives an initial qualitative 
assessment of key areas of alignment, trade-offs and 
opportunities between the SDGs and the climate change 
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement, focusing on 
selected SDGs and associated targets. 
 
SDG13 constitutes the 2030 Agenda’s climate change goal. 
It does not provide concrete mitigation targets or proposed 
limits to global warming.  It, instead, targets strengthening 
the resilience to climate-related hazards, mainstreaming 
climate change into policy and strategic planning processes, 
awareness building and capacity development, and 
funding. For more concrete and measurable mitigation and 
adaptation objectives, the 2030 Agenda expressly 
recognizes the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the authoritative body for 
defining global policies on climate change (see UN, 2015). 
The Paris Agreement, thereby, frames a boundary condition 
for the implementation of the SDGs. 
6.2 The SDG-mitigation nexus 
During the period of dialogue and negotiation for the 
SDGs, a number of studies sought to catalogue the 
interrelationships, synergies and trade-offs between the 
proposed goals and climate change (WWF and CARE, 2015; 
Scott and Picot, 2014; Picot and Moss, 2014; Munro, 2014; 
Marston, 2014; Leong, 2015; Ansuategi et al., 2015). These 
studies considered relevance from both SDG impacts on 
climate, and climate impacts on the SDG, with a range of 
methodologies and results. Some studies focused on the 
explicit mentioning and recognition of climate change in the 
target formulation of different SDGs, while others placed 
stronger emphasis on sector specific linkages. 
6.2.1 Climate change jeopardizes maintenance of 
progress against the SDGs
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
assessment reports have identified the human impacts of 
climate change with increasing confidence (IPCC 2001, 2007, 
2014a). This has led to growing concern for the long-term 
sustainability of development progress, and impacts on 
the poor, in particular, in the absence of appropriate risk 
management practices and steep reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions (see for example AfDB et al., 2003; Stern 
Review, 2007; World Bank, 2010; Hallegatte et al., 2016; 
Granoff et al., 2015). 
The need to strengthen resilience to climate change is 
a repeated concern in the SDGs. It is not only reflected in 
SDG13 on climate change, but also under several other 
goals, such as those related to ending poverty (SDG1), 
ending hunger (SDG2), building infrastructure (SDG9), and 
improving cities and human settlements (SDG11). Adaptation 
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to climate change is a necessary, complementary measure to 
mitigation, but does not substitute for closing the emissions 
gap, as with progressive levels of warming, adaptive 
capacities of several natural and human systems may 
no longer be able to cope with the rate and magnitude 
of change, and the risk of crossing tipping points with 
large-scale irreversible consequences may increase 
(Schneider et al., 2007; Lenton et al., 2008; Schleussner et 
al, 2016). 
Among the chief findings of analyses to date is that the 
impacts of climate change may undermine our ability 
to deliver the SDGs by 2030.  Analysis by the World Bank 
(Hallegatte, 2016) estimates that absent, rapid and inclusive 
development practices, climate change could result in an 
additional 100 million people living in extreme poverty by 
2030, slowing progress against SDG1.
Ansuategi et al. (2015) assessed the risk of failure to 
achieve the SDGs under high- and low-ambition climate 
change agreement outcomes at Paris. Their analysis 
identified a medium risk, even under the high-ambition 
scenario, of failing to achieve the SDGs related to health 
(SDG3); gender equality (SDG5); clean water and 
sanitation (SDG6); sustainable consumption and 
production (SDG12); life below water (SDG14); and life on 
land (SDG15). With the low-ambition scenario there would 
be a high risk of failing to achieve 10 of the 17 SDGs.
As impacts become increasingly certain in the post-2030 
period, they also become highly likely to undermine the 
ability to maintain progress against many of the SDGs 
beyond 2030. Looking only at the best understood pathways 
by which climate change impacts poverty targets— 
agricultural productivity, climate extremes, and corollary 
childhood malnutrition and developmental stunting—
Granoff et al. (2015) found that these factors alone could 
impact up to 750 million people in extreme or moderate 
poverty by 2050.  
Climate-exacerbated extreme weather events will also 
likely impact urban populations severely. Half of humanity 
lives less than 60 kilometres (km) from the coast, and 
three-quarters of all large cities are located in coastal 
areas (UNEP, 2016).  Urban impacts of climate change 
have been well noted, if less well quantified (Hallegatte, 
2016), but clearly interfere directly with targets to improve 
infrastructure (SDG9) and develop sustainable cities 
(SDG11), and will have consequent drags on poverty 
eradication (SDG1) and other goals.
End poverty in all its forms everywhere Reduce inequality within and among countries
End hunger, achieve food security and 
improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being 
for all at all ages
Ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns
Ensure inclusive and equitable quality 
education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts*
Achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources for sustainable development
Ensure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of 
terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, provide access to justice 
for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels
Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all
Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development
Build resilient infrastructure, promote 
inclusive and sustainable industrialization 
and foster innovation
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Notes: The SDGs are global goals on the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions for sustainable development. They are further 
specified through 169 associated targets.
* Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for 
negotiating the global response to climate change.
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6.3 The role of the SDGs in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions: path-
alignment and path-contingency 
While the SDGs are highly interdependent, the relationships 
are not always inherently mutualistic (Nilsson et al., 2016). 
Prior authors have emphasized the potential for conflict 
between certain SDGs and climate change objectives. 
The remainder of this chapter explores a complementary 
approach, analysing the SDGs particularly relevant for 
mitigation, divided into two key areas: agriculture, forestry 
and other land-uses, and energy-related emissions. Certain 
goals and associated targets are defined in ways that are 
synergistic, or “path-aligned”. Their achievement will 
generally facilitate the achievement of the mitigation 
objectives of the Paris Agreement. Others are defined 
in ways that may or may not be antagonistic with these 
mitigation objectives, depending on how they are pursued. 
Table 6.1: Path-alignment and path-contingency of selected SDGs
SDG Topic Alignment Analysis
SDG2 Hunger and food 
security
Path-contingent Target 2.4 emphasizes the need for alignment of improvements in sustainability and 
productivity, and pursuit of hunger and food security objectives, and increases in 
agricultural productivity envisioned in targets 2.3 and 2.a have the potential to materially 
increase emissions if they lead to extensification, soil degradation and other effects at odds 
with reduction of agriculture, forestry and other land-use emissions. Alternatively, these 
could align effectively with climate goals if pursued in an integrated fashion with target 2.4, 
and taking into account the opportunities to reduce food losses and improve distributional 
considerations. Impacts of improvements to productivity depend on technology, policy and 
context significantly, and thus alignment of the SDG is contingent upon these factors. 
SDG7 Sustainable Energy 
Access
Path-aligned The specific energy demands of universalizing energy access under target 7.1 are low, 
and there is formidable evidence that the preponderance are best served by low-carbon 
distributed technologies. The risk of potential trade-offs between expanded energy 
consumption and climate objectives are embedded within other SDGs, such as SDGs 8 and 
9 discussed below. Targets 2.2 and 2.3 aim to promote increases in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency, and greater success against these targets directly serves the mitigation 
objectives of the Paris Agreement.
SDG8 Growth and 
employment
Path-contingent Historic economic growth has been strongly correlated with greenhouse gas emissions. 
While the goal heading itself makes reference to sustainability, the only target level 
reference to sustainability is with respect to “sustained growth” under target 8.1, leaving 
open the mitigation implications of growth pathways on its face.  Target 8.4 discusses 
decoupling of growth from environmental degradation generally but focusing on the 
sustainability of consumption and production as per SDG15.  Growth’s historic correlation 
with increased greenhouse gas emissions underscores that the compatibility of this SDG 
with the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement hinges on the ability of growing 
economies to accelerate the decoupling economic output from emissions.
SDG9 Infrastructure, 
industrialization, 
and innovation
Path-contingent Targets 9.1, 9.4 and 9.a focus on the expansion of infrastructure.  Infrastructure 
development is paradoxically a strong correlate of emissions growth, and a critical 
requirement to decarbonization.  This is because incumbent infrastructure choices have 
been associated with increases in energy demand and intensity and land use change: 
decarbonization will require both the replacement of incumbent infrastructure and 
expansion of infrastructure services through low-carbon options. Some infrastructure locks 
in patterns of inefficiency, other choices lead to decarbonization, energy efficiency, and 
pollution reduction. The result of these targets on emissions will be highly contingent on 
the nature of these infrastructure choices.
Targets 9.2 and 9.3. focus on the promotion of industrialization.  While target 9.2 
does acknowledge the need for “sustainable” industrialization, historic processes of 
industrialization have been drivers of emissions growth.  New paths of industrialization, 
particularly if enabled by innovation promoted under targets 9.5, 9.b and supplied with 
low-carbon energy sources, have the potential change this historical pattern if innovation 
is geared toward decarbonizing technologies and processes. The emissions implications of 
the target are therefore contingent upon realizing this potential.
SDG11 Sustainable Cities Path-aligned The 10 targets of the goal are generally well-aligned as seven of the ten targets as-drafted 
focus on measures that expressly improve the resource efficiency of urban form, and thus 
also ones that benefit climate: factors to achieve them would be policies that improve, 
for example, compactness, public transport, and other efficiency inducing measures. 
Target 11.1 on access to housing does leave open the possibility of climate-conflicting 
approaches, but the goal taken as a whole emphasizes that improvements to urban form 
entail measures that are sustainability enhancing.
SDG12 Sustainable 
consumption and 
production
Path-aligned Improving the resource-use efficiency of production, reducing pollution and promoting 
more sustainable consumption patterns diminish the pressure on the environment, 
including impacts on the climate. This makes the targets under this goal well aligned with 
SDG14.  Achievement of these targets will also further the scope for the climate-alignment 
of agricultural production, industrialization, and corollary economic growth under SDGs 2, 
8 and 9, respectively.
SDG15 Terrestrial 
Ecosystems
Path-aligned Terrestrial ecosystems, particularly forests, hold large carbon stocks that, if disrupted, 
could have severe consequent emissions. The halting of deforestation is an important lever 
for agriculture, forestry and other land-use mitigation. While carbon stock preservation 
does not necessarily serve all of the objectives of terrestrial ecosystems preservations 
found in SDG 15’s targets, the targets are largely salutary to mitigation efforts.
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Hence, they are considered to be “path-contingent”. With 
these goals and targets, strategic choices matter. Once these 
choices about how to achieve these SDGs are made, they 
may be difficult or costly to reverse.
Table 6.1 identifies SDGs that fall under each category, 
with a brief rationale. The approach focuses on the specific 
definition of SDG goals and targets, and what this means for 
their ability to align or conflict with the mitigation objectives 
of the Paris Agreement. Goals are regarded as path-aligned, 
where both the overarching SDG and individual targets are 
expressly defined in a way that reinforces the mitigation 
objectives of the Paris Agreement.  Goals are also regarded 
as path-aligned if several associated targets are synergistic 
to mitigation objectives and others primarily neutral -- 
that is, collective progress on the goal does not impede 
simultaneous progress towards the mitigation objectives of 
the Paris Agreement. Goals are regarded as path-contingent, 
where either the goal or one or more targets are defined in a 
way capable of undermining the mitigation objectives of the 
Paris Agreement, depending on how it is pursued. 
6.3.1. SDG implications for agriculture, forestry 
and other land-use based greenhouse gas 
emissions
Agriculture, forestry and other land-uses account for around 
25 per cent of annual global greenhouse gas emissions (Smith 
et al., 2014). The goals and targets related to universal food 
security (SDG2) and sustainable management of terrestrial 
ecosystems (SDG15) are specific examples of areas where 
multiple interests in the land-use context converge. How 
these interests are integrated in development policies and 
practice will have implications for progress towards the 
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
Hunger and food security (SDG2): Path-contingency
Food security improved during the Millennium Development 
Goals, but close to 800 million people continue to suffer from 
hunger, and the global community fell short of the stated 
Millennium Development Goal ambition of halving the 
proportion of chronically undernourished people between 
1990 and 2015 (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015). 
While ending extreme hunger and achieving food security 
remain central concerns of the SDGs, SDG2 also represents 
an expansion in scope. The goal now targets the eradication 
of all forms of malnutrition, taking both undernourishment 
and nutritional quality into account. It also targets the 
improvement of agricultural productivity, especially for 
small-scale producers (target 2.3, UN, 2015), and provides 
strategic guidance on how to achieve this, assigning particular 
importance to sustainable food production systems and 
resilience of agriculture practices (target 2.4, UN, 2015). 
How societies decide to meet food security and nutrition 
targets will have direct implications for agriculture-related 
emissions, and indirect implications through agriculture’s 
impact on maintaining forests and sustaining terrestrial 
ecosystem functions (SDG15). While more quantitative 
understanding of SDG interactions is needed, early results 
from integrated assessments highlight that single sector 
policies may harbour considerable policy trade-offs, while 
a system’s perspective informing policy formulation can 
help anticipating and minimizing these (Obersteiner et 
al, 2016; see also von Stechow et al, 2016 on climate and 
energy related SDGs). For example, Obersteiner et al. (2016) 
show that for land-use decisions, the interactions between 
environmental and food security outcomes are more tightly 
associated with each other than population and economic 
growth scenarios.1  Furthermore, an emphasis on measures 
that reduces energy and other consumption demand, 
generally benefits overall development concerns by freeing 
up solution space for other SDGs, including on food security 
and infrastructure (Obersteiner et al., 2016; von Stechow et 
al., 2016). 
Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) project substantial 
increases in global food consumption accompanied with 
structural changes in diets, expecting that by 2050 around 
52 per cent (or 4.7 billion people) of the world population 
will live in countries with a national average of 3000 
kilocalories per person per day in comparison to 28 per cent 
(1.9 billion people) today. How malnourishment—related to 
both over- and under-consumption—is addressed through 
agricultural practices, land-use choices and distributional 
choices will have implications for aligning mitigation efforts 
with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The choice of 
policies and measures that integrate productivity demands 
with an advancement of sustainable agricultural practices 
will influence the level of emissions from land-use (Valin et 
al., 2013), as well as the pressure on biodiversity, natural 
ecosystems, and forests (SDG15). 
As Section 3.2 showed, almost all 1.5 and 2°C pathways 
currently available assume negative emission technologies 
during the second half of the century. This has consequences 
for available land-use options and, hence, the ability 
to achieve other SDGs that depend on the ecosystem 
goods and services provided by land.  Land-use based 
technologies, such as bioenergy carbon capture and storage, 
afforestation and reforestation, and biochar are among the 
most promising negative emission technologies. Depending 
on the type and scale of negative emission technologies 
deployed, there may be synergies or trade-offs with land 
demand for food security and environmental conservation 
targets. For example, soil carbon sequestration and biochar 
applications can be applied on existing agricultural lands, 
do not require specific land-use changes, and are also 
considered to have beneficial impacts on soil nutrients 
and land productivity, while having negligible impacts on 
water-use and albedo (Smith, 2016). By contrast, increased 
deployment of bioenergy carbon capture and storage, as 
well as afforestation and reforestation activities, may require 
land-use changes. Locally, their deployment may conflict 
with certain means to achieve food security targets, and vice 
versa (Hasegawa et al., 2015). 
1 The existing literature on the food-energy-water-environment nexus offers 
further insights on policies and practices aimed at managing interactions in 
the land-use space (Biggs et al., 2015; Howells et al., 2013; Ringler et al., 
2013).
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The supply-side mitigation options focusing on changes in 
technologies and practices in the land-use context, discussed 
above, may support or compete with food security. Demand-
side measures addressing consumption levels, by contrast, 
are expected to synergistically address both food security 
and climate change concerns, but require large-scale 
behavioural change if their potential is to be realized (Smith 
et al., 2013).
Hence, the consequences of pursuing SDG2 will be path-
contingent. The multiple objectives in the land-use context 
need to be carefully integrated, taking into account 
development needs, livelihood security and environmental 
sustainability. 
Sustainable management of terrestrial ecosystems 
(SDG15): Path-alignment
SDG15 on sustainable management of terrestrial ecosystems 
emphasizes reversing and halting trends in forest loss, land 
degradation and biodiversity (UN, 2015). The advancement 
of the specific targets of the goal are well aligned with 
enabling progress towards the mitigation objectives of the 
Paris Agreement.
Target 15.2 stipulates that by 2020 deforestation should 
be stopped, and accompanied by restoration of degraded 
forests and an increase in the global area under afforestation 
or reforestation. Target 15.2 is unusual in aiming for 
completion of the target a decade earlier than most SDGs. 
Its timely achievement will be critical for the SDG on climate 
change, in light of the important role that forests play as 
stores of terrestrial carbon (Smith et al., 2014; UNEP, 2015), 
and the importance of early action outlined in Chapters 2 
and 3 of this report. 
While well aligned with mitigation objectives, SDG15 also 
leaves some challenges to be resolved. The target implies zero 
deforestation on a global scale, but does not specify whether 
this is achieved by conservation of existing forest stocks, or 
by achieving zero “net” deforestation through offsetting 
afforestation and reforestation. The world community is 
called upon to realize a “substantial increase afforestation 
and reforestation globally” (see target 15.2, UN, 2015). 
However, it is not specified what a “substantial” increase 
means, and the extent to which there is a differentiation 
between primary and secondary forest is similarly unclear.
Target 15.5 is focused on reducing the degradation of natural 
habitats, halting the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, 
protecting and preventing the extinction of threatened 
species (UN, 2015). While there are regional differences, 
there is generally a strong association between natural forests 
and high levels of biodiversity and carbon stocks (Strassburg 
et al., 2010). This makes achievement of target 15.5 further 
the goal of avoiding emissions related to land-use conversion 
from forest stocks. However, SDG15 also illustrates that 
targets need to be considered collectively: while high-
biodiversity forest protection may help achieve SDG13, a 
focus on forest cover and afforestation for mitigation value, 
alone, may overlook important biodiversity considerations.
6.3.2 Implications of SDGs for energy-related 
emissions
Energy-related emissions are responsible for just over three-
quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2014a; 
also see Chapter 2). Energy is also critical for development. 
In addition to SDG7 on energy, a number of other goals have 
substantial energy and, therefore, climate change mitigation 
implications. In particular, these include SDG8 on growth 
and employment, SDG9 on infrastructure, industrialization, 
and innovation, SDG11 on sustainable cities, and SDG12 
on sustainable consumption and production. The following 
sections look at where energy-intensive SDGs are path-
aligned or path-contingent with climate change mitigation 
objectives.
Universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy (SDG7): Path-alignment
SDG7 comprises a universal access target, a renewable 
energy target and an energy efficiency target (see also 
Chapter 5). Given the importance of energy to climate 
change, SDG7 is closely interdependent with the mitigation 
objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
Target 7.1 aims to achieve universal access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy by 2030. One in six 
people lack access to modern electricity services, and two in 
five lack access to modern cooking services (IEA and World 
Bank, 2015). Although delivering basic access to energy for 
poor people—defined for electricity as 250 kilowatt hours 
annually for rural households, and 500 kilowatt hours 
annually for urban households—will result in an increase 
in energy consumption by people currently living below 
the poverty line, achieving the target will not have material 
implications for global emissions. Flat economies of scale 
for renewable energy (unit costs change relatively little for 
installations below a few megawatts) means that they are 
effective at delivering electricity services with small, off-grid 
or distributed installations appropriate to the rural areas 
where most of those lacking access today live. This flexibility, 
along with the rapid decline in costs, has made sustainable 
distributed energy open a tremendous opportunity to 
achieve universal access, even before 2030 (Power for All, 
2016). Aggressive strategies for universal electricity access 
are climate compatible, since they require much greater 
investment in the diffusion of flexible, easily distributed, and 
predominantly renewable energy technologies, like mini-
hydro, solar-pv, and solar-diesel hybrids (IEA, 2011; Szabó et 
al., 2011). The objective of universal access to safe, modern 
and reliable energy services by 2030 is, therefore, aligned 
with the promotion of low-carbon, renewable technologies, 
particularly decentralized ones (Hogarth and Granoff, 2015). 
Even if universal access to modern energy services was 
achieved using older carbon intensive technologies, the 
International Energy Agency estimates that it would result in 
a modest increase in global greenhouse gas emissions of 0.7 
per cent (IEA, 2011). 
Targeting universal access focuses on a benchmark of 
basic access to ensure that no one is left behind, much 
like benchmarking against extreme poverty or hunger 
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goals. This, of course, does not capture the broader energy 
demands associated with development across the full range 
of SDGs. Most projected growth in energy demand is driven 
by consumption from wealthier income groups, and for 
industrial and commercial uses in emerging economies. In 
1990, consumption in high-income countries accounted for 
63 per cent of the world’s total primary energy supply. By 
2014 this share had fallen to 48 per cent, while the share of 
upper middle-income countries had risen to 34 per cent (IEA 
and the World Bank, 2015). According to the International 
Energy Agency’s New Policies Scenario, by 2040, energy 
consumption in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) countries will be three per cent lower 
than it is today—all of the growth in demand is in non-OECD 
countries (IEA, 2015a; also see Section 3.4 and Chapter 5). 
However, per capita energy consumption in these countries 
will still be less than half the OECD average. The energy 
consumption of this cohort of middle-income countries, 
and the growing middle class and industries within them, 
will be very important for meeting climate targets. In this 
context, the transformation of the energy sector toward 
low-carbon and renewable supply will also be critical, as will 
improvements in energy efficiency that dampen demand 
growth for the same or better energy services.
Targets 7.2 and 7.3 aim at the material increase of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency, respectively. Both avenues to 
mitigation have been identified by the IPCC as critical for 
the energy sector (IPCC, 2014b). Therefore, achieving these 
goals is entirely aligned with, albeit not alone sufficient 
for, the transformation of the energy system necessary for 
achieving the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
Target 7.2 does not specify a measureable objective, 
but most countries have adopted the objective of the 
Sustainable Energy for All initiative, launched in 2011 and 
supported by most governments. It aims to double the 
proportion of renewables in the global energy mix, between 
2010 and 2030 (IEA and World Bank, 2015). Although 
generation capacity, globally, is still dominated by incumbent 
high-carbon technologies, the use of low-carbon energy is 
growing rapidly. Renewables accounted for about half of 
new power generation capacity in 2014 (Frankfurt School-
UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2016); over half (53.6 per cent) of the 
capacity installed in 2015 was in renewables (BNEF, 2016). 
In 2014, 85 per cent of the increase in power generated 
was from renewables (IEA, 2015a). Sustainable Energy for 
All estimates that between 2010 and 2012, the share of 
renewable energy in total final energy consumption globally 
increased from 17.8 per cent to 18.1 per cent. However, 
this rate of increase is well below what will be required 
to achieve the Sustainable Energy for All target, which is 
equivalent to a renewables share of 36 per cent (IEA and 
the World Bank, 2015). Only eight of the 20 largest energy-
consuming countries increased their renewables share 
between 2010 and 2012  (IEA and the World Bank, 2015). 
Comparing projections to 2030, the International Renewable 
Energy Agency concluded that, “even ambitious scenarios 
aimed to drastically mitigate emissions and climate change 
leave significant gaps if compared to the Sustainable Energy 
for All objectives” (IRENA, 2013).
The SDG energy efficiency target (7.2) implies a 2.6 per cent 
annual rate of reduction in energy intensity (IEA and World 
Bank, 2015). According to the International Energy Agency, 
energy intensity globally reduced by 2.3 per cent in 2014, 
which was more than double the average over the previous 
decade (IEA, 2015b). To drive higher rates of improvement 
in energy efficiency, the Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate recommend the convergence across countries of 
the current best energy efficiency standards for appliances, 
transport, buildings and industry (Bishop, 2015).
Growth and employment (SDG8) and infrastructure, 
industrialization and innovation (SDG9):  Path-
contingency
Energy, and concomitant climate impacts, is implicit but 
critical to two other SDGs: growth and employment (SDG8) 
and infrastructure, industrialization and innovation (SDG9). 
The implications of achieving the targets under these goals 
are largely conditional on the pathway by which those goals 
are achieved. At a global level, the link between economic 
output and greenhouse gas emissions has weakened (IEA, 
2015b), suggesting the potential for low-carbon economic 
growth (see Chapters 2 and 3). For developed countries, 
the rate at which they can decouple their economic output 
from emissions will be critical to meeting SDG8, together 
with SDG13. The energy intensity of economic growth must 
decline by four to 10 per cent per year between now and 
2050 (Loftus et al., 2015).  
For low- and middle-income economies, the industrialization 
and urbanization associated with economic transformation 
have generally been linked with increases in emissions, 
primarily via increases in energy consumption and intensity. 
Declines in emissions associated with industrialization and 
urbanization tend to be related to high-income countries (Li 
and Lin, 2015). The difference between these two effects 
has been attributed to the energy implications of durable 
infrastructure development and structural changes to less 
energy-intensive sectors (Li and Lin, 2015). This, in turn, leads 
to the path-contingent implications of infrastructure targets. 
Development of low-carbon infrastructure is regarded as 
critical to most mitigation scenarios, and yet infrastructure 
development is most closely associated with increased 
emissions, as countries have historically developed. 
The mitigation challenge for infrastructure is that it will need 
to meet both demand growth and the replacement of legacy 
high-carbon infrastructure stocks at an accelerated pace 
(Granoff et al., forthcoming). This challenge occurs in the 
context of a global infrastructure gap, with infrastructure 
falling short of optimal levels by 70 per cent (IMF, 2014). 
Most governments face political hurdles to allocating 
sufficient resources – by raising revenue or financing – to 
meet infrastructure needs, while poor countries face an 
inadequate tax base and little ability to raise debt.
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Evidence, however, suggests that future economic growth, 
underpinned by urbanization, industrialization and 
associated infrastructure development, is enhanced by low-
carbon pathways (New Climate Economy, 2014). Historic 
patterns have occurred in a context of vastly different 
technological options. Consider, for example, the limited 
availability of low-carbon technologies at the time of 
France’s rapid decarbonisation, compared to the wider range 
of available technologies today. Further, close analysis of 
the relationship between urbanization and industrialization 
show the potential for each to be associated with either 
increases or declines in energy intensity (Sadorsky, 2013).  
Further progress with respect to the energy goal (SDG7), by 
improving low-carbon energy supply and diminishing energy 
intensity through efficiency measures, would expand the 
“operating space” for progress on growth and employment 
(SDG8) and infrastructure, industrialization and innovation 
(SDG9) in a manner more compatible with achieving the 
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, 
though, the alignment of SDG8 and SDG9 with climate 
goals is contingent on the emissions intensity of energy 
consumption implicit within those goals.
Sustainable cities and consumption and produc tion 
(SDG11 and SDG12): Path-alignment
SDG11 addresses issues central to any long-term mitigation 
strategies, focusing on affordable housing, universal access 
to public transport, reducing the per capita environmental 
impact of cities, and providing access to safe, inclusive, and 
accessible green and public spaces. SDG12 on sustainable 
consumption and production is similarly path-aligned with 
the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement through a 
focus on improving the resource-use efficiency of production, 
reducing pollution and promoting more sustainable 
consumption patterns. Not only will achievement of these 
targets reduce emissions, but also further the scope for 
alignment between agricultural production, industrialization, 
and economic growth under SDGs 2, 8 and 9, respectively. 
The two goals are inextricably interlinked. SDGs 11 and 
12 aim to address demand-side emission reductions by 
transforming the way people live, and how they produce 
and consume. 
Cities and human settlements are critical to emissions 
reductions, as well as to adaptation and building resilience 
to climate impacts. Cities consume 60–70 per cent of the 
world’s energy supply, and account for 70–80 per cent of 
total global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions due to energy 
generation, transport, industry, and biomass use (Tsay and 
Herrmann, 2013). In 2014, the commitments made by 
228 global cities (representing 436 million people) were 
estimated to result in cumulative emissions reductions 
of 6.1 gigatonnes carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCO
2
e) 
by 2030 and 13 GtCO
2
e by 20502 (ARUP and C40 Cities, 
2014; see also Chapter 4). Harnessing these commitments 
will be crucial  to achieving the mitigation goals of the 
2 This corresponds to annual emission reductions of 0.402 GtCO
2
e/year in 2030 
and 0.43 GtCO
2
e/year in 2050 as reported in Chapter 4.
Paris Agreement (Articles 2 and 24, UNFCCC, 2015).
Transport in particular, much of it in urban areas, is a key 
sector for climate change mitigation. In 2010, the transport 
sector accounted for 27 per cent of final energy use, and 
emissions of 6.7 GtCO
2
 (IPCC, 2014). The World Energy 
Council warns that, without strong global action, car 
ownership worldwide is on track to more than double, to 
over two billion vehicles by 2050, with a correlated increase 
in the demand for diesel and fuel oil of up to 200 per cent 
(World Energy Council, 2011). According to the Paris Process 
of Mobility and Climate (2015) nearly three-quarters of 
countries prioritize the transport sector and 61 per cent 
include transport sector specific mitigation measures in 
their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
under the Paris Agreement.  
SDG11 comprises 10 targets, of which nine are well aligned 
with the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
Seven of them are drafted with express attention to 
sustainability and efficiency considerations, while two of 
the remaining address disasters and impacts on cultural and 
natural heritage sites.  Of the 10 targets, only one relating 
to ensuring universal access to housing and basic services 
has the potential for material climate implications without 
making specific reference to sustainability considerations. 
The challenge for achieving this and other targets relating 
to universal and inclusive access to housing, sustainable 
urbanization and safe green and public spaces in a manner 
that is path-aligned with SDG is to reconcile the short-term 
demand with longer-term sustainability requirements. 
Governments must adopt approaches that support the 
construction of homes and urban spaces using green 
building techniques in suitable locations that also provide 
a range of transportation choices to avoid undermining the 
achievement of other targets under SDG11. Implementation 
of the targets under SDG11 must be undertaken holistically 
to avoid perverse outcomes, such as building affordable 
homes in areas vulnerable to climate impacts like rising 
seas or extreme weather events, or in dispersed housing 
development lots. 
Transforming consumption and production patterns under 
SDG12 is also a core component of the goal under the Paris 
Agreement to reach net zero emissions in the second half 
of this century (Article 4, UNFCCC, 2015).  According to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
the energy used for the global production, harvesting, 
transporting and packaging of wasted food generates 
4.4 GtCO
2
e annually, or about eight per cent of total 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (FAO, 2016). This 
means that the contribution of food wastage emissions 
to global emissions is almost equivalent to that of global 
road transport (IPCC, 2014a), which emphasizes the central 
importance of both SDG11 and SDG12 to achieving the 
mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
The final target under SDG12 addresses the market 
distortions that prevent a shift to sustainable patterns of 
consumption and production, and calls for rationalizing 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies (target 12.c, UN, 2015). In 
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2015, around 13 per cent of global energy-related CO
2 
emissions were from subsidized fossil fuels (IEA, 2015b). The 
International Energy Agency estimates that this provides 
an average incentive to emit CO2 of US$115 per tonne of 
CO2. According to the IEA (2015b) efforts have been made 
in developing countries to reduce consumption subsidies, 
and in developed countries to reduce producer subsidies 
for investment in fossil fuel extraction. Fossil fuel subsidies 
remain a significant impediment to sustainable development 
and climate change mitigation.
6.4 Summing up
This chapter has outlined how selected SDGs and associated 
targets are aligned, while others potentially conflict with the 
climate change mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
For SDGs that are path-contingent, there is often general 
or even specific knowledge of the “dos” and “don’ts” of 
particular policies and practices that can help to minimize 
trade-offs and maximize synergies between different 
interests. Previous United Nations Environment (UNEP) 
Emissions Gap Reports have discussed such best practices 
for a number of key sectors and issues including agriculture, 
buildings, energy, forestry, and transport (UNEP 2012, 2013, 
2014 and 2015).  
The need for an integrated approach to the sustainable 
development and the realization of the SDGs is nowhere 
more relevant than in the context of climate change. The 
potential to meet the long-term temperature objective of 
the Paris Agreement rests within the framework that the 
SDGs provide. Equally, the potential to achieve the SDGs rests 
with our ability to address the climate change mitigation 
challenge. 
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